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ABSTRACT
Many in this world only achieve excellence when they are pushed into a position 
where nothing but excellence will do.  If federal government agencies were left to 
their own devices, the historic preservation results would be rote and and perfunctory 
at best.  The project at St. Elizabeths Hospital National Historic Landmark is an 
excellent and very recent example.  Without the participation of preservation-focused 
consulting parties, the National Historic Preservation Act and National Environmental 
Policy Act wouldn't be worth the paper they were written on.  
However, the current Congressional budget crisis threatens both these acts, and more.  
Preservation is seen more and more by legislators and administrators in the federal 
service as inconvenient and unnecessary, and funding in support of it is not seen as 
central to the mission of any federal agency.  It is now possible for any federal agency 
to use the St . Elizabeths template, created by the GSA out of necessity, to secure 
approval for any project, anytime, anywhere.  This may lead to a significant shift in 
consultation, minimization and mitigation efforts at federal preservation projects in the 
future.
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DEDICATION
As President Kennedy said, we don't things because they're easy, we do them because 
they are hard.  Trying to do the right thing for our cultural resources is not always cut 
and dried; there are not always black and white comparisons of right and wrong, and 
there are seldom propositions that find universal acclaim in this difficult economic 
climate, in these turbulent world times.
I've heard it said that all the easy preservation projects have been done, and what 
remains are the difficult battles: the hand-to-hand combat in the trenches where at 
times the professionals doing the work might be in a fight with their own employers.  I 
can't say that I've done that kind of work in my professional life, however, I can say 
that I've read the documentation, had long conversations with those involved in some 
extremely significant projects, seen the joy in their faces as they visit “their” site or 
describe the final outcome as one of the highlights in their career.  I've also heard the 
disappointment in their voices when the law of unintended consequences comes into 
play, and the results more resemble something Dr. Frankenstein created.
There are cultural resources being destroyed today that nobody will ever know about 
because it's expedient to get them out of the way of progress, and we are all the poorer  
for it.  The undertaking that I will be discussing in this thesis could have been 
consigned to the dustbin of history, but was dragged back through the efforts of a few 
preservation professionals who said “We can do better than this.”   This work is 
dedicated to them, and those who taught them preservation right from wrong.
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PREFACE
The undertaking at St Elizabeths1 National Historic Landmark is, in a word, massive.  
The project file collection I saw in early 2013 stretched for fifteen lineal feet of shelf 
space.  The public document file contains hundreds and hundreds of individual 
documents, some are one page, others are literally hundreds of pages long.  The total 
amount of office space being created across the whole campus in multiple buildings is 
greater than that seen at the Pentagon. 
Any attempt for me to cover this project in a few hundred pages is, unfortunately,  
going to be cursory.   I did not have access to proprietary GSA documents (or those of 
any other agency) on the project during the writing of this paper.  I could have 
processed a Freedom Of Information request for internal files, but such a request 
would have had a small value: those hundreds and hundreds of online documents were 
more than enough to keep me busy at this stage.  Nevertheless, my small work pales in 
comparison to the full depth of the story, which probably will never be told. 
Some information is based on interviews with persons who are not referenced in this 
document.   I have protected my sources in this regard, and have made a clean breast 
of this aspect of my work to my thesis advisor.   Those who desire further detail may 
make a request in writing, however, some data is not available for further release.
1 The strange lack of an apostrophe in the property's name, “St. Elizabeths” was mandated by 
Congressional decree in 1916 (following a usage assigned during colonial times for that land grant), 
and so is actually the official and the proper usage.  When abbreviating the name, the term “St. Es” 
is used.  This fact has annoyed proofreaders for nearly a century, and shall continue to do so into the 
future.
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INTRODUCTION
In this thesis the discussion focuses on the redevelopment project at the St. Elizabeths 
National Historic Landmark (St. Es) in Washington D.C., with comparisons to the 
Winder Complex demolition case and the African Burial Ground (ABG) National 
Monument site in Manhattan.  These three projects are tied together because they all 
involve the General Services Administration (GSA) and the National Historic 
Preservation Act (NHPA), and are formative in the way federal projects approach the 
preservation of their cultural resources.
Of these three undertakings, The Winder Complex was the first, occurring in 1975, 
and involves intentional demolition by a federal government agency in a show of total 
disregard of the NHPA.  The African Burial Ground (ABG) discovery took place in 
1991, and involves the desecration of a burial ground, and the short-lived coverup and 
disrespect of the survivor community in order to remain on schedule for a federal 
office building project.  The undertaking at the Saint Elizabeths Hospital National 
Historic Landmark in Washington DC began in 2004, and involves significant design 
and usage negotiations, with numerous agencies and interested parties, under 
extremely contentious circumstances.  The St. Elizabeths undertaking is a landmark in 
how compliance with the National Historic Preservation Act and other relevant acts 
was achieved, but  its consultation phase exposed a number of rough edges along the 
way.  
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Throughout the entire process, the St. Es project was under the political magnifying 
glass that defines large-scale projects in the nation's capital.  It is entirely possible that 
the intentions of the intricately-crafted forty-plus page programmatic agreement 
signed in December 2008 may never be fully realized because of Congressional 
budgetary constraints.  Years of hard work at the negotiation table may have become 
nothing but another bargaining chip to be tossed away in the current federal fiduciary 
wrangling.
At the Winder Complex, it became clear arbitrary use of power can destroy multiple 
landmarks in a single day.  At the ABG we saw the failure of design after the fact of  
discovery.  However, the shock value that caused these sites to be catapulted into the 
public eye has faded enough so that we as a culture (and as a government) may have 
forgotten some of the lessons that were learned.  Both of these two earlier projects had 
a significant impact on the creation of policies that eventually guided the twenty-first-
century St. Elizabeths  project.  
This work involved research using the project files posted online for use of the public, 
and interviews with participants and observers to the process at a variety of federal  
projects.  The most memorable interview comment heard during this research was 
“The law keeps us engaged, it keeps us compliant...  but the law is also a 
loophole, because as long as you counted every penny, dotted every I and 
crossed every T, we could get done what we needed to get done.  So does 
that raise a question about the strength of the law, or it's value?”2 
The ramifications of this statement echo loudly.  Now that the GSA has successfully 
passed the proverbial camel through the eye of the needle at a National Historic 
2 Interview comments, Joan Brierton, GSA, PCAB, 09JAN2013.
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Landmark, that formula could streamline approval for other projects in the future.  
Because of  federal budget cuts, going beyond 'mere' compliance on federal 
preservation projects may become a dead concept.   
To accomplish the coverage of this subject, we will begin in chapter one with a 
discussion of minimization and design for federal projects involving historic 
resources.  A brief overview of the Secretary of Interior's standards for historic 
preservation undertakings follows, and we hint at other important projects which may 
have parallels to the subject at hand.   
Moving on to regulatory issues, in chapter two is a discussion of the National Historic 
Preservation Act, the National Environmental Policy Act,  and several applicable 
Executive Orders which are necessary for a discussion of these and other projects.   
In chapter three is a brief discussion of two federal undertakings that have run afoul of 
those requirements in the past fifty years, at the Winder Complex in the 1970's and the 
African Burial Ground National Monument in the 1990's. 
We introduce the primary object of this thesis, St. Elizabeths Hospital National 
Historic Landmark, in chapter four.  Background and historical information is covered 
and site significance is discussed in this section.
In chapter five, the history and operation of the General Services Administration is 
covered, including an overview of the Public Buildings Service and the Center for 
3
Historic Buildings.  Also covered is the history and operation of the Department of 
Homeland Security as the prospective tenant for the St. Elizabeths site.  The reasons 
behind the proposal to place the DHS headquarters on the St. Es west campus are 
outlined and placed in context with an overview of their existing facilities within the 
in the District of Columbia.
The start of consultation for the proposed project at St. Es is covered in chapter six, 
with details on the early proposals for the site.  The online public document center, a 
pioneering use of technology for public involvement, is outlined.  The consultation 
process and the pedigree of parties involved in that procedure is covered.  
Chapter seven looks at the first critical months of st. Es project planning, with a few 
mis-steps and misunderstandings as public phase begins.  Questions are asked as to 
how much consideration historic preservation was given during the planning of the 
project (before the site's transfer from the Department of Health and Human Services), 
and how problems at this stage might have led to difficulties that dogged the project 
for several years.  We discuss politics, bias in the consultation process, negotiation 
procedures and transparency.  The GSA  finds itself in a difficult position as both the 
DHS and the US Coast Guard, as tenants, express reservations about the site, the 
process, and the GSA's tactics.  At the same time, preservation consulting parties and 
other government agencies push back against the proposal for several reasons.
A critical point in the process is discussed in chapter eight, the production of NEPA-
required a Draft Environmental Impact Statement and an Advisory Council for 
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Historic Preservation requested Section 213 report, both of which cite adverse long-
term impacts to the cultural resources at St. Es.  Unfortunately, their impact is 
mitigated by a failure  to meet a critical deadline, and this case then begins to raise 
questions regarding the  effectiveness and ability of federal caretaker agencies to 
function under tight budget constraints, and just how much “Administration Priorities” 
can impact project outcomes.
In chapter nine we cover the St. Es project from December 2007 through January 
2009, from the “pause and reflect” period, through the creation of the GSA 'A' team 
and the final concessions, negotiations, and agreement documents that pressed the 
project to a final Programmatic Agreement on December 9, 2008.
Chapter ten discusses mediation, negotiation, and the weapons the consulting parties 
wielded to keep the process an check as much as could have been done.  In 
comparison, the power of the GSA's PBS and its ability to act as an experienced 
ringleader in a process that is focused on compliance is discussed, and its ability to 
avoid lawsuits and to divert interference to its plans is discussed.  As an example of 
the law of unintended consequences, however, short-sightedness and poor planning 
may have both masked another site that would have been more suitable fit, and 
doomed the St. Es project to a possible death by funding shortfall.
In the concluding chapter, we ask how we can do better, and if these or other resources 
can still be properly protected  in this time of budgetary constraints. 
5
Extensive documentation in the Appendices provides ready access to critical 
documents from the lifespan of this and other cited projects.  Care was taken to 
include items that may, in years to come, become unavailable due to the vagaries of 
internet and government access regulations.  It is hoped that a careful reading of these 
documents will edify the researcher and add to the value of this document as an object 
of public record.  It should be noted that this is the first masters thesis or doctoral 
dissertation written on this particular project, and after its publication the availability 
of information may undergo a change for the better, or the worse.
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CHAPTER ONE
Minimization and Design:  Two Sides of the Same Coin
Terms such as  preservation, minimization, and mitigation are used throughout the 
federal service when discussing how cultural resources are dealt with, irregardless of 
whether their status is declared or not.   
The Secretary of Interior's Standards for Historic Preservation undertakings3 places 
treatment options into the following priority:
1).  Preservation.  
2).  Minimization.  
3).  Mitigation.  
Preservation calls for the retention of an object's original historic fabric during 
conservation, maintenance and repair.  Preservation does not necessarily mean 
removal of newer features.   Instead, its general intention is to show an object's history, 
through the alterations that have been made over time.  
Minimization is a direction consciously taken during the design phase of a project, to 
reduce the possible impact on historic resources to an absolute bare minimum.  
Mitigation takes place as a consequence of admitting that there will be unavoidable 
adverse impacts on a historic resource, and an effort is being made to reduce or offset 
3  http://www.nps.gov/hps/tps/standguide/  Last accessed 12Mar2013.
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those effects by the use of methods that will assist in the preservation of other portions 
of the undertaking.
From the outset of this study is important to understand the finer line that defines the 
difference between minimization by design and mitigation.  This may seem like 
splitting hairs, however, when considering work that involves the federal government 
in any way,  the difference is vitally important.
In the federal service when people talk about project design involving a historic site, 
they use the term 'minimization.'  The intent of involving preservation professionals 
during the design phase of a project is to ensure that a historic cultural site maintains 
its integrity throughout the process, and that all team members on that project 
understand the importance of the historic resources involved.  Each agency, and 
department within that agency, has its own focus.  The General Services 
Administration (GSA), for example, has a plethora of people whose focus is 
commercial real estate, leasing, and development, while it has another group whose 
focus is on the tasks of architects, and still another that concentrates on the oversight 
of its historic cultural resources.  Fulfilling this last role at the GSA , The Center for 
Historic Buildings must work as the gatekeeper and the standard–bearer for the 
preservation of historic buildings and also those which may become recognized as 
historic in time, within the GSA's portfolio.
On the other hand, 'mitigation' methods can run the gamut from the documentation of 
a historic site before it is demolished, the creation of educational materials or websites 
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to spread information on the historic resource, providing interpretive signage and 
place-saving monuments, to the use of building interventions that are reversible or that 
shield the changes to historic fabric from everyday view.  One of the problems to be 
considered when discussing mitigation is the permanence of those mitigation methods. 
If grant–funded interpretive panels wear out due to weathering and are removed 
because there is no further funding for their replacement, has this mitigation method 
failed as a way of interpreting or “preserving” history?  Will the layering of mitigation 
methods, by the use of documentation, publication, or the preservation of fabric in a 
location other than its original (such is in a museum, archive, or on the world-wide 
web) ever work as a permanent record of the past?  Is mitigation merely acquiescence, 
ultimately an admission of failure by society to protect its historic fabric?
The design of projects involving historic sites involves more than pencils, vellum, and 
drafting tables.4  Negotiations continually take place throughout the life of such an 
undertaking, from concept through consultation and implementation, both within an 
organization and externally with clients and consulting parties.  During nascent 
concept and design phases, those within the project need to be reminded of the legally 
binding import of historic preservation regulations on government agencies, and to do 
so requires both high levels of interpersonal skill and negotiating prowess.  There are 
several obvious examples where projects have careened off on a path that diverges 
from the intent of the National Historic Preservation Act,5 and require a skilled hand to 
bring it back on track.  The ability to communicate the importance of cultural 
4 This is an extremely dated reference, to be sure.
5 The Winder Building is discussed in chapter three
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resources to other professionals, whose daily tasks do not involve what they might see 
as 'esoteric concerns' like historic preservation, is vital to adhering to our duties under 
the NHPA and the survival of the historic fabric of our society.  
By having preservation professionals become involved at the very start of any project, 
whether it there is thought to be any impact on historic resources at all, or not, we can  
avoid problems, protect resources, and speed the planning and consulting phases of 
undertakings.  Expending hundreds or thousands of man-hours before considering the 
Section 106 impacts of new designs can be seen, time and again, to be an example of 
poor economy.  However, it continues to happen, even on federal projects, because the 
value of preservation is minimized by the apparent appeal of progress.
Minimization increases the cost of the design phase of a project because it requires 
additional manpower and research, but it reduces the execution cost of a project when 
compared with one that could have been held up due to regulatory, legal, procedural or 
public relations issues.  However, minimization by design does not work well on a 
scheduled timetable because the negotiations and fact-finding involved in making it 
work is difficult to force into a restricted frame of time.  This becomes especially 
apparent when the undertaking in question involves several agencies on the local, state 
and federal levels,  public and private consulting parties, and the need to attain any 
kind of consensus, understanding or agreement to move forward to a final outcome 
(even if that outcome is that the parties involved are unable to come to an agreement).  
When cost is seen from more than a purely financial standpoint, including capital that 
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involves political or public value, minimization by design has a value beyond dollars-
and-cents that mitigation upon discovery cannot match.  
Minimization by design and mitigation both need significant monitoring during the 
design and execution of a project.  When budgetary concerns arose about a new 
strategy to reduce the impact of construction at the St. Elizabeths NHL came up, the 
statement was made that “Programmatic Agreement stipulations are a commitment 
and cannot be discarded simply due to budget concerns.  The Agency must, by law, 
make all attempts to offset and mitigate.”6 
Another aspect of minimization by design and mitigation is documenting the 
agreement on paper, and that is done through Programmatic Agreements (PA's) and 
Memoranda of Agreement (MOA).  A site may have one or several of each, depending 
on the complexity of the undertaking.  For example, a single PA was signed for the St. 
Elizabeths NHL, followed by several MOA's covering different parts of the project.  
For St. Es, the USCG MOA covers the United States Coast Guard Building, Garage, 
Cemetery, and the specific site work associated with these parts of the undertaking.  
Additional MOAs for St. Es include: the security perimeter (excluding the cemetery); 
Shepherd parkway; adaptive reuse of existing historic structures; the public access 
program (includes gate houses, entrances and Firth Sterling).  
The discussion of preservation, mitigation and minimization can become very 
complex because of their interrelatedness, and important projects will usually have 
6 14 April 2009 St. Elizabeths Consulting Party meeting notes.
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portions that fall under differing standards.  However, by having an understanding of 
the principles behind the definitions and the regulations behind them, we can more 
easily separate them into different categories for proper treatment.  Dealing with the 
net that makes up preservation policy is something that federal agencies excel at, and 
this precedent setting work helps define the standards to which cultural resource 
protection is held in the United States.  
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CHAPTER TWO
Review and Compliance: The National Historic Preservation Act, 
National Environmental Protection Act, and Executive Orders
In order to understand the relationship regarding historic preservation law that exists 
between  federal legislation,  federal government agencies,  various other state and 
local government players, and interested consulting parties, in this chapter  an 
overview is provided of the most relevant regulations and definitions.  This also 
provides an opportunity to explore the activities involved in budgeting for agency 
operation and project funding as they are impacted by legislation such as the federal 
anti-deficiency act.
The National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA)
The NHPA guides federal decisions on the disposition of historic property, and the 
consultation process necessary when the government considers new uses or the 
disposal of a historic property from federal ownership.  It also has implications for 
properties that receive funding, licensing or other sanction from the federal 
government.  The Advisory Council on Historic Preservation is the agency authorized, 
under the NHPA, to develop implementing regulations and oversee agency compliance 
with the act.  NHPA sections 106, 110, and 111 govern the decision-making process 
when it comes to federal property.  
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Section 106 regulates the review process for federally funded undertakings, which 
include, but are not limited to, acquisition, leasing, disposal, or alteration of historic 
property.  The use of the term historic property in this instance covers a wide range of 
assets, and may include buildings, structures, land, archaeological sites, ships, aircraft, 
and other cultural resources of historic significance.  This is the most commonly 
quoted and applied part of the NHPA.
Section 110 makes federal agencies responsible for the protection of government 
owned historic properties, and the preferential integration of historic properties into 
federal government usage before other options are considered.
The heads of all federal agencies shall assume responsibility for the 
preservation of historic properties which are owned or controlled by 
such agency.  Prior to acquiring, constructing, or leasing buildings for 
purposes of carrying out agency responsibilities, each federal agency 
shall  use,  to  the  maximum  extent  feasible,  historic  properties 
available to the agency.7
Section 110  establishes the position of Federal Preservation Officer (FPO), who is to 
oversee their agency's fulfillment of historic preservation requirements.
Section 111 of the NHPA requires the implementation of alternatives for surplus 
historic buildings when practicable, as opposed to other actions such as demolition.  
These alternatives may include adaptive re-use, leasing, or its exchange for a 
comparable historic property that might better suit the government's needs.
7  National Historic Preservation Act, Section 110 (a) (1).
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The decision to retain or dispose of historic federal property fall under sections 110 
and 111, which are not as detailed a set of governing regulations as the ones that 
require review and comment for federal undertakings under section 106.  This allows 
for somewhat greater flexibility and judgment from the parties involved in regards to 
the required consultations of those two sections,  but it is a significant responsibility 
nonetheless.  Once a property has been evaluated and other federal needs for usage 
have been considered under sections 110 and 111, consideration under section 106 
then occurs.
Assessing Compliance Under NHPA Preservation Regulations and Directives
When assessing federal property for exterior modification, additions, disposal, 
demolition, or other significant actions, in order to follow the federal historic 
preservation compliance regulations of the National Historic Preservation Act 
(NHPA), five steps must be first accomplished by a federal government property 
holder:
Step 1.  Section 110 of NHPA requires the federal agency to request the State Historic 
Preservation Officer (SHPO) for a determination of eligibility for the property to be 
included in the National Register of Historic Places.  The federal agency must provide 
research about the significance of the property, historic, architectural or technological, 
for the SHPO to make this determination.  This usually will require contracting with 
an architectural historian or preservation professional to accomplish the research.  In 
the case where more than one federal agency is involved, the agency who acts as 
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property owner is the lead agency, however,  this does not necessarily make it “all 
powerful,” able to make determinations or take actions over the protests of other 
federal stakeholders.
Step 2.  Section 106 of NHPA requires the federal agency to "make a determination of 
effect" (no effect, no adverse effect, adverse effect with mitigation) of the proposed 
federal project undertaking at the property in question.  If the SHPO has already 
determined that the property meets the criteria for inclusion in the National Register of 
Historic Places, this could require the use of already existing information on file about 
a property, or contracting for the services of an architectural historian or a preservation 
professional.
Step 3.  Section 106 then requires the concurrence of the SHPO be sought for 
corroboration of the federal agency's determination of effect.  In the case of the GSA, 
this discussion is initiated by the Regional Historic Preservation Officer (RHPO), who 
works in the Agency's geographic area in question, and this action requires numerous 
meetings and negotiations.8  The GSA Federal Preservation Officer (FPO) does not get 
involved in most of these discussions, but will be copied on any decisions or questions 
brought up during the course of action that are spearheaded by the RHPO.  The 
recognition of a determination of  adverse effect, with or without mitigation, requires 
8 For administrative purposes, the GSA has broken up the nation intro a number of regions, and all of 
these deal with their own properties of projects on a day-to-day basis, with oversight and guidance 
from the GSA Central Office in Washington DC.  Region 1, for example, comprises the six New 
England States, while Region 11, more commonly referred to as the National Capital Region (NCR), 
covers all of the District of Columbia plus portions of northern Virginia and Maryland.  Region 4 
includes all of the states in the Southeastern US east of the Mississippi River.  Further details and an 
interactive map for the entire country may be found at http://www.gsa.gov/portal/category/22227  
Last accessed 18Mar2013.
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the development of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the federal agency, 
the SHPO, and consulting parties to the action (eg.  The National Capital Planning 
Commission (NCPC),9  the National Trust for Historic Preservation (NTHP),10 any 
citizen's associations that might exist with a specific interest in that property, etc.),  
prior to moving forward.
Step 4.  If there is disagreement between the federal agency and the SHPO on the
“determination of effect" (such as when the federal agency claims there is no adverse 
effect and the SHPO claims there is one), the Advisory Council on Historic 
Preservation (ACHP) can be requested, by any interested party, to participate in 
mediation and in a determination of the effect.
Step 5.  Mediation then takes place to: (1) reach a Memorandum of Agreement, or (2) 
to the point where the federal agency determines that it wishes to terminate mediation 
and request that the ACHP declare that compliance requirements have been met, 
enabling the federal agency to move ahead with their project undertaking.
For example, based on the time frame for the recent demolition of two properties in 
the DC Navy Yard Annex historic district, the time to accomplish the consultation on a 
particular federal undertaking might be two or three months each for steps one through 
9 The NCPC is a U.S.  government agency that provides planning guidance for Washington, D.C.  and 
the surrounding National Capital Region.  Its 12-members meet monthly to adopt, approve, or 
provide advice on plans and projects that impact the nation's capital and surrounding areas.  See 
http://www.ncpc.gov/ncpc/Main%28T2%29/About_Us%28tr2%29/AboutUs.html Last accessed 
18Mar2013.
10 The NTHP is a member-supported organization that was founded in 1949 by congressional charter 
to support preservation of historic buildings and neighborhoods through a range of programs and 
activities.  More details on the NTHP follow throughout this thesis.  
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four, and six months for step five, for a total of fifteen months.  Hence, even the 
simplest project requires a significant investment in time when a federal agency 
complies with Sections 106 and 110.  This also means that any project most probably 
has to survive two or more budgeting and finance cycles.11 
Of the possible steps, termination of consultation is the most controversial, and is to be 
avoided if at all possible.  Calling an end to mediation between parties prematurely 
and making determination by fiat, such as was done by the GSA with the Winder 
Building demolition in 1975, is what gets agencies in trouble, and increases the 
possibility of legal action in the courts.  Understanding the intent of legislation is not 
enough, one must be able to understand the interests of all the involved parties to an 
action.  A decision to end consultations impacts other agencies who are tied up in the 
process (in a sort of 'guilt by association') because they were involved at some point in 
the consultation process, and does not further a cooperative or trusting relationship for 
undertaking future joint work.  
11 A prospect that appears to be a riskier proposition with each passing year.
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The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) established the U.S.  national 
policy that promotes the enhancement of the environment.  The Act ensures that 
environmental factors are taken under consideration by federal agencies when 
undertaking of any action, and projects must meet NEPA guidelines when an agency 
provides financing for the action in question.  The Act set up procedural requirements 
for all federal agencies in regards to environmental assessments (EA's) and 
environmental impact statements (EIS's), and also established the President's Council 
on Environmental Quality (CEQ).  The procedural requirements found in NEPA apply 
to the agencies of the federal executive branch, but specifically not the President, 
Congress, or the Courts.  The breadth of NEPA's impact has expanded considerably 
through interpretation by the courts in the four decades since its enactment.
The term “environment” in this context refers to the human environment, and 
undertakings that impact historic properties therefore fall under the NEPA umbrella.  
This is a fact which is often overlooked or misunderstood by the public.  NEPA can 
therefore be a valuable tool whose intricacies it is important to understand.
 
An Agency may use the NEPA process and the documents that it produces to comply 
with Section 106 in lieu of the procedures set forth in NHPA Secs.  800.3 through 
800.6, a method which is specifically allowed by NHPA Section 800.8 (c).   To do so, 
the Agency has to follow these steps: 
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 Notify the SHPO/THPO and the ACHP that the NEPA process will be used for 
the undertaking (no concurrence from those so notified is required).
 The consulting parties must be identified and invited to participate in the NEPA 
process (so as to comply with Section 800.3(f)).
 Historic properties and effects of the undertaking within the area of potential 
impact must be identified so as to comply with Sections 800.4 and 800.5, and 
“the scope and timing of these steps may be phased to reflect the Agency 
Official's consideration of project alternatives in the NEPA process, and the 
effort is commensurate with the assessment of other environmental factors.” 
(as in Sec.  800.8(c)(1)(ii))
 Consultation must take place with the SHPO/THPO,  the consulting parties,  
and the public during NEPA scoping, analysis and documentation.
 Alternatives and minimization/mitigation methods must be developed in 
concert with the consulting parties, and those methods and consultations must 
be described in the Environmental Assessment (EA) or Draft Environmental 
Impact Statement (DEIS).
 
It should be understood that the majority of everyday cases involving historic 
properties do not utilize the NEPA process, but highly complex projects undertaken by 
the federal government benefit from its use.  At the GSA, it has become the preferred 
methodology, and is part of agency policy.  
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Unfortunately, some of the side-effects of the NEPA process is its complexity, and the 
lack of familiarity that some consulting parties have with it.  This unfamiliarity has 
been known to cause misunderstandings.12  In addition, because NEPA requires 
consideration of all feasible alternatives and the recording of that investigative 
process, it delays the focus of decision-making on a specific area, building, or artifact 
when the consultative process is begun under NHPA Section 106.13 
Executive Orders
Executive orders are issued by the President of the United States, and the authority for 
their use is found through interpretation of the US Constitution's executive power 
grant found in Article II, Section 1, Clause 1, and also in Article II, Section 3, Clause 5 
which requires the president to enforce the laws of the land.  The first Executive 
Orders can be traced back to declarations made by George Washington in 1789, and 
they are intended to clarify or further act on a law put forth by the Congress or the 
Constitution, not to make new law.14  Executive Orders generally are not concerned 
with buildings; they regard policy or are issued as directives to agencies of the Federal 
government on how to pursue particular issues.  Although they are often challenged, 
out of thousands of Executive Orders issued, only two have ever been overturned as 
unlawful.  That being said, Congress can elect not to fund an action prescribed by an 
Executive Order, nullifying its effectiveness.
12 We will see examples of this at the St.  Elizabeths NHL undertaking in chapters to follow.
13 In St. Es project NEPA investigation, over a dozen alternatives were investigated and discarded over 
a period of just under four years while other aspects of the project planning progressed.  Details are 
provided in the chapters that follow.
14 Executive Orders in Times of War and National Emergency: Report of the Special Committee on 
National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, United States Senate.  93rd Cong., 2nd 
sess.  (1974).  USGPO.  p. 23.  
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Executive Order 11593, “Protection and Enhancement of the Cultural 
Environment” 
Signed May 6, 1971 by President Richard Nixon,  Executive Order No.  11593 
provides the mandate to survey and nominate historic properties owned by the Federal 
government.  More specifically, this executive order directs federal agencies to 
inventory their cultural resources and establish policies and procedures to ensure the 
protection, restoration, and maintenance of federally owned sites, structures, and 
objects of historical, architectural, or archaeological significance.  Federal agencies are 
required to locate, inventory, and nominate all properties under their jurisdiction or 
control that appear to qualify for listing in the National Register.  This also requires 
agencies to record any listed property that may be substantially altered or demolished 
as a result of Federal action or assistance and to take necessary measures to provide 
for maintenance of and future planning for historic properties.15 16
Executive Order 12072, “Federal Space Management”
Signed by President Jimmy Carter August 16, 1978, Executive Order No.  12072  calls 
for effective and cooperative space management for federal agencies, and the 
consideration (not the requirement) of using historic properties for space needs.  It 
states that serious consideration must be given to the impact of site selection when 
15 This information from http://www.achp.gov/book/sectionVI.html  Last accessed 08Feb2013
16 Despite this directive in 1971,  four decades later there are thousands of properties as yet to be 
investigated and have their eligibility determined, in some part because of agency resistance,  and in 
other cases because of manpower and budgetary constraints.  Some properties that were just built 
when Executive Order 11593 was enacted will soon be eligible and listed, showing that this task 
may never be complete.
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seeking space in an urban setting, and to what that selection will have on improving 
the social, economic, environmental, and cultural conditions of the local community.  
It sets out that procedures for planning, acquisition, utilization, and management of 
Federal space needs in urban areas are to include considering “Utilization of buildings 
of historic, architectural, or cultural significance” and it specifically directs the 
Administrator of the GSA “In ascertaining the social, economic, environmental and 
other impacts which site selection would have on a community, the Administrator 
shall, when appropriate, obtain the advice of interested agencies.”17 
Executive Order 13006, “Locating Federal Facilities on Historic Properties in 
Our Nation's Central Cities”
Signed by President William J.  Clinton May 21, 1996,  Executive Order No.  13006 
calls upon Federal agencies to give not just consideration, but first consideration, to 
utilizing historic properties in historic districts when locating Federal facilities, 
whenever economically prudent and operationally appropriate.  If no such historic 
property is suitable, agencies must then next consider use of other non-federal 
properties in historic districts, and then historic properties outside of historic districts.  
It also states that any construction or rehabilitation undertaken by Federal agencies 
must be architecturally compatible with the surrounding historic properties.  This 
Executive Order also directs Federal agencies to reform regulations and procedures 
that impede location of Federal facilities in historic properties or districts, and to seek 
the ACHP's assistance in this effort.  It calls upon Federal agencies to seek 
17 40 U.S.C.  United States Code, 2011 Edition, Title 40 - Public Buildings, Property, And Works, 
Subtitle I - Federal Property And Administrative Services, Chapter 1 - 1-General, Subchapter Iii - 
Administrative And General,Sec.  121 – Administrative.  USGPO.
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partnerships with States, local governments, Native American tribes, and private 
organizations to enhance the Nation's preservation program.18 
Executive Order 13287, “Preserve America” 
Signed by President George W.  Bush March 6, 2003, Executive Order 13287 
establishes policy that provides for federal leadership in the preservation of  America’s 
heritage.  It does this by advancing the protection, enhancement, and use of historic 
properties owned by the Federal government.  The order encourages agencies to seek 
partnerships with other branches of government and the private sector to make more 
efficient and informed use of historic properties.  The order requires Federal agencies 
to review and report on their policies and procedures for compliance with NHPA, 
Section 110 and 111, to improve Federal stewardship of historic properties, and to 
promote their long-term preservation and use to contribute to the economy of 
communities of which they are a part.  This Executive Order requires the head of each 
agency to designate a Senior Policy Official, and directs the Secretary of Commerce to 
use existing authorities and resources to assist developing local and regional heritage 
tourism programs, thereby stimulating the local economy.
Executive Order 13327, "Federal Real Property Asset Management"
Signed February 6, 2004 by President George W.  Bush, Executive Order 13327 
establishes the Federal Real Property Council (FRPC), in order to develop guidance 
for each agency’s asset management plan.  The Senior Real Property Officer (RPO) of 
18 This information from http://www.achp.gov/book/sectionVI.html  Last accessed 08Feb2013.
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each agency is required to develop and implement an asset management planning 
process that meets the form, content, and other requirements established by the FRPC.  
In relation to cultural resources, the Senior RPO incorporates the planning and 
management requirements for historic properties under E.O.  13287 (“Preserve 
America”).  It defines “Federal Real Property” as any  property owned, leased, or 
managed by the Federal Government, both inside and outside the United States.19
The Federal Antideficiency Act
This act prohibits federal employees from making any expenditures or obligations in 
excess of congressional budget appropriations unless specifically authorized to do so 
by law.20  In essence it prevents overrunning the budget for any agency or project, and 
can cause the cessation of any undertaking if funding is cut off by Congress.  This act 
could lead to an agency choosing not to pursue regulatory enforcement if funding is 
short, or to put off mediation efforts indefinitely until additional funding is provided.  
The Federal Antideficiency Act can therefore be used as a tool, or an excuse, for not 
moving forward with efforts or regulations otherwise required by law.  The only way 
to overcome this act is through legal action brought by non-federal parties against the 
agency in question, and this action would only effective then if a court judgment leads 
to an allocation by Congress.
19 Information from http://www.fs.fed.us/eng/toolbox/his/his03.htm Last accessed 08Feb2013.
20 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A).  More information may be found at  
http://www.gao.gov/legal/lawresources/antideficiencybackground.html  Last accessed 21Apr2013
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Legislation such as NHPA, NEPA and Executive Orders, when combined with 
operational and legal precedents, work together to protect the cultural resources in the 
United States.  This connective web was built to protect of our tangible heritage, and 
each layered addition helps close gaps in the net.  However, as we will see in chapter 
three, these protections are only as good as the will to enforce them, the availability of 
funding, and the presence of vocal advocates to lobby for their use.  By cutting 
funding in the past, Congress has stymied the implementation of Executive Orders and 
legislation, and the Federal Antideficiency Act serves to make any failure to enforce 
such regulations and Orders implicitly legal.
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CHAPTER THREE
Background: 
The Winder Complex and 
The African Burial Ground National Monument 
To discuss how the GSA has grown into a government agency that is so influential in 
preservation, we must discuss two pivotal cases of the past, the Winder Complex and 
The African Burial Ground National Monument.  These were not the most shining 
moments in agency history,  but we often learn as much or more from our mistakes as 
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Illustration 1:  Winder Building, 17th and F St NW, Washington DC, taken between 
1860 and 1880.  Photographer: Matthew Brady Studio. Source:  Library of Congress, 
Image ID# loc.pnp/cph.3c35530     Last accessed 13Apr2013.
we do from our successes.  Avoiding the pitfalls of the past is easier if we understand 
how they were encountered before. 
The Winder Complex
The Winder Complex demolition in Washington DC by the GSA in 1975 was an early 
and extremely blatant attempt by a Federal Agency to ignore the NHPA.  The GSA  
was brought to court by a citizens group, Don't Tear It Down,21 to halt demolition of 
the NRHP listed building and three potentially eligible buildings adjacent to it.22   
The main structure, the Winder Building, was built in the early 1850's and designed by 
Robert Mills, who also designed the Washington Monument and numerous other 
buildings in Washington DC, Philadelphia, Richmond, Baltimore, Atlanta and his 
native Charleston, South Carolina.  The Winder Building housed the War Department 
during the Civil War, and was the site of several pivotal federal government meetings 
following the death of President Abraham Lincoln.  It is located at the corner of 17th 
and F streets NW in Washington DC., in one of the more prominent locations in the 
Capital, directly across the street from the Old Executive Office Building, a few 
hundred yards from the White House, two blocks from the Mall, one block from the 
GSA's central office building at 18th and F Streets NW, and two blocks from the 
Department of the of Interior's central office building.23 
21 Don't Tear It Down is now known as The DC Preservation League.
22 For further information see Appendix A.
23 This last location is where the National Park Service and the Keeper of the National Register have 
their offices.
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The GSA had notified the ACHP that it intended to build a new office building, and in 
so doing so demolish the Winder complex of buildings.  The Council pointed out that 
NHPA due diligence needed to be done,  the required reports would take time to 
create, and the three additional buildings in the complex might also be potentially 
eligible for the NRHP.  GSA was advised that it needed to comply before it could 
attempt to move forward with any plans.   
The GSA failed to respond to the Council's letter advising it of these points, and so the 
ACHP made a request directly to the Secretary of the Interior to determine the NRHP 
eligibility of the additional structures on site.  The Secretary found the buildings to be 
potentially eligible within only days, and notified both the GSA and the Council of 
that determination.  
A week after that communication, the GSA finally did respond.  It informed the 
Council that it had decided to demolish the buildings anyway, but strangely enough, it 
also stated that it was willing to participate in the Council's consultation process.   
After a single consultation meeting in February 1975, the GSA began an unannounced 
demolition of the structures on the first Sunday in March, clearing one building 
completely, leaving nothing but the facade on a second, and removing part of the roof 
on a third.24  The citizens group Don't Tear It Down obtained a restraining order on 
24 All this work on a Sunday must have set a record for demolition speed in DC, especially since use of 
explosives was probably out of the question on short notice in the center of the Capital.
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Monday to prevent further demolition.  The GSA immediately moved to have the 
order overturned, and the court refused.  
Now, it must be pointed out that the ACHP Board of Directors, by definition, includes 
several Federal agency heads, one of which is the GSA  Administrator.  At the time the 
Administrator was Arthur F. Sampson, a second-term appointee of the Nixon 
administration (and by then serving under Gerald Ford).  At the April ACHP meeting 
(moved up from May due to the urgency of the issue at hand),  Mr. Simpson said the 
GSA had gone ahead with demolition because agreement was unlikely, any more 
consultation was futile, and so the GSA therefore didn't have to comply with Section 
106 or the Council's regulations.  
It should be noted that this action also could have been in violation of Executive Order 
11593, in force since 1971, to inventory, nominate and record NRHP eligible 
properties before they were substantially altered or demolished. 
After the lawsuit was filed, the court subpoenaed audio recordings of the ACHP's 
April board meeting, which the GSA subsequently (but unsuccessfully) sought to 
suppress.  This what was found by the court when it listened to the recordings 
(emphasis added):
The staff, according to Sampson, was intransigent, inflexible and had "the 
power to control and/or influence the Council." Further consultation, thought 
Sampson,  would  be  futile.  The  legal  requirements  were  thus  not  deemed 
necessary and  demolition  began.  The  "simple"  explanation,  then,  reduced 
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itself to a statement that Sampson believed that the Council (of which he was 
a member) was under the misguided tutelage of its own staff and the staff 
would never agree with Sampson's  views.  Therefore,  further consultation 
was in vain and would not be carried on despite the legal mandates. 25 
 The court found that the actions of GSA prior to the Council meeting were in 
contravention of the policies expressed in NHPA and of the Council's regulations.  The 
GSA  moved to a stance of compliance, issued an apology, and the court then declared 
any additional action on its part would be moot.  Mr. Arthur F. Sampson's three year 
period at the helm of the GSA ended several weeks later., however, we will never 
know if his retirement had any direct connection to the GSA's handling of the Winder 
Complex. 26
25 Ibid, Appendix A.
26 http://www.nytimes.com/1988/03/15/obituaries/arthur-f-sampson-is-dead-at-61-led-gsa-under-  
nixon-and-ford.html  Last accessed 12Apr2013.
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The African Burial Ground National Monument
Illustration 2:  African Burial Ground and the Commons Historic District.  Source: 
http://geographer-at-large.blogspot.com/2011/01/african-burial-grounds-update-
and.html    Last accessed 01Mar2013.
The African Burial Ground National Monument (ABG) began its design phase in the 
late 1980s as the Ted Weiss Federal Building,  290 Broadway in lower Manhattan.  
Because of sloppy research, a lax archaeological site investigation and a cursory nod 
toward  regulations in Sections 106 and 110 during the preliminary master planning 
phases, it was destined to become a watershed moment for the protection of resources 
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of cultural significance.27   Along the way, it exposed a little-known aspect of life in 
colonial and federal-era America:  the existence of a thriving slave culture in the 
northern portion of the colonies that became the United States.  The site's excavation 
and study has been referred to as "the most important historic urban archeological 
project in the United States."28
The handling of the ABG discovery also highlighted a change that was occurring in 
the way professionals inside and outside the federal service understood and interacted 
with historic communities during site investigations, moving from a policy of avoiding 
contact with the local community and making determinations solely based on 
scientific observations, to one of engagement, interaction and contact.29  
The Federal Government, as represented by Region 2 of the GSA, acquired land in 
lower Manhattan to construct a new Federal building and an associated pavilion.  
When excavation began, nothing archaeologically significant was expected by the 
project team as there had been a considerable amount of construction in lower 
Manhattan in the 350 years since it was first settled by Europeans.  In addition, the 
area had been filled with up to thirty feet of soil more than a century before, raising 
the ground level significantly.  The CRM firm hired to do the research and archeology 
expected  anything significant left on that site to have been long dispersed or be 
minimal in scale. 
27 Dr.  Sherene Baugher interview, 15Nov2012.
28 National Parks Service African Burial Ground website: http://www.nps.gov/afbg/index.htm  Last 
accessed 14Apr2013.
29 Dr. Sherene Baugher interview, 15Nov2012.
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Dr. Sherene Bauer was the archaeologist of the city of New York until just before the 
time when ground was broken at the site of the new federal building in downtown 
Manhattan.30  During her time there, she was aware of sites near the future federal 
office building where remains had been found, and other locations in that 
neighborhood where undisturbed areas below 19th century basements had yielded 
valuable cultural artifacts from colonial and pre-European contact periods.31
Three cultural resource firms bid on the archaeological investigation contract that was 
to take place on a compressed time-line, just ahead of major construction activities on 
the site.  The highest bidder was chosen for the archaeological investigation, although 
unfortunately it was the lowest bidder who had the greatest qualifications in the 
investigation of African burial grounds grounds in the northeastern and Atlantic region 
of United States.  The new federal building was to be a skyscraper on a site that had 
never been excavated to any significant depth, to place a large-scale structure with 
deep footings and a  multi-level basement on it.  Before excavation began, the 
NYSHPO representative, a non-archaeologist, was assigned as the one to be notified 
in the event of any discoveries.
When the archaeological investigation commenced on the site, it was done with a 
mind toward keeping to the project time line.  There was little transparency to the 
process, and it all took place behind construction hoarding that obscured the view of 
the site from the street.   However, archaeologist Daniel Pagano from the NYC 
30 This was in 1990.  Dr. Baugher began working at Cornell in 1991, and currently holds the position 
of Professor in the graduate fields of Landscape Architecture and Archeology.
31  Dr. Sherene Baugher interview, 15Nov2012
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Landmarks Preservation Commission with a camera was able to document inadequate 
archaeological procedures being used on the site.   Human remains appeared to have 
been found in significant quantity, standard procedures for excavating those remains 
were not being followed, legal municipal notifications to the city coroner were not 
being made, and what documentation there was did not appear to be of a high 
standard.32  
The CRM firm that was hired for the archaeological investigation was one that did not 
believe in involving the local cultural community in its processes.  This meant that the 
local African-American community had no prior knowledge or input into the choice of 
this site or its excavation.  When the story leaked out about what was happening 
behind the construction hoarding at the new federal building downtown, the backlash 
was severe.
Local activists, African-American community members, and professionals in 
archeology, CRM, and historic preservation were uniformly outraged.  The GSA 
Region 2 Administrator claimed an inability to stop the project or change its scope 
without direction from above.  Coincidentally, New York City was operating under its 
first African-American mayor, and had its first African-American Congressperson in 
Washington.  Although the GSA claimed it had performed to the letter of the section 
106 requirements of the NHPA, the community felt that it had not acted in the spirit of 
that act.  Congress stepped in as the furor rose, and held hearings on the project.
32 Harrington, Spencer PM. "Bones and Bureaucrats: New York's Great Cemetery Imbrogolio." 
Archaeology Magazine. March/April, 1993
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One of the watershed moments for the project occurred when the head of the GSA was 
told by Congress that all funding for GSA projects was going to be frozen until a 
proper plan was created to deal with the discoveries at the African Burial Ground.  
This forced the suspension of all work on the site, and led to the hiring of  cultural 
resource firm John Milner and Associates, who had an extensive background in the 
investigation of African burial grounds from the colonial period of America.
During the excavations, over 400 graves were discovered, and there appeared to be 
many, many more yet to find.   At a certain point, local African-American community 
members and Congressional representatives called for the new federal office building 
construction to be stopped completely on the site of the African burial ground.  It was 
decided  to redesign the building for a smaller footprint, and not to utilize new land 
beyond its existing spaces.  Design work to create a new memorial and a Museum on 
the site of the African Burial Ground began.   
The National Park Service estimates that there are 15,000 graves from the 17th and 
18th centuries located on the whole burial ground site, in a space not limited by the 
borders of the property today.  The location was quickly made a National Historic 
Landmark, and in 2006 was declared a National Monument.  Although that outdoor 
memorial took several years to create, eventually the re-interment of remains took 
place.  The museum promised for the site finally opened in 2010, nearly two decades 
after the initial discoveries were made.  
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At the ABG, at least 11 federal, state and local government departments and agencies 
eventually became involved.  Many of these entities had signed onto the project during 
the site's consultation phase as a federal office building, and had made their 
determinations based on information provided to them by the GSA's hired contractors 
and consultants.  When this information proved incomplete or incorrect, it affected  
relations at several levels.
Like the Winder Complex case, the ABG happened well after Executive Order 
111593, but it still preceded the various preservation-oriented Executive Orders of the 
mid-1990's and early twenty-first century.  As soon as “discovery” took place, the 
ABG project became concerned not only with mitigation of impacts to the site's 
cultural resources, but also mitigation of damage to the reputation of the Federal 
government and the GSA in particular.  
Even after the whole federal office building project was revamped, redesigned, and a 
new memorial, interpretation center and museum were constructed, a great deal of 
anger remained in the African-American community over the way the discovery was 
handled.  In the end, it took nearly twenty years to complete discussions on the 
completion of the ABG project (including a memorial, an interpretation center and 
museum), and it was by no means a pleasant series of public consultations.33  The way 
the early hours and days of the discovery unfolded set the stage for the next two 
decades, and continues to be recalled a colossal public relations disaster today.34  It is 
33 Joan Brierton, GSA.  Interview 15Jan2013.
34 Joan Brierton, GSA.  Interview 15Jan2013.
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possible that, without the embarrassment of the ABG,35 the GSA could or would not 
have put extensive resources into the preservation of historic buildings and sites in the 
two decades that followed.  
Illustration 3:  African Burial Ground National Monument.  Source: 
http://maap.columbia.edu/mbl_place/10.html  Last accessed 01Mar2013. 
As was mentioned before, this project became a watershed moment for the 
archaeological and CRM community, and as far as having a nationwide impact on 
federal sites, it was every bit as important as the Penn Central determination more than 
a decade before.  This case brought to the fore a sensitivity for descendent  
communities who were impacted by projects.  CRM professionals who had 
intentionally avoided contact with descendent communities (so as not to color their 
35  Not to mention the 1970 Winder Building demolition.
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'purely scientific observations')  saw this become a research and interpretational sea-
change.  It also placed the entirety of the US government on notice that it would be 
held the same standards as the rest of the country when it came to dealing with cultural 
resources.  Throughout the project planning, discoveries, and execution, the National 
Park Service was dedicated to protecting this site, but it is important to know that the 
GSA only reevaluated its position when it was were forced by public attention and 
Congressional involvement.
Because of the African Burial Ground Project,  governmental agencies became aware 
that they would be held accountable for dealing with all types of cultural resources.  
This project made them more keen on proper project design, and proper evaluation in 
advance of making commitments.  The GSA implemented extensive efforts to mitigate 
physical (and public relations) damage to this site after the fact.  This was indicative of 
a major shift within the Public Building Service at the GSA, making them much more 
attuned to protection of historic resources.  
African Burial Ground National Historic Landmark time line36:
 1987  -  The  General  Services  Administration  (GSA)  began 
planning to provide greater office space for Federal agencies 
and to provide additional courtrooms and support space for the 
adjacent  U.S.   courthouse  located in  the Civic  Center-Foley 
Square  area  of  lower  Manhattan.   The  site  proposed  was 
between Broadway, Duane, Elk and Reade streets.
 1989  -  Before  construction  could  begin,  compliance  with  a 
number of laws was required.  Most important was Section 106 
of the National Historic Preservation Act  of 1966.  It  states 
that,  before  receiving  funding  for  construction,  federal 
36 This timeline may be found online at the military burial ground resource website site 'Fold Three'   
http://www.fold3.com/page/285838421_the_african_burial_ground/  Last Accessed 15May2012.
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agencies must determine if the proposed site merits inclusion 
on the National  Register  of Historic  Places.   GSA was also 
required  to  consult  with  the  Advisory  Council  on  Historic 
Preservation  and  a  Memorandum of  Agreement  was  signed 
between the two parties in 1989.
 1991  -  The  Memorandum of  Agreement  was  amended  and 
signed by GSA, the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation 
and the New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission.  
 June  1991  -  Human  remains  were  discovered  during 
archaeological testing, but by October full-scale excavation for 
the  construction  of  the  Foley  Square  Federal  Office  Tower 
Building had begun.  
 1992 - the Mayor of New York formed the Mayor’s Task Force 
on the African Burial  Ground.  Members of this Task Force 
later formed the basis of the Federal Steering Committee.  
 Early July 1992 - at least 390 burials had been removed.  In 
response to a letter from Mayor Dinkins, GSA stated that they 
intended to excavate an additional 200 burials on a portion of 
the site that was to become a four story pavilion beside the 
office building.  
 In mid-July 1992, Congressman Augustus Savage,  Chairman 
of the House of Representatives’ Subcommittee on Buildings 
and Grounds, informed GSA that no further projects would be 
funded  until  he  had  personally  met  with  the  GSA 
Administrator to review issues concerning this project.  
 In late-July 1992 and immediately thereafter,  meetings  were 
held with GSA, members of congress and city agencies.  It was 
agreed  that  a  Federal  advisory  committee  of  primarily 
descendant  African  community  leaders  and  professionals  be 
established to make recommendations to GSA with regard to 
its Section 106 responsibilities at the site.  
  October 1992- The Federal Steering Committee was chartered 
to  represent  the  interests  of  the  community  and  to  make 
recommendations regarding the Burial Ground.  Its mandates 
included:  (1)  the  review  of  proposals  regarding  the  human 
remains on the Pavilion site, (2) the analysis, curation and re-
internment  of  remains  removed  from  the  African  Burial 
Ground  and  (3)  the  construction  of  a  memorial  or  other 
improvements  on  the  Pavilion  site.    Shortly  afterwards, 
President Bush ordered GSA to abandon construction on the 
Pavilion  site,  and  approved  the  appropriation  of  up  to  $3 
million for modification of the Pavilion site and "appropriate" 
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memorialization of the African Burial Ground.37
These two case studies, spaced fifteen years apart, were significant in the development 
of policy at the GSA, and guided the way the St. Es undertaking was approached.  Just 
as seen with the commercial sector, the government can have difficulty with balancing 
the value of preservation against more easily quantifiable short-term profits.  The 
regional nature of GSA operations means that enforcement of GSA policies and the 
utilization of the available corporate long-term memory is not always consistently 
applied across the portfolio of buildings it owns and manages.  Although each GSA 
region has a Regional Historic Preservation Officer (RHPO) to oversee compliance 
with relevant regulations, the duties that employee are assigned can divide their 
allegiances (as detailed in chapter five), and cause difficulties in the process.  This to-
and-fro is a constant tension within the GSA, and the outcome often depends on the 
personalities involved in the decision-making process.  However, it must not be 
forgotten that in the case of the ABG and the Winder building, it was the involvement 
of the public, outside the halls of government, that forced a change in the direction of 
these projects by the use of public relations, publicity, media coverage, and pressure 
on local, state, and federal officials.
37 http://www.archaeology.org/online/features/afrburial/   Last accessed 11Nov2012.
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CHAPTER FOUR
St. Elizabeths Hospital National Historic Landmark
 
Illustration 4:  Topographical map of the District of Columbia / surveyed in the years 
1856-9 by A. Boschke; engraved by D. McClelland, Published 1861.  St. Elizabeths 
Hospital is marked by a black dot added in the lower right corner.  Source:  DC 
Preservation League
The historic background behind the St. Elizabeths Hospital National Historic 
Landmark can be traced back to the founding of Washington DC, but the period we are 
most concerned about begins after 1850.  In this section we will discuss the locality, 
the construction of the hospital, the medical advances made there and a few of its 
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famous patients.  Finally we will cover some of the similarities and differences 
between St. Es as a historic site versus the Winder complex and the ABG.  
Where Is St. Elizabeths?
The St. Elizabeths National Historic Landmark is part of the St. Elizabeths Hospital 
Historic District, in the Anacostia Hills of Southeastern Washington DC.38  High on a 
rise overlooking the Mall, Bolling Air Force Base, and Ronald Reagan National 
Airport, the area was known as the St. Elizabeths district in the first few decades in the 
history of the District of Columbia.  The initial subdivision of the area in 1854, when 
it was founded by John Van Hook and then known as Uniontown,39 carried restrictive 
covenants prohibiting the sale, rental or lease of property to anyone of African or Irish 
descent.  However, by 1877,  African-American abolitionist, writer and orator 
Frederick Douglass moved to Anacostia, was appointed as a United States Marshal, 
and in 1881 he was appointed Recorder of Deeds for the District of Columbia (so in 
time the issue of restrictive covenants in Anacostia had definitely been laid to rest).40   
The area was important in shipping, and during the Civil War the height of land in 
Anacostia was advantageous for observation points and forts.  
Today, this is generally considered to be an under-served portion of the District, 
having a greater number of its residents living in poverty than in all of Washington.  
38 An exceptional map of this area, with fadeable transparent overlays showing both satellite imagery 
and maps dating back to the late 19th century, can be found at 
http://rumsey.geogarage.com/maps/gcw0678500a.html  Last accessed 28Mar2013.
39 Note that the naming of Uniontown in 1854 was seven years before the outbreak of the Civil War.
40 Douglass lived in Anacostia until his death in 1895 (the home is now a NPS National Historic Site 
and listed in the NRHP).  My visit to the Anacostia neighborhood to see Frederick Douglass' Home 
on a 106 degree Sunday in July 2012 was one of the most memorable of my time in Washington.
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Census data shows that the racial makeup of the neighborhood changed from what was 
in the 1950s and 1960s reported as 87% White to today's 92% African-American, 5% 
Non-Hispanic White, and 3% Other.41   Because of high crime rates, the Anacostia area 
has also become infamous within the District in the last several decades.
 
Illustration 5:  St. Elizabeths West Campus, showing a small sampling of the support 
buildings of various sizes, styles and usages.  Source:  Author photo
An Overview of St. Elizabeths Hospital History
St Elizabeths Hospital National Historic Landmark has been recognized for its social 
and architectural importance to the history of the United States, its connection with 
significant individuals, and advancements in the treatment of mental health.  Listed on 
the National Register in 1979 and as a National Historic Landmark in 1990, it remains 
one of only 2500 sites to have been so recognized.  In addition, on May 26, 2005 the 
St. Elizabeths Historic District was approved by the District of Columbia Historic 
Preservation Review Board (DCHPRB).  Since December 2004 the General Services 
41 2010 US Census data.
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Administration (GSA) has overseen the care and management of the Western portion 
of the District, and the District of Columbia Mental Health Services controls the 
Eastern section.
Saint Elizabeths Hospital is reported to be the most historically significant hospital for 
the treatment of the mentally ill in the United States.  Originally named the 
Government Asylum for the Insane, it was established in 1852 east of the Anacostia 
River on the land patent known as Saint Elizabeths.  The institution quickly became a 
model for national, state and local institutions of this type across the nation.  The name 
was changed during the American Civil War, dropping the terms “asylum” and 
“insane” when it also began to be used as a hospital for wounded and sick soldiers.  
There are two cemeteries on the property containing the remains of members of the 
military services, including a strictly Civil War-era National Cemetery overlooking the 
Anacostia River, and another on the East campus containing both deceased patients 
and service members.
The hospital was initially established by Congress to serve the residents of the District 
of Columbia and mentally ill members of the armed forces.  It was done largely at the 
urging of educator and reformer Dorothea Dix,  former Civil War Superintendent of 
Army Nurses, who struggled for the improvement of the treatment of prisoners and the 
mentally ill.  Dix believed the mentally ill could be cured, or at least their condition 
improved, if their living conditions were similarly improved.  Before St. Es, the insane 
had often been confined "in cages, closets, cellars, stalls, pens; chained, naked, beaten 
with rods and lashed into obedience."  Since it was widely believed that the insane did 
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not feel cold, they were not given clothes or blankets, and asylums often charged 
visitors admission to stare, according to Dix's biography.42
Among Dix's allies was Dr.  Thomas Kirkbride, the medical superintendent of the 
Pennsylvania Hospital for the Insane, and part of a group that presaged the foundation 
of the American Psychiatric Association.  Kirkbride was a Quaker, and developed the 
idea of a “linear plan” for mental hospital wards, with private rooms along corridors 
that provided plenty of light and air.  This concept also allowed for the easy 
observation of patients while still giving them what we would now call their own 
'personal space.'   He published the text On the Construction, Organization and 
General Arrangement of Hospitals for the Insane in 1854, at the same time as the 
Center Building of Saint Elizabeths Hospital was being built.
The four-story castellated Gothic Center Building was designed by Saint Elizabeths 
superintendent Charles Nichols with the assistance of Thomas Walter,  the Architect of 
the Capitol.  Nichols was familiar with Kirkbride’s ideas and, with modifications, 
incorporated them in his design, providing an arrangement that included offset 
symmetrical transverse wings.  The Center Building opened for patients in 1855, and 
Kirkbride was so taken by how the plan developed that he published a copy of it in the 
second edition of his book.
42 Dorethea Dix, as quoted in Gollaher, David:  Voice for the Mad: The Life of Dorothea Dix.  Free 
Press:  New York,  1995.
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As the patient population increased, so did the size of the hospital physical plant, with 
the Center Building receiving seven new residential and support wings over the next 
few years.  Mental health theory progressed as well; in part because of the success of 
the Kirkbride plan, the salutary effects of light, air, landscape and activity worked to 
good effect.  Another environmental factor was that many patients were placed in 
smaller, more cottage-like buildings which were independent of the main structures.  
The West campus now is a complex of brick buildings, each one different from all the 
others on the site.  
Most of the campus, however, was left open for trees, grass, and gardens.  The site 
planning was done, in part, by Frederick Law Olmstead's firm in Boston,  influenced 
by the Romantic movement with curvilinear paths and roads lined with trees and 
plantings.  Patients tended these landscapes and raised food as part of their therapy on 
another tract on the east side of Asylum Road (now Martin Luther King Jr.  Avenue).  
This newer section, purchased in 1869, is now referred to at St. Elizabeths East 
campus.  It served as a working farm for nearly a century.
Saint Elizabeths West campus includes many support buildings, including a central 
kitchen, a boiler house that served the entire facility, an ice plant, a bakery, a dairy, a 
firehouse, multiple greenhouses, gatehouses, and animal and hay barns.  Between 
1890 and 1900 the structures began to be more formally sited along roadways and a 
central quadrangle.  These newer buildings were more Beaux-Arts influenced in 
contrast to the previously built Victorian structures, and were designed by the Boston 
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architectural firm Shepley, Rutan and Coolidge.43   In 1902, the building campaign 
moved across the road to the East campus, with residential, treatment, laboratory, and 
support buildings slowly replacing the operating farm.
As mentioned previously, Saint Elizabeths was a leader in the “moral treatment” of the 
mentally ill.  The hospital was also the first in the United States to provide this 
particular type of asylum treatment for African Americans, to both those serving in 
military service and those in civilian life.  This was done by providing 'separate but 
equal' facilities.   By the 1880's St. Es was also on the cutting edge of brain physiology 
and pathology, and it was one of the the first  American institutions to practice 
psychoanalysis.  It performed its own autopsies on site, and eventually hosted a brain 
collection numbering in the thousands.   The hospital pioneered the use of 
hydrotherapy to calm patients, and was also pivotal in the development of malarial 
therapy.44
St Elizabeths' most famous former inmates include Ezra Pound (poet and Fascist 
sympathizer who was arrested by Allied forces upon invasion of Italy),  John Hinkley 
Jr.  (who attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan), Richard Lawrence 
(who attempted the first presidential assassination in US History, misfiring twice at 
Andrew Jackson in 1835), and Charles Guiteau (assassin of President James Garfield 
in 1881).  
43 Shepley, Rutan and Coolidge was the successor firm to Henry Hobson Richardson's architectural 
practice.  Each principal worked in Richardson's firm at the time of his death  in 1886, and they 
completed all of the unfinished projects left behind by him.  The firm continues today as Shepley 
Bulfinch.
44 National Register nomination #79003101, St. Elizabeths National Historic Landmark listing.  US 
National Park Service.  
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St. Elizabeths Hospital, at its peak in the mid-1940's, had over 7,000 patients.  Today 
the West campus is vacant, and the East campus houses a patient population of less 
than 500 in a new building opened in 2010, which is operated by the District of 
Columbia Mental Health Services (DCHMS).  The bulk of that East campus had been 
transferred to the District of Columbia in 1987, and although DCMHS was nominally 
overseeing the east and west properties for several years, the Federal Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) officially had possession of the property until 
December 2004.45 
The St. Elizabeths Hospital National Historic Landmark is a site significant in 
American history, however, unlike the African Burial Ground, it doesn't have a viable,  
vocal survivor community to advocate for it.  This point makes protection of the site 
difficult in ways that ABG or the Winder complex did not.  In closing, Rob Nieweg of 
the National Trust for Historic Preservation stated this problem succinctly: 
In  Manhattan,  your  survivor  community  were  the  actual  or  spiritual 
descendants of the African American slave community.  Who is your survivor 
community at St. Es?  The descendants of insane people?46
45  An exceptional video report on the history of St. Es by National Public Radio (NPR)  may be found 
at http://www.npr.org/blogs/pictureshow/2010/05/03/126475263/stliz  Last accessed 01Mar2013.
46 Rob Nieweg & Elizabeth Merritt interview, 21Feb2013.
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CHAPTER FIVE
The U.S. General Services Agency 
and the Department of Homeland Security: 
The Landlord and the Tenant
 
Illustration 6:  Illustration : GSA Central Office,  1800  F Street 
NW, Washington DC.  Source:  GSA
In this chapter the history and operation of the General Services Administration is 
covered, including an overview of the Public Buildings Service and the Center for 
Historic Buildings.  We will also look at the creation and operation of the Department 
of Homeland Security as the prospective tenant for the St. Elizabeths site.  The reasons 
behind the proposal to place the DHS headquarters on the St. Es west campus are 
outlined and placed in context with an overview of their existing facilities within the 
in the District of Columbia.
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The General Services Administration (GSA)
The GSA is an independent agency of the federal government, created in 1949 at the 
behest of President Harry S. Truman to assist in the supply, management, and support 
functions of federal agencies.  General Jess Larson, Administrator of the War Assets 
Administration, was named the GSA's founding Administrator, and his first job was a 
complete renovation of the White House from the exterior walls inward (finished in 
1952).  Today the GSA has a staff of 12,000 with an annual operating budget is about 
$26 billion.  The Agency oversees $66 billion in procurement per year while managing 
$500 billion worth of federal property and a 210,000 vehicle motor pool.  It includes 
the Federal Acquisition Service (FAS), the Public Buildings Service (PBS), the Office 
of Government-wide Policy (OGP), Office of Small Business Utilization (OSB), the 
Office of Civil Rights (OCR), and the Office of Citizen Services and Communications 
(OCSC).
The Public Building Service (PBS) within the GSA has the stated mission “To provide 
superior workplaces for federal customer agencies at good economies to the 
American taxpayer.”47  The PBS acts as the landlord for the federal government.  It 
provides space through acquisition, new construction and the leasing of private 
property, while it also acts as caretaker for federal properties across the country.  PBS 
owns or leases 9,624 properties,  which includes roughly 370 million square feet of 
workspace for 1.1 million federal employees at a variety of agencies.48  It is quite 
47 http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/104444  Last accessed 26Jan2013.
48 http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/104444    Last accessed 26Jan2013.
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literally the largest commercial property management firm in the world, and when 
PBS makes a decision it has an impact across the entire public and private commercial 
real estate marketplace.  PBS is funded primarily through the Federal Buildings Fund, 
which is supported by the rent from federal customer agencies.
In the GSA's real estate inventory are many buildings that are significant because of 
their role in American history, architecture, or culture.  One third of the over 1,500 
buildings in the GSA's portfolio are over 50 years old; more than 400 of these are 
eligible for or listed on the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP).49  They 
include large monumental courthouses, custom houses, federal buildings, and smaller 
historic buildings (such as railroad stations, city libraries, hotels, sanitariums or banks) 
that were acquired for use by federal agencies.  The GSA's design, construction, 
acquisition, and disposal activities impact not only these buildings, but the social and 
economic life of the communities surrounding them.  
The GSA Center For Historic Buildings
GSA’s Center for Historic Buildings (CHB) is part of the Office of the Chief Architect, 
a department within the PBS.  CHB helps maintain compliance with both the spirit and 
substance of the NHPA, NEPA, many Executive Orders and a plethora of additional 
regulations.  Because of the GSA's overall size and status, its budget, the large stable 
of historic properties involved, and its well-qualified staff, the preservation activities 
and policies of the CHB are extremely influential.  The CHB spearheads the 
49 http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/104444    Last accessed 26Jan2013.
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development of historic preservation strategies that are used to evaluate the viability, 
reuse, and integrity of historic buildings the GSA owns, leases, or might consider 
acquiring.  It takes the lead on the production of National Register nominations of 
GSA-owned properties, the creation of Historic Building Preservation Plans (BPP's) 
and, when a building is transferred out of federal service (sold), it insures that the 
historic character of the structure (e.g.: any artwork that might be part of the building 
such as murals or sculpture) is protected through the use of restrictive covenants 
included in the sale agreements.  It performs preservation services on contract for 
other federal agencies who are unable perform these tasks themselves.  
The philosophy behind the GSA's stewardship of historic properties can be found in a 
1999 publication “Held in Public Trust:  GSA Strategy for Using Historic Buildings,” 
which was produced by the CHB.  A follow-up called “Extending the Legacy” was 
released in 2004 and 2008,  and it includes updates,  trends, and coverage of new 
resources.50   Another CHB publication, “The Historic Property Disposal Guide,” was 
released in 2008, and is an  invaluable document covering policy, procedure, and 
practice on all aspects of Historic Building ownership, not just disposal, and includes a 
CD-ROM disk with forty-eight reference documents.  The CHB has produced several 
books which are pivotal in understanding government actions surrounding historic 
properties, however, there has been much less publishing activity since 2008 as the 
GSA concentrates on making individual releases online.
50 http://www.gsa.gov/graphics/pbs/pbs_preservation.pdf  Last accessed 26Jan2013.
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In an interview, William J. Guerin, Assistant Commissioner at the GSA PBS Office of 
Construction Programs, boiled the philosophy behind the Agency's preservation policy 
down to one word: “Pride.”51
One of the areas of difficulty at the GSA lies in the makeup of its preservation 
governance structure.  The FPO in the Central Office in Washington D.C. directly 
oversees the CHB as its manager.  However, the RHPO's in the various regions are not 
part of CHB, and are managed by and answerable to their respective Regional 
Commissioners.  Some RHPOs have multiple titles and their work lies on both sides 
of the divide between preservation and profit.  Contact between the FPO and RHPO's 
is open and productive, but the power to hire, fire, evaluate and reward RHPO's lies 
within the regions (who understandably have a focus on being a functional and 
profitable real estate management entity), not under the FPO in Washington.  
The point at which this has the most potential for problems is in Region 11 (National 
Capital Region, or NCR), overseeing the Washington DC metropolitan region, which 
has the most GSA historic structures per square mile of area.  The FPO and CHB have 
their offices at CSA Central Office at 1800 F Street NW,  and the NCR (Region 11) 
group office is situated in a separate facility at 301 7th Street, SW.  Making sure there 
is regular contact between these groups has been essential in keeping the immensely 
busy and complex Washington D.C. area running smoothly, and cooperation on major 
undertakings is a regular occurrence.  CHB has a staff of eight helping the regions 
across the country with preservation issues each day, and this is a great help to all the 
51 William Guerin interview comments, 08Mar2013.
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RHPO's, who have no staff reporting directly to them at the Regional level.  Activities 
are much more hectic in the NCR than, for example, in some of the mid-western 
Regions with many fewer historic buildings, but help from CHB in GSA Central office 
is spread across the entire country.
The St. Elizabeths project, which began life as a GSA NCR undertaking, is a good 
example of this relationship.  During certain periods, aspects of this project were run 
by NCR, brought under the control of the GSA Central Office, and utilized staff from 
CHB and other parts of PBS.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
This agency began as the Office of Homeland Security,  brought into being when 
President George W.  Bush first  responded to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the 
United States.  About a month later,  former Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge 
assumed the title of Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, and on 
November 25, 2002 the DHS itself  was established by the Homeland Security Act of 
2002.52  Ridge was named as secretary of the DHS on January 24, 2003 and the 
Agency began official operations, although most of the departments were not 
transferred into the DHS until March 1.  As a timeframe reference, the Iraq War began 
on March 20, 2003.  
The creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) brought together twenty-
two separate agencies into one department to make communication and coordination 
52 DHS history found at:  http://www.dhs.gov/history  Last accessed 29Apr2013
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during time of domestic need or crisis more efficient.  This consolidation included 
such diverse entities as the Coast Guard, the Secret Service, the Customs Service, the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Transportation Security Administration,  
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Federal Protective Service, the 
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, and the Plum Island Animal Disease 
Center.  Not included were the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), which was a controversial decision at the time.  In fiscal 
year 2011, the DHS had a budget of $98.8 billion (nearly four times that of the GSA's 
$26 billion budget) and had 240,000 employees (compared to the GSA's 12,000 
employees nationwide, less than 5% of the DHS's total).53  
The departments that were being combined to create the DHS were operating from 
dozens of sites across the Washington DC metropolitan area.  In order to facilitate 
communication, coordination and cooperation across the Agency and improve 
operational efficiency,  the most critical components of the agency were identified as 
having a need to be co-located in one functional campus, preferably within 
Washington DC.  However, there were problems in putting all those longstanding 
agencies together in a rush.  
The forced marriage of so many different cultures and components 
never allowed for listening and respect to become endemic to the 
DHS culture.  Instead it exacerbated cultural differences and allowed 
the always-volatile politics and imperfect people of the day to make 
it worse.54  
53 DHS data found at:  http://www.dhs.gov/budget-performance  Last accessed 30Apr2013
54 http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/why-is-dhs-a-crappy-place-to-work-part-2/  Last 
accessed 12Feb2013.
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This problem would have repercussions in the multi-party consultations which took 
place ahead of the St. Elizabeths project, as the frustrations of DHS representatives 
occasionally got the better of  them in communications between that agency and others 
concerned with the undertaking.
To understand the push for the new site at St. Elizabeths, we need to consider what the 
DHS was already using as its main site.  Beginning in 2003, the agency moved into 
the Nebraska Avenue Complex (NAC), a former women's college taken by the 
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Illustration 7:  St. Elizabeths West Campus Master plan, 2012.  The dark shaded 
buildings are historic, those outlined in white are planned new construction.  A full 
size version of this map is available at: 
http://assets.stelizabethsdevelopment.com/documents/document_center/4_appendix-
C_ERRATUM1_20100421162339_20100421095934.pdf?CFTREEITEMKEY=D831 
Last accessed 31Mar2013.  Source: GSA EIS documentation.
Roosevelt Administration for use by the Navy and its cryptography group during 
World War II.  Due to its connection with significant events in history, this site is 
currently being investigated for listing on the National Register of Historic Places.  
Although DHS wanted ownership of the NAC assigned to them,  it was instead 
transferred from the Navy into the care of the GSA, making DHS a tenant.  At this 
time, an expansion is being planned to add six new buildings and a four-level  parking 
structure to the NAC, for a total 1.2 million GSF, however, with funding being 
uncertain no actual construction has begun to date.55  DHS utilizes other office spaces 
across the Washington Metropolitan area (as GSA tenants) which it would like to 
consolidate.
One of the problems DHS was facing during the period between 2003 and 2009 was 
one of public optics.  Blame for a failure to be prepared for Hurricane Katrina in 2005 
was placed on the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), now a part of 
DHS.  Shortly afterward, in 2006, DHS was cited for up to $2 billion of waste and 
fraud after audits by the Government Accountability Office revealed widespread 
misuse of government credit cards by its employees.56   In 2008, DHS was criticized 
by Congress for failing to bring its spending under control and not accounting for a 
number of unusual and frivolous purchases.  The Washington Post stated  “In the five 
years since it was created, the Department of Homeland Security has overseen roughly 
$15 billion worth of failed contracts for projects ranging from airport baggage-
55 See http://dcmud.blogspot.com/2011/05/ncpc-reviews-draft-master-plan-for.html Last accessed 
01Mar2013.
56 http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/19/washington/19cards.html?
ei=5088&en=5e9000b0261c5602&ex=1310961600&adxnnl=1&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&adxnnlx
=1164294012-DXvgXm9ImuoTtQCqwkhFjA&_r=0  Last accessed 01Mar2013.
58
screening, to trailers for Hurricane Katrina evacuees, according to Congressional 
data.”57  These management issues would not make things any easier as the 
consultation phase for the new consolidated headquarters campus moved forward and 
financing was needed.
Why DHS at St. Elizabeths?
The GSA is tasked with the proper upkeep of its properties, whether historic or not.  
Although it had been handed the St. Es property in December 2004, HHS had not been 
properly maintaining the property for several years (possibly as far back as the early 
1980's) to the same standards as would have been applied had the property been fully 
utilized.  Given the sheer scale of the property, and its status as a National Historic 
Landmark, this meant that the financial burden and the standard of care required for 
this undertaking was going to be greater, because it was not 'just any campus.'
As the global financial troubles of the first decade of the century rolled into the 2008 
financial crisis, the period became known as “the Great Recession.”  Federal funding 
was denied to St. Es in the 2007 and 2008 budgets, and it became apparent that 
without some sort of stimulus, St. Es and its historic resources were going to continue 
to deteriorate.  The GSA pointed out throughout the consultation process that the 
federal government was the only party in that economy that would have the finances 
and experience to take on the St. Elizabeths campus redevelopment, and if they did not 
57 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/09/16/AR2008091603200.html  Last 
accessed 01Mar2013.
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do it, the campus would continue to decline.  The only way to do that was to get a 
significant client, and the one at the top of the priority list was the DHS.58  
Hence, in conclusion, the Department of Homeland Security, its agencies and 
departments, were scattered across 70 buildings throughout the National Capital 
Region.  They felt that to effectively operate in the future there was a need to 
consolidate its leadership at a single secure location, allowing coordination of policy, 
management, operational functions, incident management and command and control 
capabilities.  The DHS had determined on its own that it required a total of over 6 
million GSF of office space, and saw a need  for 4.5 million GSF of that space to be 
on one campus (this number included a new USCG HQ).  The DHS approached the 
GSA to fulfill this need, although exactly when that approach was made is unclear.  
The Administration deemed the proposal to be a priority, and work got underway with 
all due speed. 
58 Second on the list was the FBI. “As of 2012, the J. Edgar Hoover Building is nearing the end of its 
useful lifespan. It is suffering from deterioration due to deferred maintenance and mediocre design. 
The FBI, General Services Administration, and General Accountability Office agree that the 
building is no longer appropriate for the FBI, but the cost of building a new headquarters has led to 
inaction for several years.”  
http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/blogs/housingcomplex/2011/11/09/the-fbi-building-is-a-
disaster/  Last accessed 04Apr2013.
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CHAPTER SIX
St Elizabeths Project:  The Early Period, Starting December 2004 
Illustration 8:  The Center Building at St. Elizabeths Hospital in Washington, D.C. is 
one of the oldest buildings on the campus, pre-dating the American Civil War.  
Source:  Thomas Otto
The start of consultation for the proposed project at St. Es will be covered in this 
chapter, with details on the early proposals for the site.  The online public document 
center, a pioneering use of technology for public involvement, is outlined.  This 
chapter includes details on the consulting parties involved, and on events that 
impacted the project during early planning for the proposed undertaking.  
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The Proposal For St. Elizabeths West Campus
In January 2001, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) announced 
that it no longer had a need for the West campus and declared the property “excess to 
its needs.”  Previous to 2001, the site was supposed to have been managed in 
cooperation with the District of Columbia Mental Health Services (DCMHS)  as part 
of an agreement that eventually would have transferred actual ownership of the St. 
Elizabeths East campus.  In order for this to move forward, the District  was 
responsible for providing a masterplan for redevelopment of the West campus.  
However,  this masterplan never materialized, and therefore the transfer of the site did 
not take place.  The West campus site deterioration continued during this time, with 
little or no maintenance (and a bit of vandalism) from 1990 to 2004.  
This problem with HHS and DCMHS overseeing St. Es' physical assets mirrored a 
similar situation for the decomposing historic core of the Walter Reed Army Medical 
Center (WRAMC).  That notable case caused the National Trust for Historic 
Preservation (NTHP) to take the US Army to court in 1996, in an attempt to compel 
the Army to live up to its Programmatic Agreements commitments by moving to 
stabilize and preserve the cultural resources on site.59  Although the Trust was not 
completely successful  (officially, the judgment went against the NTHP), the court 
59 NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION and Save Our Seminary At Forest Glen, 
Plaintiffs, v. Major General Ronald R. BLANCK, et al., Defendants.  Civil Action No. 94-1091 
(PLF). United States District Court, District of Columbia.  September 13, 1996.  Available in full at 
http://www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?
page=15&xmldoc=19961846938FSupp908_11692.xml&docbase=CSLWAR2-1986-
2006&SizeDisp=7   Last accessed 12Apr2013.
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found the Army was in violation of their duties under the NHPA, and the written 
findings slapped them hard for allowing the decomposition at WRAMC to take place.  
At St. Es, the GSA officially took custody of the West Campus of St. Elizabeths from 
HHS for redevelopment or disposal December 9, 2004.60  Like any commercial 
developer, the Agency would not have taken on this property without having a plan in 
place on what to do with it, and that plan would have taken time to develop.  The GSA 
could, theoretically,  have been working on it since 2001 when HHS declared the 
property surplus. Unfortunately, none of those records are available, but it would have 
been instructive to know what was discussed, how long the negotiations with HHS 
took, and what planning meetings had taken place within the GSA and which internal 
departments were involved.  It would be pivotal from a CRM standpoint to know how 
much Historic Preservation figured into those discussions, and how the topic of the 
National Historic Landmark status of the site was discussed at the GHS before and 
after the transfer from HHS.   As it is, the first time St. Es is publicly connected to the 
GSA was at the time of transfer, and by then it appears that tasks had been assigned 
and the project planning was already moving full steam ahead. 
Upon acquisition of St. Elizabeths West Campus, the GSA undertook a $14.5 million 
structural stabilization project at St. Es, and they also increased site security to prevent 
further loss.  This stabilization included several actions:  the replacement of several 
roofs, the boarding up of all campus windows and doors with plywood, and the 
60 Unless otherwise stated, in this paper all references to “St. Elizabeths” are specifically referencing 
the West campus of St. Es.  
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provision of mechanical ventilation for buildings to prevent moisture buildup.  It also 
meant initiating work to document the existing conditions of structures on the property 
to meet federal preservation standards. 
St. Elizabeths and the Public Process
The proposed St. Elizabeths project was in the Congressional district of 
Representative Eleanor Holmes Norton.  The project was a high priority for the 
administration of President George W.  Bush, and for several members of Congress 
and the Senate.   At the same time, because it was a National Historic Landmark 
(NHL), the project at St. Es able to galvanize the historic preservation community.  
The initial consultations for the historic preservation concerns of the USCG HQ 
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Illustration 9: New US Coast Guard Headquarters at St. Elizabeths, concept view. 
Source: USCG 
project were arranged on a time-line to indicate they would take a very short time (40 
days plus about 20 more for outside agency approval), but they ended up running from 
2005 through the end of 2008, nearly four years.  Because of its NHL designation,  at 
St. Es all designs (including the first new structure on the campus, the sprawling new 
USCG headquarters) were carried through a public consultation process in accordance 
with NEPA, as combined with Section 106 and other parts of the National Historic 
Preservation Act, and involved a long list of consulting parties.  
One difference between a property that is listed on the National Register and one that 
is recognized as a National Historic Landmark is that, in the latter case, the National 
Park Service (NPS) is automatically and directly involved in the preservation process.  
Since the NPS is part of the Department of Interior, inter-departmental relations can 
complicate project time-lines, however the process adds a degree of protection for 
these culturally significant sites.  As plans at St. Es developed they included taking 
part of the adjacent Shepherd  Parkway, which was NPS land.  This proposed taking 
gave the NPS an extraordinary and necessary amount of leverage that it could exercise 
over the planning of the undertaking at St. Elizabeths.
The Online Public Document Center for St. Elizabeths
At St. Elizabeths, the GSA has undertaken (to date) eight years of public comment, 
negotiation, and consultations, with the requisite generation of paperwork and digital 
files:  These include reports, layout of multiple designs, and the creation of tens of 
thousands of pages of documentation regarding the site.  Making this documentation 
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publicly available was made possible through the online St. Elizabeths Document 
Center, found at http://www.stelizabethsdevelopment.com/document_center.cfm.61  
This boon of information is in stark contrast with that available from the GSA for 
projects years ago (for example, during the the Winder Building or the African Burial 
Ground Projects).  The embrace of this technological method of information sharing 
by the Agency has been enthusiastic (when funding permits it),  and such methods are 
now being used on a number of federal undertakings.  The District of Columbia has 
also created a similar website for the redevelopment of the St. Es East campus at 
http://www.stelizabethseast.com/ 62
The data on St. Es includes the correspondence and memos between the parties, the 
draft and final Environmental Impact Statements, the Programmatic Agreement, a 
variety of options considered and studies undertaken, archaeological reports, 
committee and consulting party meeting minutes, the Building Preservation Plans, site 
concepts and proposals, and more.  It is invaluable for understanding the project, truly 
a landmark in terms of government openness.  
This approach has proven invaluable to all parties in the process, not the least of which 
was the GSA itself.  The public relations and procedural boon received under this 
policy reaped major rewards in the St. Es consultation process, which, of course, was 
no doubt part of the overall plan when the online data system was created.  
61  Last accessed 30Apr2013.
62  Last accessed 02Feb2013.
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The Consulting Process
The NHPA, Section 110 (a)(2)(E)(ii) requires: 
. . . an agency's procedures for compliance with section 106 to provide a 
process for the identification and evaluation of historic properties and the 
development  and  implementation  of  agreements,  in  consultation  with 
SHPOs,  local  governments,  Indian  tribes,  Native  Hawaiian 
organizations, and the interested public, as appropriate. 
Further, the Secretary of Interior's Consultation General Principles63 state (emphasis 
added):
The agency needs to inform other agencies, organizations, and the public 
in  a  timely  manner  about  its  projects  and  programs,  and  about  the 
possibility of impacts on historic resources of interest to them.  However, 
the agency cannot force a group to express its views, or participate in the 
consultation. These groups also bear a responsibility, once they have been 
made aware that a Federal agency is interested in their views, to provide 
them in a suitable format and in a timely fashion.
The list of consulting parties that were about to be formally invited to participate in the 
process at St. Elizabeths was extensive, and can be broken into four categories.  They 
are described below. 
Professional Organizations
 The American Society of Landscape Architects   (ASLA) is the national 
professional association representing landscape architects, with more than 
17,000 members.   Founded in 1899, its charter is to "establish landscape 
architecture as a recognized profession in North America, develop educational 
studies in landscape architecture, and provide a voice of authority."  Because of 
the significance of the landscape design at St. Elizabeths, recorded by the 
63 http://www.nps.gov/hps/fapa_110.htm    Last accessed 31Mar2013.
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Historic American Landscape Survey (HALS), this organization was invited to 
participate in the process.  
 The Brookings Institute   (BI), founded in 1916, is one of Washington's most 
respected think tanks.  It conducts research primarily in economics, 
metropolitan policy, governance, foreign policy, and also global economy and 
development.   In 2003, the Brookings Institute proposed a thriving 
neighborhood with offices, condominiums, houses, assisted living for 
regeneration of the area.64  
 The Cultural Landscape Foundation   (CLF) focuses on increasing awareness 
and  understanding of the importance and irreplaceable legacy of cultural 
landscapes, landscape architecture and its practitioners.  Founded in 1998, it is 
not a membership organization but operates as a not-for-profit promotion, 
education and awareness entity. 
 The National Association for Olmsted Parks (NAOP) was founded in 1980 to 
raise awareness of the legacy of landscape work left by Frederick Law 
Olmsted Sr.   It is composed of design and preservation professionals, historic 
property and park managers, scholars, municipal officials, citizen activists and 
representatives of Olmsted organizations.  
Federal Government Agencies & Representatives
These are described elsewhere in this paper, but they include:  the Advisory Council 
for Historic Preservation (ACHP);   the Department of Homeland Security (DHS);  the 
64 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/16/AR2007061601192_3.html   Last 
accessed 02Apr2013.
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National Park Service (NPS);  the U.S.  Coast Guard (USCG);  the U.S. Commission 
of Fine Arts (CFA);  the National Capital Planning Commission (NCPC);  the Federal 
Highway Administration (FHA);  and the office of Eleanor Holmes Norton 
(Congressional Representative for the District of Columbia).
Local Government Agencies 
 The Advisory Neighborhood Commissions 8A, 8B, 8C, 8D, and 8E   (the 
ANC's) are bodies of the local government within the Southeast portion of the 
District of Columbia (near Anacostia).  These Commissions  are recognized by 
local legislation for being representative voices, regard the policies and 
programs that impact their neighborhoods, including highways,  recreation,  
zoning, economic development, services,and liquor licensing. They report to 
the DC Council, and have input when creating the District budget.  Each 
Neighborhood Commission is empowered to have a small staff and to take 
donations for its local operations.
 The District of Columbia Department of Transportation  (DDOT) is in charge 
of the publicly owned transportation infrastructure in the District.  It has 
authority over the planning, design, construction, and maintenance of alleys, 
bridges, sidewalks, streets, street lights, and traffic signals.
 The District of Columbia Office of Planning  (DCOP) is concerned with 
planning, development and neighborhood revitalization.  It is responsible for 
the city's comprehensive plan, project reports, news, and historic preservation 
(see below).
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 The District of Columbia State Historic Preservation Office   (DCSHPO) is 
within the DCOP and is responsible for all aspects of work assigned to a SHPO 
as part of the NHPA, including Section 106.
 St. Elizabeths Hospital   in this context refers to the operational facility on the 
East campus run by the District of Columbia Department of Mental Health 
(DMH) as public psychiatric facility for individuals who need inpatient care to 
support their recovery.  The DMH serves more than 22,000 adults, children and 
youth and their families each year, but less than a thousand of those are in-
patients, those in residence at St. Elizabeths. 
 Council member Marion Barry   was a four-term Mayor of Washington DC, and 
currently serves on the Council of the District of Columbia for all of Ward 8.
National advocacy groups:
 The National Trust for Historic Preservation   (NTHP) is a member-supported 
preservation advocacy organization with a reported 250,000 members.  It was 
founded in 1949 by Congressional charter to support preservation of historic 
buildings and neighborhoods through a range of programs and activities.  
Additional details on the NTHP can be found throughout this thesis. 
 The National Historic Landmarks Stewards Association   (NLSA) is an 
organization formed in 1998, comprised of persons who own or take care of 
National Historic Landmarks all across the nation.
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Local advocacy groups:
 The Anacostia Historical Society   is a non-profit volunteer civic group 
concerned with local history, founded in the 1970s. 
 The Committee of 100 on the Federal City   (C100FC) was created in 1923 with 
the intention to sustain and to safeguard the precepts of the L’Enfant Plan, the 
McMillan Commission, and significant legislation such as the 1910 Height of 
Buildings Act.  It works as an advocate to protect Washington DC from 
unwarranted development and preserve the distinctive character of the city as a 
community. 
 The DC Preservation League   (DCPL) helps to protect and interpret the history 
of the District of Columbia.  It is a non-profit, member-supported organization 
which also seeks to enhance the historic and built environment of Washington 
through advocacy and education. 
 The Friends of St. Elizabeths   is a volunteer group that works to assist in the 
operation of  and fund-raising for the St. Elizabeths Hospital mental health 
facility on the East campus.
 The Medical & Professional Society of St. Elizabeths Hospital   is a staff-
membership organization concerned with the currently operating  mental 
health facility on the East campus and its legacy from the time when it was 
previously united with the West campus.
 The National Coalition to Save Our Mall   (NCSOM)  is a national, not-for-
profit organization working to preserve the National Mall as a monument to 
democracy.  Its mission is “to defend our national gathering place and symbol 
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of Constitutional principles against threats posed by recent and ongoing 
proposals (for new memorials, security barriers, service buildings and roads) 
that would encroach on the Mall's historical and cultural integrity, its open 
spaces and sweeping vistas, and its significance in American public life.”65 
 The National Museum of Civil War Medicine   (NMCWM) is concerned with 
preservation and research into the “innovation and humanitarianism” of that 
profession during the conflict of 1861-65.   It is involved in both public 
education and investigation into the impact of the Civil War on society today. 
Given the complexity of the project at St. Elizabeths, the number of consulting party 
meetings and site visits that took place, the huge volume of paperwork that was being 
passed at every stage of the consultation, and a bit of public unfamiliarity with the 
NEPA process, the time commitment involved became an unfortunate limiting factor 
that impacted ability of some representatives to participate.  One example of this can 
be found in the Consulting Party Working Group Meeting notes from 23 June, 2008:   
Rebecca  Miller  from  the  DCPL pointed  out  that  many  [consulting 
parties]  worked for small,  board-driven nonprofits,  and would find it 
difficult to turn around comments within [the short time frame desired 
by the GSA].66
The creation of the online document center, as a resource, lays the public 
communications of the project out for our use, and we see the expressions of the 
consulting party in stark relief.  Each communication from the consulting parties 
described above appears in easily downloadable format.  As useful as it is, however, 
65 http://www.savethemall.org/    Last accessed 02Apr2013.
66 Meeting Notes, St. Elizabeths West Campus, 23Jun2013, available on the ST. Es document center at  
http://assets.stelizabethsdevelopment.com/documents/document_center/106CP_MN_0806231_2010
0415120800.pdf?CFTREEITEMKEY=D431  Last accessed 16Apr2013.
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we should not mistake it for the complete picture.  It is, at best, a self-selected data set, 
created by the developer to serve a need, the GSA's quest for the paperwork to show 
compliance with NEPA and NHPA requirements needed to move the project forward.  
A further investigation of GSA and DHS internal files through a Freedom of 
Information request would be instructional, and add to the knowledge of the planning 
and execution of the consultation and planning phases of this project.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
The First Critical Twelve Months of St. Es Planning: 2005
.
The first twelve months of this project set the stage for the following three years of 
consultations.  Missteps at this stage, as with early-term problems on any project with 
an engineered time-line, were to have a domino-like effect on the project's critical path 
landmarks.   Given the amount of time that must have been spent preparing for the 
project, well before December 2004, the only conclusion that a reasonable researcher 
can come to, given the problems encountered, is that historic preservation planning 
was given short shrift during that critical early period.   As with most problems of this 
type, this error took more time to correct than it took to create.
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Illustration 10: St. Elizabeths Campus, view from "The Point" toward the Mall.  
Source:  Author photo.
Possession and Planning
As previously mentioned, GSA took possession of St. Elizabeths West campus on 
December 8, 2004.  In January 2005 the GSA met with the Advisory Council on 
Historic Preservation (ACHP) and the National Park Service (NPS) to brief them on 
their acquisition of St. Es.  In March of 2005, a master planning effort was initiated 
internally by the GSA to redevelop St. Es and to create a new building to host the 
headquarters of the United States Coast Guard (USCG).  
The public document file indicates the creation of a GSA “Certification of Need” 
(CoN) report in support of the construction of a new Coast Guard headquarters, dated 
May 13, 2005.  This report states that all possible options for sites to place the USCG 
HQ had been explored, and the only possible location that met all the parameters was 
at St. Es.   The CoN report was eventually followed, in time, by orders instructing the 
Coast Guard to cooperate with the plans to move.67  In addition, the differential in 
renting a private building versus a Federally-owned one was projected to save over 
eighty million of dollars over thirty years.  Early encouragement for the move would 
have come from the agency to which the USCG reported to, namely the Department of 
Homeland Security. 
67 Even though USCG was happy where they were, the Agency was growing, needed more office 
space, and now needed access to a helicopter landing pad, something it did not have in its current 
location.
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On May 20, 2005 the DC Historic Preservation review Board (DCHPRB) released its 
agenda for its May 26 meeting, and on that schedule (among other items of regular 
business) was a hearing on listing St. Elizabeths as a Historic District.68
On June 7, 2005 the GSA issued a public Notice of Intent (NOI) for the submittal of 
redevelopment proposals for the St. Elizabeths campus, including a new Coast Guard 
Headquarters facility.  The announcement unfortunately failed to mention the site's 
NHL status, or a need for experience with Section 106 review and compliance, or a 
need for experience in working with the ACHP, NCPC, DCSHPO, consulting parties 
and neighborhood organizations.  There was no mention of Section 106 archaeological 
requirements, and Historic Preservation was not listed as one of the Architect / 
Engineering services required.  Only the NEPA was mentioned; the NHPA or 
Executive Orders that affected the project were not.   This was not a good start for the 
proposed undertaking.
DHS Appears on the Scene
By the end of June 2005 the DHS is recorded as having informed GSA of its need to 
consolidate its office locations around the National Capital Region (NCR) to a single 
campus to promote operational efficiency.  Its stated requirement was for 4.5m GSF 
specifically including the USCG HQ.   
To understand the sizes being discussed:
68 This designation regarded the whole of the historic campus, both on the East (DC) and West (GSA) 
sides of Martin Luther King Jr. Avenue.
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 the existing space within historic and other buildings on the St. Es West 
campus currently totals 600,000 GSF.  
 The proposed Coast Guard building was to be 1.1m GSF.  
 The DHS wanted 4.5m GSF total of office space including the USCG HQ.
 This is a total of 3.9m GSF greater than was historically on site, or an increase 
of greater than 500% in site density. 
 The Pentagon, in comparison, has 3.7m GSF of offices (with 6.5m GSF total 
including all services).
However,  it is relatively obvious that DHS was always part of the St. Es plan, just by 
seeing that the USCG HQ was always part of the total they were requesting.  By the 
time the first meeting with the consulting parties took place September 7, 2005 (ten 
months after acquisition), designs for the campus had been created showing numerous 
larger structures added to the landscape, to match the amounts required by the DHS.  
However, the identity of DHS as tenant for the site was not revealed outside the GSA 
until January 2006.   
At that first consulting party meeting, the DCSHPO stated that the master plan needed 
to be taken to the DC Historic Preservation Review Board.  The SHPO has discretion 
to seek guidance from HPRB, and the hearing that would then occur would be an 
opportunity for public comment.  The GSA's response to this was not one of support 
for the process, but to express surprise at the request for HPRB review, and a 
statement of concern for the effect such an action could have on its schedule.69
69 Consulting Party Meeting minutes 07Sep2005.  These are available at: 
http://assets.stelizabethsdevelopment.com/documents/document_center/September_7_2005_Minute
s1_20100414070021.pdf?CFTREEITEMKEY=D305  Last accessed 12Apr2013.
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By the time the consulting parties met October 11, 2005, there were still problems 
with sharing information due to security issues.  The designs in question had not 
received input from the DCSHPO, CFA, NPS, DCPL, Cof100, NCPC or NTHP.  
There was concern over several aspects of the proposals, especially scale.  The DCPL 
noted that it appeared that “buildings were placed where they would do the least harm, 
instead of where they could make the greatest difference.”70  The Cof100 stated that 
the consultation process had to be more than just a 'consideration' of the the local 
community, they had to be included in the public process.  That organization also was 
the first to make a particular point in the minutes that the buildings being proposed 
were “huge in scale.”  
In this early meeting the NPS concentrated its comments on the landscape and how St. 
Es' in particular was a feature that the capital had been working around for three-
quarters of a century, and from a planning perspective it was a historic feature that 
absolutely needed to be maintained.  The SHPO stated “The master plan team is 
looking at 4.5M sf of massive development.  We just don't see it.  Is this all that's on 
the table or is there more being considered?”71  The CFA in particular stated “Once 
you develop this, it is gone forever.  Perhaps this is not a marriage that should be 
consummated.”72   The GSA was keen to move right on to discussing design 
guidelines and a programmatic agreement, but the DCSHPO was much more 
70 Consulting Party Meeting 11Oct2005.  
http://assets.stelizabethsdevelopment.com/documents/document_center/October_11_2005_Minutes1
_20100414070328.pdf?CFTREEITEMKEY=D311  Last accessed 12Apr2013.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
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interested in exploring efforts for minimization and getting into site specifics and they 
would not be rushed.   At this point, the words no developer enjoys hearing in relation 
to a historic site, “adverse effect,” began to be used.73   
On December 12, 2005 The Washington Business Journal (WBJ) published an article 
on the St. Elizabeths project (Appendix C).  This article laid out the well-reasoned 
theory that, in addition to the USCG HQ,  the GSA planned to create a high-security 
DHS headquarters complex within the campus at St. Es.
There had been no November consulting party meeting, but the day after the WBJ 
article was published, there was one which occurred on December 13, 2005.  This 
session saw a reduced number of participants, and other than GSA and its 
subcontractors, it included only CFA, NCPC, ACHP, DCSHPO, and the DCOP.  The 
NPS, NTHP, Cof100, DCHPL, USCG and  DHS, all at the previous meeting, were not 
invited to this session.  GSA stated its goal was to “maximize development 
opportunity on the site”  with a high security campus for the USCG and an 
“undisclosed tenant.”  Jonathan McIntyre of the NCPC questioned whether the historic 
context of the site was actually factored into the planning process.74  NCPC went on to 
state that the plan did not preserve the historic character or environmental integrity of 
the site, and it would find it quite difficult to make a substantive response to the 
minimal plans being provided by GSA.75  The NTHP, on the other hand, was not in 
73 Ibid.
74 Consulting party meeting 13Dec2005. 
http://assets.stelizabethsdevelopment.com/documents/document_center/December_13_2005_Minute
s1_20100414071145.pdf?CFTREEITEMKEY=D322  Last access 12Apr2013.
75 Ibid.
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attendance, was never informed that this meeting was taking place, and when they 
found out on their own (a week after the fact) they were not at all pleased.  The 
President of the Trust was shortly on the schedule for a meeting with the GSA 
Administrator in January 2006.
The Problems with the St. Es Process
There were certainly differences of opinion between the GSA, its client DHS, those 
who were hired as consultants, and the consulting parties in regards to compliance 
with the NEPA process.  GSA staff in the PBS were concerned with assuring 
compliance with all the laws and executive orders, while upholding the principles and 
intent of historic preservation. They were tasked with making sure that St. Es avoided 
the pitfalls learned at projects such as the Winder complex and the African Burial 
Ground.   However, this put preservation staff in a difficult position with other 
departments within GSA as they carried out their task to maintain the integrity of the 
process and keep the Agency out of court for over-reaching or moving too rapidly.  
They were acting as negotiator, mediator, and compliance process assurance 'agents' 
for the GSA.  
Inside the GSA there were also problems.  In 2006 it appears that the project was 
being approached by two different groups (Architects and Preservationists) from two 
different Regions (NCR and Central Office) with divergent views on Section 106, with 
one group concentrating on the needs of the clients (USCG and DHS), and another on 
the needs of the historic campus.  This was a further outgrowth of some of the year 
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one missteps.  A realignment of the thinking about the entire campus as the area of 
potential effect (APE) was essential.  The new USCG HQ project being designed for 
the site could not be separated  from the NEPA and Section 106 consultation, as much 
as the 'new construction' focused parts of the project team wanted it otherwise.  If the 
process continued on that track, the ACHP would be getting more involved than the 
GSA had envisioned them being at first, because the NTHP would  have the 
opportunity to bring its legal weight to bear in court. 
At the same time, a confrontation outside the consulting process could do more than 
throw the project time-line into chaos.  Going to court at this point in the project, 
before consultation had been given the chance to take corrective, collaborative action 
on an outstanding issue, could also damage the good reputation the GSA's CHB had 
been cultivating for some time.  It could impact other projects, and damage 
relationships with other agencies.  By ending up back in court, accused of bypassing 
consultation regulations, the preservationists at PBS knew that the ghost of the Winder 
Complex would come back to bite them. 
At the same time, PBS had to manage a client (DHS) who viewed the process in an 
adversarial manner.   Preservationists needed to interpret and translate 
communications from the consulting parties, going from preservation legalese and 
jargon into language that PBS and DHS could digest, and back again.  At various 
times the staff acted as collaborators, as mediators, or as negotiators.
The NEPA process was chosen for St. Es as it was the GSA standard 
procedure for a complex project. The GSA has a written policy called 
“ADM 1095.1F  Environmental  Considerations  in  Decision  Making” 
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which in part reads (emphasis added):              
In all its decision making, GSA will attend carefully to the National 
Environmental  Policy  set  forth  in  Section  101  of  NEPA.   To  the 
maximum extent practicable, GSA will ensure that its actions protect 
and where  possible  improve the  quality  of  the  human environment, 
including the built and sociocultural environments of the nation's urban 
areas.   GSA decision  makers  will  use  the  NEPA review  process 
prescribed  in  the  CEQ regulations  as  a  practical  planning  tool,  and 
integrate both the NEPA review process and the Section 101 National 
Environmental  Policy  into  decision  making  in  an  efficient,  cost-
effective manner.   The NEPA review process will  be initiated at  the 
earliest possible stage in planning any GSA action, and will be carried 
forward in coordination with other planning activities.  
Decision  makers  will  ensure  that  they  have  reviewed  and  fully 
understand the environmental impacts of each decision, before making 
any such decision.  All managers responsible for decision making on 
GSA actions  will be accountable for being knowledgeable about, and 
attendant to, the requirements of NEPA and the National Environmental 
Policy that these requirements are designed to advance. 
 The agency was required to go through NEPA in any case, and consolidating NHPA 
Section 106 fulfillment within that framework was both implicitly legal and made 
good sense.  Hence, NEPA provided the principal set of regulations to follow, and 
NHPA Section 106 became a subset within those reporting requirements.  This also 
increased the complexity of project on an arguably complex site, with a complex  
multi-purpose client (DHS), and considering the huge, complex scope of the proposed 
undertaking (reportedly the largest federal government project in DC since the 
Pentagon).  The combination of NEPA with the section 106 process also led to a bit of 
ambiguity about who would sign on for the negotiated outcome.  From the viewpoint 
of some, rather than saving time by preventing duplication,  the NEPA process led to  
misunderstandings,  confusion, and in some cases mistrust.  The DCSHPO's office, in 
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trying to discern the direction of the project, wrote in December 2006 (emphasis 
added):76 
[T]he process of the former [NEPA] somehow trumps the intent of the 
latter [NHPA Section 106]...   It has been our experience that when 
NEPA and 106 reviews  are  combined,  the  aims  of  the  latter  often 
suffer for it....  In such a case as this, NEPA allows for...  a degree of 
public participation.  Section 106 requires it.
GSA's reliance to date on the National Environmental Policy Act  as 
the  primary  tool  for  considering  effects  to  the  National  Historic 
Landmark throughout this critical   planning phase  may account for 
some  of  the  frustration  expressed  by  consulting  parties over  the 
difficulty of  reaching consensus  on how to  minimize these effects. 
The analysis of alternatives under NEPA has not revealed sufficient 
detail about the specific consequences each alternative will have for 
historic  properties,  yet  GSA's NEPA schedule has been the driving 
force in how GSA has considered the impacts of this development on 
historic properties.  The section 106 implementing regulations provide 
that the goal of consultation is to seek ways to avoid, minimize or 
mitigate any adverse effects on the historic properties.  We appreciate 
GSA's concern that it not compromise the NEPA process by settling 
on  alternatives  at  this  stage,  however,  it  has  been  difficult  for  the 
consulting parties  to provide GSA with specific concerns when the 
scope  of  the  undertaking  remains  undetermined  and  evaluation  of 
historic resources values is still incomplete.  Consultation to resolving 
adverse  effects  to  historic  properties  under  section  106  cannot 
commence until  the nature and severity of adverse effects resulting 
from various alternatives is more fully defined.
Moving into a NEPA review, without due consideration in advance of the adverse 
effects to the property unnecessarily pitted one law against another.   Although the 
NEPA process is intended to place everything on an even playing field in a regulated 
and pre-planned format, when merged with the NHPA processes they do not 
automatically work seamlessly with each other.  Many areas where NEPA and NHPA 
cross are open to interpretation,  and end up being gauged against precedents.  The 
76 Timothy J.  Dennée, Architectural Historian, DCSHPO Office communication to William B.  Bush, 
GSA  ARA.  20DEC2006.
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PBS appears to have a good deal of practical experience in creating those precedents, 
and with uniting these regulations to assure compliance with their stated purpose.  
Because of this, the CHB has, in a way,  taken on the role of writing the NEPA/NHPA 
playbook one project at a time.  Co-mingling the regulations as you go, however, is 
not a painless process.
Areas of Concern for the Consulting parties
The NEPA process is generally broken down into parts, the first of which is to collect 
comments from interested parties. These are then addressed in turn, in a timely 
fashion.  For each project, the GSA internally creates spreadsheets which summarize 
the comments and concerns that have been expressed.  They continue this spreadsheet 
system throughout the consultations as new concerns are added or old ones dealt with. 
GSA's response to each item may then be tied to supporting data and links can be 
provided for further information.   This project was no exception.  
The reoccurring themes found on these spreadsheets highlight:  (1) alternative site 
study;  (2) project scale and the amount of proposed new construction on the site;  (3) 
the protection, reuse and treatment of existing cultural resources;  (4) the design and 
placement of the security perimeter and a desire for public access to the site;  (5) the 
site master planning taking place concurrently with NEPA and NHPA compliance 
work.  We will discuss these below.
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(1)  Alternative Site Study
The validity of the GSA's study of alternative sites was questioned.  The GSA had 
looked at a total of 12 local sites in addition to St Elizabeths to find an appropriate 
location for a secure campus for the DHS that could provide up to 4.5m gross square 
feet of space.  The NTHP wanted reconsideration of the Armed Forces Retirement 
Home (AFRH) in Northern Washington DC, in particular,  for the undertaking.  Along 
with the DCSHPO, the NTHP requested a more in-depth analysis of all of the 
alternative sites,  covering environmental, transportation, historic considerations, 
security issues, access and other concerns for each possible alternative.  Land-swap 
deals with other entities (such as the government of the District of Columbia, the 
military, and various other agencies) were suggested as alternatives to construction at 
St. Es.77  
The most often mentioned alternative site was the Armed Forces Retirement Home 
(AFRH), located in the Park View neighborhood of Washington DC.78  The problem  
in this case was that the GSA was restricted from entering into any arrangement for 
ground-lease payments because other non-lease sites were available.  The addition of 
the DHS to the AFRH campus by outright land acquisition would have impacted 
77  Data for this section consolidated from numerous sources.  A central source can be found in the 
11Apr2006 GSA white paper:  “Preliminary Analysis, Department of Homeland Security Elements, 
Developable Federal Land in the National Capital Region ”   which is available at: 
http://assets.stelizabethsdevelopment.com/documents/document_center/Location_Alternatives_Anal
ysis1_20100422174153.pdf?CFTREEITEMKEY=D863  Last accessed 13Apr2013.
78   The AFRH was first set up on land purchased with booty obtained by Gen. Winfield Scott during 
the Mexican War in 1847, and was designated for the housing of elderly and disabled
veterans.  The site is maintained by the payroll deductions of active-duty members of the military.  It 
was listed as a Historic District in the NRHP on 05Dec2007,  reference number 07001237.
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AFRH's ability to remain a viable and self-sustaining entity (as it is dependent in part 
on income from its ground leases to funds its operations).79  
A second option was the Army's Walter Reed Medical Center (WRAMC)  in Northern 
DC, which had just been placed on the Base Realignment And Closure (BRAC) list in 
2005, but was projected to take seven more years to close.  This seven years would 
have taken us to 2012, but the original St. Es decision was planned to have USCG and 
DHS in occupancy long-complete by that time, so it was discounted.  The medical 
center site is now being considered for a Wegmans, Best Buy, and other retailers.  
A third option concerned the Southeast Federal Center site (SEFC).  Unfortunately, 
this location able to offer less than half the space needed for the DHS's use.  On June 
2, 2005, GSA announced it had  “turned over the keys” to the SEFC site a commercial 
developer for a 44 acre phased development.
The fourth site under consideration was a parcel known as “Reservation 13” on the 
west bank of the Anacostia river.  However in 2005 it was already being considered by 
Congress for transfer to the District of Columbia.  This transfer did take place,  but in 
2013 it still sits unused.  The site was offered to the Washington Redskins football 
79 In time, a suggestion was made that a land-swap between GSA and AFRH could have freed up space 
that could have provided much needed income to AFRH by providing space elsewhere it could 
generate revenue from.  However, by the time that proposal was made, construction was already 
underway for the new USCG Headquarters building.  It seems unfathomable that the astute real 
estate professionals at the GSA didn't come up with this suggestion.  This fact adds weight to the 
idea that the St. Es site was selected for USCG and DHS long before the project was revealed, 
before the site was transferred from HHS to GSA.  Because those details are not publicly available, 
we will probably never know.
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team as a location for their training camp, in contravention of the site master plan.  
The community currently opposes any non-public use of this site.  
The fifth option, the site of Robert F.  Kennedy Stadium, is on land owed by the 
federal government but on lease to the District of Columbia.  It was  considered and 
rejected as much too small. 
 
The sixth possible choice, The Germantown Campus of the Department of Energy, 
was less than half the size needed by the DHS, and thus was never seriously a 
contender.
The seventh option was the Suitland Federal Center in Maryland.   This site was 
unacceptable because it was outside the District, eight miles from downtown 
Washington, and had only one-third of the space needed by DHS.  
The eighth possibility was the Nebraska Avenue Complex (NAC), originally a 
women's college but taken during WWII by the government for use by the Department 
of the Navy for code-breaking activities.   The NAC's historic campus was listed on 
the National Register and situated within a residential-area, but its buildings had not 
been well maintained over the years and was not up to modern office standards. 
With  its  red-bricked  buildings,  white  chapel,  and  well-
manicured  grounds,  [on  the  outside]  it  has  all  of  the  visual 
charm  of  a  small  college  campus.   Truth  be  told,  it  was 
accurately described by Paul Schneider, DHS deputy secretary, 
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in a 2008 congressional hearing as a “dump.80    
Although already being utilized by DHS (leased from the GSA), the NAC was situated 
on a mere 38 acres, and the most ambitious proposals made in 2011 suggest only 1.3m 
GSF of office space for the site,  far from the 4.5m GSF stated as the DHS' total space 
need.
A ninth option that was investigated was a federal storage site in Franconia, Virginia, 
was considered but the space available was less than 5% of that needed.  
Tenth on the list of possibilities was the White Oak Laboratory site, in nearby 
Maryland.  This former naval weapons research facility had been taken over by the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), but not enough of the site's seven hundred and 
twelve acres was open for redevelopment due to ongoing environmental remediation.  
This remediation work was projected to extend 22 years with continuous monitoring 
for contamination, and effectively put the site out of consideration.  
Choice number eleven was to locate at the Beltsville Agricultural Research Center 
(BARC), currently being utilized by the FDA .  Located in Maryland and ten miles 
north of downtown Washington, it possessed over 6,400 acres of space.  However, 
taking it from the FDA would have required a transfer or an Act of Congress, and it 
was also outside the District of Columbia.  In addition, it was 8 times farther from the 
Capitol than the Pentagon, and in times of emergency, that was probably was too far.
80  http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/why-is-dhs-a-crappy-place-to-work-part-5/  Last 
accessed 12Feb2013.
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Finally, the twelfth option that was investigated was the Cotton Annex, a tiny site in 
downtown DC.  However, its mere 440,000 GSF space and lack of a viable security 
perimeter made it totally unsuitable.  
A quick look at these shows that, within the District of Columbia, there were no sites 
other than St. Elizabeths that met all the relevant criteria within the allotted project 
deadlines.   However, hindsight being 20-20, it can be seen that WRAMC could have 
been an ideal site had there been a broadened project time-line.   On August 25, 2005 
the BRAC proceedings called for consolidation of military hospital operations in 
nearby Bethesda, Maryland, and WRAMC closed officially on August 27, 2011.   St. 
Es was well underway by this time, and so WRAMC moved in the seemingly 
irretrievable direction of commercial redevelopment.81  
Within this discussion of site selection there is an intricate web of regulations, 
legislation and directives governing the process and the decisions.  One Executive 
Order required that preference be given to placing federal agencies on land that was 
already federally-owned.  Another was the statutory requirement that certain Cabinet-
level federal offices, such as Departmental headquarters, be located within the District 
of Columbia (per 4 USC §§ 71-72, to wit: “All offices attached to the seat of 
government shall be exercised in the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere, except 
as otherwise expressly provided by law.”).  Another requirement holds that federal 
81 For further information on the development of WRAMC property, see 
http://www.wtop.com/109/2840937/Wegmans-large-corporations-could-fill-vacant-DC-sites Last 
accessed 02Apr2013.
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agency headquarters must have 60% of its staff located at a work site within the 
District of Columbia.  Still another, The Federal and District of Columbia Government 
Real Property Act of 2006,  restricts the federal government from taking additional 
land in the District (as it would reduce property tax revenue to the DC government).  
All of these impacted the choice of location for the new DHS Headquarters.
(2)  Project scale and new construction
There was an expression that the high density of development being proposed would 
make it difficult to reuse many of the existing historic resources on site.  There was 
also a concern that the scale and massing of any new buildings could undermine the 
historic context of the campus as a whole.   This was largely because of the size of the 
development proposed for the West campus, with a total of 4.5m gross square feet 
total for office and parking space.   This level of development was seen by all of the 
consulting preservation parties as inappropriate, given its significance and the 
potential impacts.   At an April 25th 2007 meeting, the consulting parties suggested 
that less than half of that amount would be the maximum acceptable or appropriate, 
with the NTHP requesting that alternatives between 1.5 and 3m gross square feet 
needed to be more carefully evaluated, even if it meant the DHS being sited at 
multiple locations.  
The discussion of development density was about a desire not to overwhelm the site 
with new construction or high levels of traffic on (or off) the site.  The GSA 
acknowledged that the consulting parties were correct in assuming that the DHS's 
needs would be greater than the minimum development options being proposed  by the 
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consulting parties (1.5m GSF), and in fact the client's needs actually exceed the 4.5m 
gross square feet being considered for St. Elizabeths.  The draft and final 
Environmental Impact Statements for St. Es, however, were prepared to evaluate the 
impacts of development alternatives with the full possible range between 1.5 to 4.5m 
gross square feet.  It was important to remember that, as the client, DHS wanted to be 
housed on a secure campus environment, and the GSA's assigned task was to help 
them achieve that goal.  The GSA had needs for substantial new federal office spaces 
across DC, and the possibility of using St. Elizabeths to make that DHS vacated space 
available for other use,  may have been part of the plan to fulfill those needs.  
Although the finalized EIS actually covered the information desired by the consulting 
parties, the NTHP put forth that the findings of the study were flawed, publicly 
referring to the St. Elizabeths project as “death by shoehorn.”82
(3)  Protection, Reuse and Treatment of Existing Cultural Resources
The GSA is required, not only by the NHPA and the Secretary of the Interior's 
recommendations,  but also by several Executive Orders to look first at reuse, and if 
possible, adaptation and/or incorporation of historic structures into its plans for office 
space.  By utilizing minimization by design, the GSA was addressing the issue of 
adaptive reuse in ways that would help preserve this property into the future.  
The NTHP placed St. Elizabeths on its endangered sites list in 2002 because of the 
site's state of disrepair.  By the time that St. Es was turned over to the GSA in 
82  A Disaster for St. Elizabeths.  Moe, Richard, President HTHP.  Editorial.  The Washington Post.  
08Jan2009.
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December 2004, the site had been deteriorating for well over a decade.  The DC 
Historic Preservation Review Board listed both the West and East campuses of St. Es 
as a historic district in May 2005, affording them the most powerful means of 
protection.83  There was a great deal of interest in the preservation community at what 
was going on at St. Elizabeths.  GSA's work usually set precedents, and because the 
site was the largest undeveloped tract of land in DC,  and due to its NHL status, this 
case was breaking new ground. 
The GSA began its stewardship by spending $14.5m stabilizing the physical assets on 
the site, including the complete structural replacement of collapsed roofs on two 
buildings and the boarding up of windows and doorways on the campus.  In time, a 
thorough survey of the historic building and landscape elements was undertaken to 
determine what structures would be the most valuable and appropriate for adaptive 
reuse, and to allow for the design of new buildings to work along with the existing 
campus resources and any minimize impacts by dealing with them during the design 
process.  
(4)  Security Perimeter and Public Access
Public access and preservation of cultural resources on the St. Elizabeths campus, such 
as the Point and Civil War Cemetery, were highly valued by local stakeholders and 
neighbors, and this project was seen as a threat.  There was a desire to maintain access 
to the site as it was said to have existed while the hospital was in operation.  “The 
83 Local protection in Washington is bound up with State protection because of the size of the District, 
and the fact that the DC government and Washington City government are one in the same, unlike, 
for example, the relationship between Ithaca NY, Tompkins County, NY, the NYS SHPO, and the 
government of the State of New York in Albany, NY. 
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Point,” for example, is essentially a bluff that overlooks downtown Washington DC, 
and had evidently been used by the local community for picnicking, sightseeing, and 
Fourth of July fireworks viewing for years.  The new development, as planned for 
DHS, was to create a secure campus with very limited access, cutting off public 
visitation to a National Historic Landmark.
As far as public access goes, security for the client (the DHS) was an obvious but 
essentially non-negotiable constraint.  The site layout was going on as the NEPA 
process was proceeding, and while the master plan was being worked out, so the GSA 
was continually revisiting development decisions in light of the needs of the DHS, the 
desires of the consulting parties, and input from the public (and politicians).  The GSA 
investigated allowances for public access to the St. Es NHL, but the best this might be, 
after project completion, would be to allow visits for pre-scheduled special events or 
escorted group tours.  It was an oft-repeated myth that open access to the public or the 
neighborhood had ever been the case at St. Elizabeths, due to its status as a mental 
hospital.   In fact, all the proposed plans kept access at its historic level, which was 
essentially no access.  
Additional security concerns also included keeping the vista at “the point” inaccessible 
to anyone without the proper clearance, as it was line of sight to both Reagan National 
Airport and Bolling AFB (where Air Force One and the Marine One and Two 
helicopters are stationed).  It also had a clear view of the central capital region from 
across the Anacostia River, and there were concerns that the site, if open to the public,  
could be used as a place from which to plan, coordinate or launch an attack on the 
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Capital.  A change to this access status, although highly desirable for many reasons 
(such as exposing the public to an exceptional historic site) was not going to be 
achievable given the operational parameters of the DHS and the security concerns of 
the US Government.
(5)  Site Master Planning Concurrent With NEPA and NHPA
The consulting preservation parties had significant reservations about the site master 
planning taking place concurrently with the design of the new Coast Guard building 
for the campus.  This was a  question of appropriate planning policy, as project 
planning normally will take place first so as to inform the design process.  Having this 
take place simultaneously was not seen as a violation of the intent of section 106 or 
110, but it was an area of great concern.
The consulting parties saw the planning process as unnecessarily aggressive, and felt it 
risked the integrity of the NHL campus.   They pointed out that both NEPA and 
Section 106 require treating the entire site as an NHL, and that even if the USCG has 
been proposed for a totally vacant part of the campus, it would still be considered an 
adverse effect within their Area of Potential Effect (APE).  The whole site, including 
viewsheds, was part of the programmatic concerns they had, and they felt they were 
not being heard.   There had been no chance for the public to comment on the USCG 
site selection until after summer of 2006, over a year after the announcement of the 
choice.   
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According to meeting minutes, the CFA and NCPC in particular were concerned over 
planning issues they were being confronted with in presentations that had already 
seemingly been decided by the GSA, and these parties felt that they needed to be 
providing input during design, not afterward.   This meant that input on historic 
preservation should have been sought as soon as GSA began to think about the site, 
before December 2004,  and regular consulting party meetings should have started 
immediately upon acquisition, not eighteen months afterward, long after planning had 
progressed to an advanced stage.
Part of this seems to parallel a differential of planning priorities within the GSA.  
There were apparently intensive meetings between the architects, engineers and 
planners taking place on the USCG part of the project in 2004, but that work does not 
seem to have been generating a  lot of historic preservation consultant paperwork 
regarding Section 106  even through late 2005 (the USCG site would necessarily have 
a number of APE issues that would need to be documented and studied, even though it 
was to be “new construction”).  On the rest of the St. Es site, surveys of the historic 
resources generating Existing Conditions Reports, Historic Landscape Reports, 
Historic Structures Reports, Building Preservation Plans, and the like were being 
created (and are now posted on the public information site), but not a lot was 
appearing on the USCG project side of the proposed undertaking.  Reports indicate 
that this trend was sounding alarms at the other consulting parties offices, too. The 
approach got the whole process off on the wrong foot, and it was something the GSA 
struggled to recover from in the months to come.
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Scheduling issues also arose when it came to the completion of the St. Elizabeths 
Master Plan.  The process was going to overlap (by about a month) the schedule to 
begin actual nuts-and-bolts design of the Coast Guard Building.  On the surface this 
was likely to be a difficult issue from a PR standpoint, and  a number of the consulting 
parties were quite vocal about it.  However, the overlap point was figured out months 
in advance, and was actually going to occur over the December 2008-January 2009 
holiday period.  The consulting parties were made aware of this aberration by the 
distribution of the project schedule  in advance.   
This timing difficulty came from a conflict between the NEPA time-line process for 
the determination of the effects and the plans to mitigate GSA office space leasing 
issues, although the NHPA Section 106 process that was running concurrently with it 
did provide additional delays within the process.  When the new USCG project was 
first proposed, the idea was to complete the building before the old lease ran out on 
their current headquarters (making signing of a lease for another five years 
unnecessary).  In the end, the project was further delayed by planning issues and 
Congressional budget cuts, and this overlap became a minor factor in the grand 
scheme of things.  Changes could (and would) be made after the 'final' Coast Guard 
design was presented.  As the overlap only meant an extra month for the Master Plan, 
in time the NCPC did indicate a willingness to work with the GSA to help them on 
their tight development schedule.  It was implicitly understood that the design for the 
Coast Guard would be subject to the final master plan and design guidelines that were 
being created, and close coordination between the parties concerned was expected.
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An underlying consideration during the consultations, planning and negotiations was 
the physical status of the St. Elizabeths site.  The Washington Business Journal had 
referred to the site in 2005 as “a blighted campus,”84   and although several consulting 
parties espoused a desire to see the DHS facility sited somewhere else,  the cultural 
resources on the St. Es site were essentially decomposing.  The $14.5m initially spent 
by the GSA to stabilize the structures on the site barely scratched the surface of what 
needed to be done, which is not hard to understand considering it has over 60 
buildings, many of which are well over 100 years old.  Without funding, parts of the 
site were dangerously close to becoming cases of demolition by neglect.  Urgency was 
a consideration in this regard.
The St. Elizabeths Project and Politics
There was,  predictably, a significant amount of political pressure on the St. Es project. 
As was seen at the Winder Complex and the African Burial Ground, when politicians  
are confronted with the ire of the public, the project scope can change in an 
unanticipated fashion.  Regulations might be altered or exempted by the stroke of a 
pen.  One major player was Eleanor Holmes Norton, the Member of the U.S.  House 
of Representatives from the District of Columbia's 'At-large' district, who has held that 
office since January 1991.  As a Delegate to Congress she is entitled to sit in the 
House of Representatives and vote in committee, but is not allowed to take part in 
legislative floor votes.  She was, at the time of the St. Es project, the Chair of The 
Sub-committee on Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency 
84 Mazzucca, Tim.  Southeast's St.  E's to land new HQ’s, $900M budget.  Washington Business 
Journal, 12Dec2005.  http://washington.bizjournals.com/washington/stories/2005/12/12/story2.html 
Last Accessed 04Jan2013.
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Management, a position that placed her in a position to influence the decision on 
where the new headquarters of the DHS was going to be situated.  Norton was not 
going to let a cabinet level department move outside the District boundaries, and she 
was determined that the new facility was going to be situated east of the Anacostia 
river, in an area underdeveloped and underserved by the Federal government.85
In the earliest stages of planning, the GSA staff felt that all the options and alternatives 
had been adequately recorded and evaluated across the most feasible sites within a 
reasonable distance of downtown Washington.  In their minds this had been done 
when they published the Notice of Intent for the USCG headquarters.  The PBS staff 
only re-visited the entire data set publicly after the requirements of the DHS were 
revealed and began to be debated by the consulting parties.  Given the failings of the 
other locations available for its use when the study was done in 2005, St. Elizabeths 
had been the obvious choice.  However, the preservation of the NHL was in the 
forefront for the GSA's Center for Historic Buildings staff when defending the 
property.  As one member of the CHB staff recalled,  
One of the master plan ideas from DHS was… 'we should just level at 
all, it's a great site, it's got a fence, it will be a secure facility, but just  
get  rid  of  all  these  buildings  and  build  it  new  and  it'll  be  a  lot 
easier.' ...and [the CHB] said “Well, no.”  One of the things I was told 
when seeing this in the first few months was “make no mistake, this is 
not a preservation project” and I said “It can't not be.  It's inherent in 
the site you picked.  You did that to yourself when you picked this site, 
you can't just disregard it.  It's not just the consolidation of DHS.86 
85  Beth Savage, GSA FPO Interview, 20Nov2012.
86  Beth Savage, GSA FPO Interview, 20Nov2012.
98
Continual reminders from CHB preservationists helped the PBS remain in compliance 
with Section 106 procedures throughout the USCG Master Planning process.  This not 
only gave the project the best chance of staying on schedule, but also helped it to 
avoid costly litigation and counter any bad press.   By continually documenting the 
GSA's efforts to stay within the intent and letter of the law, being immediately 
responsive to inquiries from concerned parties, and creating a massive and detailed 
paper trail that showed a concern for compliance (the online St. Es Documentation 
Center previously mentioned), the GSA publicly laid out its commitment to the NEPA 
and NHPA processes.  
Politics in DC,  Both Federal & Local,  All At Once
As previously mentioned, politics was certainly at work in the DHS consolidation at 
St. Elizabeths. When looking the rush to move forward on this project,  we must recall 
what was happening at the time.  Republican George W.  Bush was President from 
January 2001 to January 2009, with a re-election in November 2004, and the proposal 
and planning for the St. Es campus involving DHS took place during his tenure.  The 
signing of the Programmatic Agreement for St. E's on December 9, 2008 took place 
only six weeks before he left office and a new Democratic president was sworn in.  
Between 2001 and 2012 the control of Congress and the Senate flipped back and forth 
between Republican and Democratic control, with only one session (the 111th 
Congress from 2009 to 2011) where one party held a majority in both houses.87  That 
Congress, as a result of the election of November 2008 when Barack Obama was first 
87 Composition of Congress by political party.  http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0774721.html.  Last 
accessed 24Jan2013.
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brought in as President, was also seated six weeks after the St. Es Programmatic 
Agreement was signed.  The pre-planned deadline to complete the St. Es agreements 
fits neatly within the last weeks of the political calender of that era, allowing it to be 
seen as a legacy preserving accomplishment of the outgoing administration.   
One thought expressed in the interviews was that there seemed to be a concerted effort 
to delay the project as long as possible, and by doing so the proposals to break up 
DHS that were in the news might come to fruition before the St. Es project could 
move forward.88  Decisions are a product of their times, and the political and societal 
time-line of the era needs to be considered while investigating the background behind 
an undertaking, no matter what their size, but particularly in ones as large as St. 
Elizabeths.
The DHS and the Consultation Process
Even though they are required to have a FPO (Federal Preservation Officer) and 
written preservation policies, the DHS appeared to be extremely impatient with the  
consulting parties and the NHPA Section 106 and 110 process.  Records indicate that 
their desire was to complete the process as quickly as possible, which is why any sites 
that required time to transfer or turn over (such as WRAMH) were discounted during 
the initial site considerations.  As previously mentioned, some of these could have 
been utilized with less difficulty and speedier than St. Es, given the delays that were 
88 http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-03-30/business/35446682_1_homeland-security-security-  
campus-project  Last accessed 04Apr2013.  See also Appendix 7 where this article is reproduced in 
full.
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eventually encountered with consultations, planning, and congressional funding.  The 
push to move forward may have proven to be false economy.
The DHS' negotiation strategy was described as less of a consultation than a 
confrontation.  One consulting party referred to the DHS interaction as “aggressive”  
while another hedged their response by saying it was an “education.”  Managing the 
DHS's participation and its interaction with the consulting parties was an important 
part of the customer service provided by the PBS, but it was only one part.  As lead  on 
the undertaking, the GSA was also tasked with compliance, leading consultations, 
scheduling meetings, distributing documentation, holding discussions and public 
information sessions with interested parties, overseeing contractors, dealing with 
design and preservation issues, dealing with public relations issues, and taking care of 
interdepartmental and inter-agency communications.  By acting as the 'orchestra 
conductor' for all these items, the GSA was in a good position to tailor the experience 
of the DHS and the consulting parties, and lead them through the complex NEPA and 
NHPA processes.  However, the GSA's outlook of pride, preservation, and compliance 
was difficult when confronted with a client who had a “winner take all” attitude, and 
was described by one attendee at the consulting meetings as “just awful.”
DHS has  become all  anti-terrorism,  but  that's  not  all  of  what  DHS 
departments do.  This fervor has overtaken them, and they would be 
well-suited to try to recalibrate a bit. Yes that's very important, no one 
would say it's not, but is that the sole overriding purpose of DHS? 89
Some consulting parties and community members, while insisting on alternative sites 
being investigated in fine detail, expressed an 'anyone but the DHS' mindset, which in 
part could have been brought on by those interactions.  The Rev.  Anthony Motley, a 
89 Attributed to Mr. James A. Williams, acting GSA Administrator, by a protected source.
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Congress Heights resident for 55 years and president of the Council of Churches of 
Greater Washington, said: "I'd like to see anything on the site but Homeland Security.” 
Motely recalled picnics, apple picking, ballgames and horseback riding there, 
contradicting the closed-campus environment of a secure mental hospital.90  
 
It is apparent that the dislike between the DHS and the consulting parties was mutual.  
There are public responses from the consulting parties that reference those exchanges: 
some point to threats from DHS to walk out on the consideration of St. Elizabeths, 
with no hope of  a negotiated agreement.  Reports indicate that contact between the 
DHS and the consulting parties decreased significantly after the time the draft EIS was 
released in late 2007.  
Preferences & Biases in Research and Negotiated Procedures
A major problem, not just at St. Es but on any project, is that the cultural resource 
professionals on a project will never be totally objective, as much as they may try.  
They are being funded by the agencies or organizations or employers who have hired 
them, whether it is a branch of the government, a private client, or any one of dozens 
consulting parties.  Each looks at a project through their own lens, and in order to get 
and keep the work, the interests of the party who is making the payments are the ones 
that will be expressed.  As discussed by author and CRM professional Thomas F.  
King:91
90 Holley, Joe.  A Tussle Over St. Elizabeths.  The Washington Post, 17Jun2007.
91  King, Thomas F., Our Unprotected Heritage: Whitewashing the Destruction of our Natural and 
Cultural Environment.  Left Coast Press.  2009.
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If  we're  so  enthusiastic  about  our  client's  project,  how  can  we 
possibly do a responsible, even semi-objective job of analyzing its 
impacts?  Particularly since, if we're working at their pleasure, we 
have to keep our clients reasonably happy with us.  The client wants 
to  build  this  project,  that's  understandable,  and if  we seem to  be 
throwing up environmental roadblocks, he's probably going to start 
shopping for another consultant.
That being said, professional ethics can only be bent so far.  Those that write reports 
realize that what they write in support or in opposition to a proposed undertaking can 
be the difference between future credibility and a lack of employment in a particular 
sector of the field in question.   
The first  thing that  I  said  when I  was given the assignment  was 
“Does  the  GSA  care  that  is  destroying  a  National  Historic 
Landmark?”  The response was “Why do you say that?” and I said 
“Because you are.” Their response was “How can we alter the plan 
in your mind not to do that?92
Those interviewed for this thesis expressed a dedication to their field, and were 
unequivocal in their insistence that they were not required to compromise their 
integrity for the sake of their income on the St. Es project.  Certainly there were 
discussions, heated arguments, and disagreements in the course of hammering out an 
agreement (and they continue to this day), but they only occur because of a belief in 
the principles of the work they are doing:  whether it be architecture, preservation, 
planning, politics, or national defense.  We must separate the person from the issue at 
hand, and understand that each party truly believes they are doing the right thing.  
Otherwise we cannot hope to create a collaborative atmosphere where a final outcome 
that provides optimal returns for all is attainable.
92 Beth Savage interview, 20Nov2012.
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Understanding the motivating factors behind each player in a negotiation or mediation 
is critical to obtaining an agreement which has the ability to maximize return for all 
parties concerned.  Knowing what is important to the other party allows discussions to 
move forward in a mutually advantageous manner, unlike the adoption of an 
adversarial stance which can be a barrier to an optimal solution.  Realizing this is 
imperative when we engage in a negotiation around a complex and controversial 
project such as this one.  By employing professionals who had worked at multiple 
cultural resource agencies,  the GSA understood the background behind the requests of 
the consulting parties, and was able to work to satisfy their needs.
Transparency in Information Sharing, and Misunderstandings
After the terrorist attacks of Sept.  11, 2001, heightened security standards for all 
federal buildings were of paramount concern, and releasing information on the ST. 
Elizabeths project (in the minute detail everyone used to expect before September 
2001) was probably difficult for the GSA, given new restrictions on “Sensitive But 
Unclassified (SBU) data.  The GSA directive on this is PBS 3490.1, Document 
Security for Sensitive But Unclassified Paper and Electronic Building Information, 
issued March 8, 2002, shortly after the formation of DHS.  The latest edition, PBS 
3490.1A (of June 1, 2009) states:93
Building information considered SBU must be protected with access 
strictly controlled and limited to those individuals having a need to 
know such  information.   Those  with  a  need  to  know may include 
Federal,  State,  and  local  government  entities,  and  non-government 
entities engaged in the conduct of business on behalf of or with GSA. 
Non-government  entities  may  include  architects,  engineers, 
93 http://www.gsa.gov/portal/directive/d0/content/520542  Last accessed 15Feb2013.
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consultants,  contractors,  subcontractors,  suppliers,  and  others 
submitting an offer or bid to GSA or performing work under a GSA 
contract  or  subcontract.   Contractors  must  provide  SBU  building 
information  when  needed  for  the  performance  of  official  Federal, 
State,  and local government functions, such as for code compliance 
reviews and for the issuance of building permits.  Public safety entities 
such  as  fire  and  utility  departments  may  require  access  to  SBU 
building information on a need to know basis.  This clause must not 
prevent or encumber the dissemination of SBU building information to 
public safety entities.
This included data that revealed floor plans of federally owned, leased or controlled 
buildings, or those of any proposed buildings, and could mean restriction of access to 
such innocuous sources as HABS, HAER and HALS documentation (and if taken to 
an extreme, National Register nomination packages).  This led to some 
misunderstandings along the way between the GSA, DHS and the consulting parties.  
Although the GSA was doing its best to balance the needs of their very special client 
with the NHL significance of the site, transfer of data was impeded early in the 
project.  As time went on this was ironed out, but it was a problem seen across the 
entire Federal government sector, and just as is seen with NEPA and the NHPA, the 
GSA's work had to set precedents just to get its work done.94  
GSA at St. Es:  Negotiating Between A Rock and a Hard Place 
The challenge that the GSA faced at St Es was ultimately not one of process (reaching 
out to the community, consulting with agencies,  keeping elected officials in the loop).  
In 2005 and 2006 the real challenge was that the GSA had a plan that was opposed on 
94 Further information on SBU information may be found by viewing a presentation on the St. 
Elizabeths Public Document site at: 
http://assets.stelizabethsdevelopment.com/documents/document_center/SecPerimMOAExhibit_14_
SBU1_20100423173346.pdf?CFTREEITEMKEY=D917  Last accessed 10Apr2013.
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a fundamental level all of the local and national consulting parties who had the power 
to impede its plans.  The parties were at odds with the way planning for the site was 
approached, in that they wanted the needs of the NHL put first and the GSA's (and the 
Administration's) second.  They didn't agree with the proposed density or 
programmatic needs of the DHS related to security, building size and public access, 
the impacts on traffic or the proposed solutions, or to changes that would occur to the 
visible skyline of  the Anacostia area.  Negotiating on those concerns without losing 
control of its ability to serve the core needs of its client, whose priorities had 
ultimately been set by the Administration, was the PBS' job. 
On the other side, DHS was making demands (recall the desire to see the site 
bulldozed as mentioned earlier), and design issues that were actually the purview of 
the GSA.  DHS did not appear to be taking a positive attitude about historic 
preservation, despite having a legally designated Federal Preservation Officer and a 
support staff.  They wanted features that cut the Anacostia neighborhood off from the 
financial benefits of having a government installation in its midst.  The DHS's 
program was in opposition to nearly everything being sought by the consulting parties. 
As the lead agency, the GSA and its subcontractors appeared to realize everyone at the 
table was going to have to work together on additional agreements for this and other 
projects.  
There was a crackerjack team working on the master plan, there's an 
amazing project manager, there were some very good subs on the team. 
But  part  of  the  challenge  was  with  some  of  those  subs,  whose 
professional opinion did not match what the GSA was having to do.  So 
bridging,  and  maintaining  their  professionalism,  but  trying  to  push 
them as far as we could push, to go where the agency needed to go, 
because there was no way we're going to be able to progress if they 
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were saying 'this' and we were going to be doing 'that'.95
Those involved in the undertaking from the preservation side of the equation were 
early-on very concerned about getting the right firms on board for the work to insure 
sensitivity to the preservation aspects of the work:  architects and engineers, 
researchers, archaeologists and consultants who were experienced in work involving 
the Department of the Interior and the National Parks Service, the DCSHPO, NCPC 
and other concerned parties in the preservation sphere.  
Good planning makes for good preservation, while good planning also makes for good 
design.    Because of the importance and magnitude of the proposed project at St. Es 
the GSA placed several of its Preservation staff into a special group to just deal with 
the St. Es project.  They were brought in from CHB, PBS Central Office and GSA 
NCR.  There they juggled multiple cultural resource contractors, contact with other 
government agencies, interested legislators and many regulatory bodies, plus all of the 
consulting parties.  To keep up with the deadline that the Administration and Congress 
had placed on the project, the GSA needed to boil that all down into summaries, 
reports and recommendations.  Where other projects might have had architects or 
administrators at the forefront of such an effort, it was the preservation professionals 
at the GSA who were at the lead of the St. Es project, because without pre-planning 
the preservation efforts needed to comply with NEPA and the NHPA, the undertaking 
was going to become a very expensive boondoggle.  The volume of information they 
95 Beth Savage interview, 20Nov2012. 
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were able to process in a short period of time is impressive, but it has to be realized 
that their only job was assuring the compliance of this one project.  
The desire to save St. Es was in some ways balanced by significant reservations about 
the project.  Beth Savage, GSA FPO said: 
There  was  this  inherent  'here's  the  decision,  implement  it'  and  we're 
saying 'that's not how it can work.  We have to listen, we have to hear 
comments, we have to address them, we are trying to respond to that in 
fixing the master plan.'96   
Joan Brierton adds: 
Lets just suffice it to say I was able to maintain that line,  where I never 
had to say 'I did it because I was told to.97   
There were times, undoubtedly, when that did not make the preservation staff popular 
within the GSA or with the client.  However, when it comes to negotiations, it 
important to separate our impressions about personality from the project being 
discussed.  
One difficulty for the consulting parties was the sheer volume of data being produced 
for the project, and meetings and tours that occurred several times a month.  Some 
parties interested in the protection of the site and the GSA's plans may have found it 
difficult to keep up unless they also had a staff to attend meetings, process St. Es 
paperwork, watch the news for reports and press conferences on the project, check the 
congressional record continuously for parallel projects and budget allocations, and 
watch government records of land acquisitions and disposals.  Interest groups who had 
been watching the St. Es project had many other items of interest, proposals and 
96 Interview with Beth Savage, who, at the time relating to this comment, was GSA NCR RHPO.
97 Interview comments, Joan Brierton, GSA, PCAB, 09Jan2013.
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concerns at one time across DC or the nation, and those outside of Washington were at 
a decided disadvantage.  This certainly had the unfortunate consequence of limiting 
immediate feedback from outside the area on this project.
The consulting parties made their feelings known throughout the project, in print and 
meetings, and those records ended up in the online public database.   The NTHP, in 
particular, continuously lead a PR campaign against the project.  They and the DC 
Preservation league (DCPL), National Coalition To Save Our Mall (NCTSOM) and 
The Committee Of 100 on the Federal City (C100FC) combined on a letter in August 
2008 saying: 
DHS consolidation should not have been considered for St. Elizabeths. 
Based upon the information provided to date by GSA, it is difficult for 
us to conclude that the DHS consolidation is a compatible use for the 
National Historic Landmark West Campus of St. Elizabeths.98  
In the local community and with the other consulting parties, the GSA felt it had been 
extremely proactive.  Between January 2005 and March 2006 alone, these actions 
included:
 A NEPA scoping meeting that included over 3,000 hand delivered postcards to 
community residents, plus advertisements in newspapers East of the Hill, the 
Washington Post, and the Washington Times.
 Personal phone calls to encourage attendance of community leaders at the 
scoping meeting.
 Letters to over 150 agencies, organizations, and residents about the scoping 
meeting.
98  NTHP et al.  Letter to GSA, 08Aug2008.
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 Two separate presentations to each of the Advisory Neighborhood 
Commission's (ANC's) in Ward 8 (ANC's were Consulting Parties to the 
Section 106 process and were invited to the monthly planning meetings).
 Two separate presentations to the Anacostia Coordinating Council (ACC).99  
 Participation in DDOT's Anacostia Development Fair, where over 400 
residents got the chance to take a bus tour of the campus.
 Outreach to the Anacostia Business Association (ABA).100
 A Community Meeting in Ward 8 by local Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton, 
specifically about the St. Es development.
 The creation of the website www.stelizabethsdevelopment.com that would 
hold critical public information that would be available for access throughout 
the project.
 Direct contact with DC Mayor Williams, Council Chairman Linda Cropp, 
Council member Marion Barry, Council member Kwame Brown, Council 
member Vincent Orange, Council member Kathy Patterson, and Council 
member Adrian Fenty ( who became Mayor of Washington 2007-2011 ). 
 Monthly participation in Anacostia transportation meetings hosted by DDOT
 Stakeholder meetings for several agencies (included DC DPW, DC DOH, DC 
DMH, DCP&R, WASA DDOT, DCOP, SHPO, MWCOG, V-DOT, MD-DOT, 
99 The ACC was not in the original list of organizations and individuals contacted by the GSA, but by 
this point it had become an active participant in the public process.  “Founded in 1983, it is a 
volunteer membership consortium of organizations and individuals concerned with the revitalization 
of Anacostia and its neighboring communities east of the Anacostia River. ACC is lead by a local 
board of directors.”  http://www.anacostiacc.org   Last Accessed 15Jan2013.
100 The ABA appears to have shut down in 2011.  The Anacostia Economic Development Agency  
(AEDA) is available at http://www.anacostiacdc.com/ Last accessed 28Jan2013.
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WMATA, DC Office of Planning, VDOT, MDDOT, MNCPP, WMATA, U.S.  
Fish and Wildlife).
 A stakeholder meeting for federal agency neighbors of the St.  E's property 
(included the Department of the Navy, the Air Force and the National Park 
Service).
 Ongoing Consultation meetings with NCPC, CFA, ACHP, DCSHPO and other 
Section 106 process consulting parties.
Despite this outreach, some consulting organizations saw the actions of the GSA to 
move the project forward between January and December 2008 as overly aggressive 
and schedule oriented, and in some cases took personal affront to the way that the 
GSA's preservation professionals, as individuals, completed their tasks.  The 
preservation staff, with a combined 100 years of experience in preservation, had 
worked with or alongside the very groups that were now complaining.   The staff on 
the St. Es project took flack from inside and outside the government, and were under 
pressure from within the GSA to do what was expedient to move the project forward.  
The Administration, DHS, USCG, Congress and the National Park Service were all 
very insistent on their needs, and there were frequent and sometimes tumultuous 
meetings.   At a certain point, inter-agency relations became so strained that a directive 
had to be made from the very top for agencies to move St. Es toward a conclusion,  
because the project was an administration priority.  
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The Coast Guard was not happy about the project
It must be noted that the Coast Guard was very resistant to the proposed consolidation 
of operations at the new St. Es campus, even if they were moving into a new, purpose-
built structure that was one-third the size of the Pentagon.  Now working under the 
DHS,101 the USCG had occupied the same site at the confluence of the Anacostia and 
Potomac Rivers  for twenty five years.  This also placed it literally next door to the 
Naval War College, The National Defense University, The Industrial College of the 
Armed Forces, and, of course, their own boatyard.  New new site would have none of 
these amenities.  
The CG thought it was secure at its current location at the confluence of the Potomac 
and Anacostia Rivers, having its place cemented in federal legislation several years 
before with a stipulation that they could not be moved.  However, the CG was 
informed that old legislation can be changed by new legislation, and that's exactly 
what happened in late 2006.
One example of an objection that was raised by the USCG was the need for seismic 
upgrades at St. Es.102   This was due to federal mandates for progressive collapse in the 
engineering of federal buildings.   For existing buildings there is a requirement under 
Executive Orders EO12941 and EO12699 to utilize the standards referenced  as 
ICSSC RP6 "Standards of Seismic Safety for Federally Owned and Leased Buildings" 
101The USCG previously worked under the department of the Navy and actually pre-dated it, being 
foundeded in 1790.
102This was five years before the August 2011 earthquake in DC that closed several public buildings.
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to evaluate buildings and mitigate unacceptable risks.103   The concern was in regards 
to  projects that reuse existing facilities, and the St. Es campus had over 60 buildings 
of various ages.  Here is an excerpt from the chapters of most concern to preservation 
of the buildings (emphasis added): 
4.3 Existing Construction Modernization 
Existing structures undergoing a modernization should be upgraded to 
new construction requirements when required by the risk assessment.
4.3.1 Protection Levels
Risk  assessments  based  on  the  new  construction  criteria  must  be 
performed  on existing structures to examine the feasibility of upgrading 
the  facility.  The results, including at a minimum recommendations and 
cost,   must  be  documented  in  a  written  report  before  submission  for 
project funding.  
4.3.2 Progressive Collapse 
Existing buildings will not be retrofitted to prevent progressive collapse 
unless  they are  undergoing a  structural  renovation,  such as  a  seismic 
upgrade.   Prior  to  the  submission  for  funding,  all  structures  must  be 
analyzed according to requirements for new construction, and a written 
report  must  clearly state  the potential  vulnerability of  the building to 
progressive  collapse.   This  report  will  be  used  as  a  planning  tool  to 
reduce risk.  Findings of the design-analysis must be incorporated into 
the project’s risk assessment and include the methodology, the details of 
the  progressive  collapse  analysis,  retrofit  recommendations,  cost 
estimates, and supporting calculations.   
4.4 Historic Buildings 
Historic buildings are covered by these criteria in the same manner as 
other existing buildings (see 4.3).
Although the raising of this seismic concern may have been a delaying tactic, this was 
quickly met, as most of the buildings at St. Es being reused that the Coast Guard 
headquarters would use (an exercise building, a cafeteria, a supply dispensary, etc.) 
were already being structurally modified on the interior to be safer than the buildings 
they were  leaving.   The move was estimated to save the government $84m over the 
103ICSSC RP6 was actually written by the GSA, so  the Agency was intimately familiar with the scope 
and intent of that document.
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cost of leasing the old and very much less secure Coast Guard site for 30 years (at 
2005 prices).104   Of course, there were further legislative initiatives designed to stall 
the process.
PL 109-241:  The Coast Guard Maritime and Transportation Act of 2006  
Coast Guard appropriations and guidance acts are passed every few years.  The 
previous legislation was enacted in 2004, and another was passed in 2012.  It includes 
direction, pay raises, staffing, funding and budgeting, and numerous detailed 
instructions of what the agency is to undertake while that bill is in effect.  The 
particular bill that dealt with St. Es was passed on July 11, 2006.  Within it, as one of 
several hundred other sections, was tucked this item:
SEC.  212.  Limitation on moving assets to St. Elizabeths Hospital—
The Commandant of the Coast Guard may not move any Coast Guard 
personnel, property, or other assets to the West Campus of St. Elizabeths 
Hospital  until  the  Administrator  of  General  Services  submits  to  the 
Committee  on  Transportation  and  Infrastructure  of  the  House  of 
Representatives  and  the  Committee  on  Commerce,  Science,  and 
Transportation and the Committee on Environment and Public Works of 
the Senate a plan— 
(1) to provide road access to the site from Interstate Route 295;
(2) for the design of facilities for at least one Federal agency other than 
the Coast  Guard that would house no fewer than 2,000 employees at 
such location;
(3) to provide transportation of employees and visitors to and from sites 
in  the  District  of  Columbia  metropolitan  area  that  are  located  within 
close proximity to St. Elizabeths Hospital;
(4) for the construction, facade, and layout of the proposed structures, 
including security  considerations,  parking facilities,  medical  facilities, 
dining facilities, and physical exercise facilities on the West Campus;
(5)  that  analyzes  the  costs  of  building  restrictions,  planning 
considerations,  and  permitting  requirements  of  constructing  new 
facilities  on or near historic landmarks and historic buildings (especially 
104 Adjusting for inflation, as of 2013 that savings would be well over $100m. 
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those known to possess medical waste, lead paint, and asbestos);
(6) that analyzes the feasibility of relocating Coast Guard Headquarters 
[to six other sites]
(7)  that  analyzes  how  a  potential  move  to  the  West  Campus  of  St. 
Elizabeths Hospital would impact— 
(A) the Coast Guard’s ability to access and cooperatively work with the 
Department of Homeland Security and the other Federal agencies of the 
Department; and
(B)  plans  under  consideration  for  relocating  all  or  parts  of  the 
headquarters of the Department of Homeland Security and other offices 
of  the Department.
This legislation was made to insure that the Coast Guard would not get moved into a 
new building out in middle of nowhere with no other federal agencies to share the site. 
Given the vagaries of Congressional funding that we have seen in the last few years, it 
is apparent from this legislation that the USCG was looking into its crystal ball and not 
only was unhappy, but feeling quite nervous about the proposed move.  If the 
rehabilitation of the rest of the site wasn't  carried out, it was looking at being the only 
tenant on a site meant for thousands of others, on the opposite side of the river from 
the 'power center' of Washington DC, and was being referred to by the locals as being 
'shipped to Siberia.'
Addressing Increased Security Concerns For Federal Offices After 2001
As far as overall building security for federal office space, there was an increased need 
and requirement for blast protection after September 2001.  Utilizing the St. Es 
campus provided significant monetary savings in the implementation security 
measures.  By providing adequate gate security and perimeter fencing around the 
entire campus, the alteration of individual buildings on the St. Elizabeths campus 
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became unnecessary  (several scenarios had been investigated, such as the addition of 
laminated safety glass to historic wooden sashes and then overlaying that with an 
exterior blast-resistant storm window).  The savings from using perimeter security 
measures were estimated at roughly $120m lower than the cost of having to secure and 
blast harden all of the individual buildings on a campus without controlled access.105
Section 4(f) of the Transportation Act and the National Park Service
The St. Elizabeths site would require the evaluation of the GSA's Section 4(f) 
responsibilities of the Transportation Act.   This consideration was to look at not only 
how traffic would get there, but also the impact of transportation funding on the 
environment, including historic resources and viewsheds.   All feasible and prudent 
alternatives needed to be evaluated as to their projected impact.   Six were rejected as 
being infeasible, imprudent, or both, while four were found as acceptable, with 
preferences expressed.   In the end, a new exit off the nearby Shepherd Parkway was 
authorized, leading directly to the new on-site parking garage.  The problem was that 
the Shepherd Parkway was on National Park Service property, and making this change 
would cause a major review of the access requirements because of that status.  It 
would also invoke the ire of those in the NPS who, to this point, merely had an 
advisory role in the proceedings.
Over the next few months, the back-and-forth between the GSA, NPS and the FHA in 
regards to the Shepherd Parkway included some stern words.   There were threats from 
105 Based on perimeter security estimates during consultation.
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NPS that they would de-list St. Elizabeths as a National Historic Landmark if the 
proposal remained unchanged, and this threat would have been a real public relations 
problem if it were allowed to go unchallenged.106   This was countered by the 
preservation professionals at the GSA by saying that until the proper process was 
followed and actual physical changes were begun, the NPS could not legally move 
forward with such an action.  Beth Savage said:
We needed to get, as some part of this process, the Shepard Parkway, in 
order to fulfil the transportation improvements that were necessary to get 
the  people  to  the  site.   At  the  Park  Service  there  was  an  inherent 
animosity on that subject.  The thing I was able to do was to present the 
Park Service mindset on this [to the GSA].  The Park Service doesn't 
think about things the way that you think of them, and just because they 
have a different perspective it doesn't mean they're wrong.  They're on 
the other side of the fence, so how do we bring them along?  The Park 
Service pushed, and pushed, and pushed the GSA to do its due diligence 
when we were looking at transportation alternatives, to minimize what 
would ultimately be a necessary transfer of parkland.107
Eventually the parkland was transferred.  However, the constant interplay between the 
GSA, DHS, NPS and the various consulting parties consisted of a complex web of 
interconnected, if conflicting, mandates.  Significant negotiation skill and regular 
meetings helped everyone to better understand the programs and policies involved.  
One very real issue that impacted the outcome of the consultation process was a 
historical difference between agencies.  This posed a real threat to the protection of St. 
Es as an NHL, and to the consultation process.  One of the more serious issues in 
regards to this will be covered in the next chapter.
106  Beth Savage interview comments, 20Nov2012
107 Beth Savage interview, 20Nov2012.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
The Draft EIS & The Section 213 Report: 
A Critical Turning Point At St. Elizabeths  
A critical point in the process was the production of both a NEPA-required Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement and an Advisory Council for Historic Preservation 
requested Section 213 report, both of which cite adverse long-term impacts to the 
cultural resources at St. Es.  Unfortunately, the impact of these reports was mitigated 
by a failure to meet a critical deadline, and the case at St. Es begins to raise questions 
regarding the  effectiveness and ability of federal caretaker agencies to function under 
tight budget constraints, and just how much “Administration Priorities” can impact 
project outcomes.  It also brings into question the effectiveness of inter-agency 
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Illustration 11: St. Elizabeths Center building, decorative terracotta lion, 
damaged before GSA took control of the property.  Author photo
cooperation for the protection of Cultural Resources when historic animosities might 
be getting in the way.
The Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).
The GSA was required by regulations to issue a draft Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS).  It had to provide a full and fair analysis of proposed impacts.  40 CFR 1502.1 
of the Council on Environmental Quality Regulations (CEQR) states:108
The primary purpose of an environmental impact statement is to serve 
as an action-forcing device to insure that the policies and goals defined 
in the Act are infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the 
Federal  Government.   It  shall  provide  full  and  fair  discussion  of 
significant  environmental  impacts  and shall  inform decision-makers 
and the public  of  the reasonable alternatives  which would avoid or 
minimize  adverse  impacts  or  enhance  the  quality  of  the  human 
environment…  Statements shall be concise, clear, and to the point, 
and  shall  be  supported  by  evidence  that  the  agency  has  made  the 
necessary environmental analyses.  An environmental impact statement 
is  more  than  a  disclosure  document.   It  shall  be  used  by  Federal 
officials in conjunction with other relevant material to plan actions and 
make decisions.
Further, Sec.  1502.9 Draft, final, and supplemental statements prescribes (emphasis 
added):
(a)  Draft  environmental  impact  statements  shall  be  prepared  in 
accordance with the scope decided upon in the scoping process.  The 
lead agency shall work with the cooperating agencies and shall obtain 
comments as required in Part 1503 of this chapter.  The draft statement 
must fulfill and satisfy to the fullest extent possible the requirements 
established for final statements in section 102(2)(C) of the Act.  If a 
draft statement is so inadequate as to preclude meaningful analysis, the 
agency shall prepare and circulate a revised draft of the appropriate 
portion.  The agency shall make every effort to disclose and discuss at 
appropriate points in the draft statement all major points of view on the 
environmental  impacts  of  the  alternatives  including  the  proposed 
action.
108This section may be found at http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/regs/ceq/1502.htm#1502.1  The complete 
text of these regulations may be found at: http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/regs/ceq/toc_ceq.htm  Last 
accessed 24Jan2012.  
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The task of creating the Draft EIS was contracted to experienced firm The Smith 
Group.  They were in contact with the GSA throughout the process and were fully 
aware of the positions and objections accorded to the consulting parties.  They were 
also aware that, if they were to favor one side over another, they would be called out 
on it by the consulting parties.  If that happened, as stated in Sec.  1502.9, that could 
bring about a need for a revision and a re-circulation of the report, which would delay 
the NEPA process and therefore the proposed undertaking even more.  To understand 
this we must utilize both parts of Section 106 and the NEPA regulations. 
 
The criteria of Adverse Effect under Section 106 of the NHPA, 36 CFR 800.5(a)(1) – 
(2) is (emphasis added): 
(1) An adverse effect is found when an undertaking may alter, directly 
or  indirectly,  any  of  the  characteristics  of  a  historic  property  that 
qualify the property for inclusion in the National Register in a manner 
that  would diminish the  integrity of  the property's  location,  design, 
setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, or association.  Consideration 
shall be given to all qualifying characteristics of a historic property, 
including  those  that  may  have  been  identified  subsequent  to  the 
original  evaluation  of  the  property's  eligibility  for  the  National 
Register.  Adverse effects may include reasonably foreseeable effects 
caused by the undertaking that may occur later in time, be they farther 
removed in distance or be cumulative.
(2) Examples of adverse effects.
Adverse effects on historic properties include, but are not limited to:
(i) Physical destruction of or damage to all or part of the property;
(iv)  Change  of  the  character  of  the  property’s  use  or  of  physical 
features within  the  property's  setting  that  contribute  to  its  historic 
significance;
(v)  Introduction  of  visual,  atmospheric  or  audible  elements that 
diminish the integrity of the property's significant historic features;
The definition of the term “significantly” under provisions of NEPA; 40 CFR Sec.  
1508.27 requires the consideration of both context and intensity.   An action needs to 
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be analyzed for significance in several contexts, such as its significance to society as a 
whole, significance to the region, significance to the locality, and its significance to all 
the affected interests.   Significance varies with the setting of the proposed action:  In 
the case of a site-specific action, significance would depend upon the effects in the 
locale (rather than the whole wide world).   Both short and long term effects are 
relevant to significance.   
Intensity  refers to the severity of impact that the proposed activity will have. Officials 
must bear in mind that more than one agency may make decisions about different 
portions of an action.  When evaluating intensity, we need to consider: 
1.  Impacts that may be both beneficial and adverse (A significant effect may exist, 
and the impact of that effect has to be considered even if the Federal agency believes 
that the effect will be beneficial) 
2.  The degree to which the proposed action affects public health or safety.  
3.  The unique characteristics of the geographic area, such as its proximity to historic 
or cultural resources, park lands, prime farmlands, wetlands, wild and scenic rivers, or 
ecologically critical areas.  
4.  The degree to which the effects on the quality of the human environment are likely 
to be highly controversial.  
5.  The degree to which the possible effects on the human environment are highly 
uncertain or involve unique or unknown risks.  
6.  The degree to which the action may establish a precedent for future actions, with 
significant effects or represents a decision in principle about a future consideration.  
121
7.  Whether the action is related to other actions, and to what extent their with 
individually insignificant may become cumulatively significant impacts.  A 
determination of significance exists if it is reasonable to anticipate a cumulatively 
significant impact on the environment.  Significance cannot be avoided by terming an 
action temporary or by breaking it down into small component parts.
8.  The degree to which the action may adversely affect districts, sites, highways, 
structures, or objects listed in or eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic 
Places, or may cause loss or destruction of significant scientific, cultural, or historical 
resources.  
9.  The degree to which the action may adversely affect an endangered or threatened 
species or its habitat that has been determined to be critical under the Endangered 
Species Act of 1973.  
10.  Whether the action threatens to be in a violation of Federal, State, or local law, or 
requirements imposed for the protection of the environment.
For all these reasons, the GSA preservation staff insisted that the report had to be 
unbiased and thorough, and that is what they got.  It makes for painfully blunt reading. 
The overall assessment was that the level of density and the associated demolition 
required would result in a “major, long-term adverse effect to the site,” and that 
assessment would not, and could not be glossed over.  As the old saying goes, "You 
can clean up a pig, put a ribbon on its tail, spray it with perfume, but it is still a pig."109 
109“'Lipstick on a pig' finds origin in tiny state newspaper.” Guzman, Monica.  10Sep2008 
SeatlePi.com  www.blog.seattlepi.nwsource.com   Last accessed 16Feb2013.
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Given history and the import of this proposed undertaking, the GSA could not afford 
to be accused of taking part in an exercise designed for optics alone.
The Smith Group and the CPB knew that, when evaluating historic and cultural 
significance and assessing impacts and effects (all of which are qualitative processes), 
they had to take place within established professional practices and in accordance with 
other laws, regulations, standards, guidelines, administration and agency policies.110  
Quoting again from 40 CFR 1502.9 (emphasis added):
(b) Final environmental impact statements shall respond to comments 
as required in Part 1503 of this chapter.  The agency shall discuss at 
appropriate points in the final statement any responsible opposing view 
which was not adequately discussed in the draft statement and shall 
indicate the agency's response to the issues raised.
This is one place where that spreadsheet system of recording issues came in so useful. 
The professional credibility of the preservation staff and that of the GSA's contractors 
was at stake while working on this project.  They all would be seen as not operating in 
good faith had they not fully acknowledged adverse impacts on site at St. Es, and a 
loss of that credibility could have incited challenges, both legal and otherwise, in a 
domino-effect of repercussions that would have been felt on projects across the nation. 
If a case could have been made to involve Congress (and if the GSA could be 
portrayed as being less than truthful and diligent, such as at the Winder Complex or 
the African Burial Ground cases) it would have been much worse than dealing with it 
as the blunt truth, right from the outset.  
110  This includes the test of “a reasonable professional” as a part of the standard of care and duty of 
care stipulations existing today as descendants of English Common Law.
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By following the procedure and releasing the draft EIS document just as the Smith 
Group wrote it, without meddling with the final product, the GSA showed it was 
confident that it could stand on its expressed desire to fulfill its obligations under 
NEPA and the NHPA, while continuing to document public participation in the process 
and presenting itself as operating fairly and openly.  The DHS, with its adversarial 
approach to negotiation and preservation, was less than convinced, but kept in the 
background and away from the consulting parties.
The GSA released the draft EIS in September 28, 2007 with a copy directly to the 
NCPC.  The NCPC pointed out in its response that the draft EIS states itself that the 
proposed undertaking would have “major, direct, long-term, adverse impacts” as well 
as “adverse effects” to the National Historic Landmark campus.  These were attributed 
to:  (1) the size and nature of the construction program; (2) the loss of historic 
buildings and the landscaped setting of the campus; (3) the altered or obstructed 
viewsheds to, from, and within the campus; (4) the increased traffic in the 
neighborhood; (5) and the changes needed to the regional transportation and utility 
systems that would alter both the campus and its surroundings.  On the positive side, 
the draft EIS had pointed out that the comprehensive modernization of the 
infrastructure and introduction of the new facilities required would result in the 
rehabilitation of many of the historic buildings and their re-use for new purposes; 
however, some of the historic buildings would be demolished (6 total) to make way 
for other work on site, and much of the landscape character would be “lost to an 
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altered campus composition”111 because of the massive amount of office space being 
added to the site.   
The Section 213 Report 
Section 213 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) [16 U.S.C.  § 470u] 
states:
To assist the Council [ACHP] in discharging its responsibilities under 
this Act, the Secretary at the request of the Chairman, shall provide a 
report to the Council detailing the significance of any historic property, 
describing  the  effects  of  any proposed  undertaking  on  the  affected 
property, and recommending measures to avoid, minimize, or mitigate 
adverse effects.
In 36 CFR § 800.10(c) it specifies that Section 213 Reports may be requested when an 
undertaking affects a National Historic Landmark.  Reports have generally been 
sought for undertakings in which consultation was particularly difficult and/or 
controversial.  They must, according to the regulations, be completed in sixty days 
(unless ACHP and NPS specifically agree on a change to the time schedule), and the 
production and return of those reports must follow a specific chain of command.112 
A statement from the ACHP regarding Section 213 reports says 
111 St. Elizabeths draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).  The complete document is found at 
http://assets.stelizabethsdevelopment.com/documents/document_center/9_Chapter%206.pdf?
CFTREEITEMKEY=D98  Last accessed 19Jan2013.
112  “The ACHP Executive Director will submit a request for a Section 213 Report to the NPS Director, 
with a copy to the NPS Associate Director for Cultural Resources.  The ACHP Executive Director 
will identify in the request the appropriate ACHP staff points of contact for working with the NPS.  
The NPS Associate Director for Cultural Resources will forward the request for the Report to the 
appropriate NPS Regional Office.  The completed report will be forwarded by the appropriate NPS 
Regional Director with appropriate cover sheet, in electronic (PDF) format to the ACHP Executive 
Director, with a copy to the NPS Director and NPS Associate Director for Cultural Resources.  The 
ACHP will transmit the Report to the consulting parties upon receipt from the NPS, and shall make 
the Report available to the general public on its website.”  http://www.achp.gov/213guidance.html  
Last accessed 19Jan2013.
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“The NPS will take reasonable steps to keep the ACHP informed of the 
progress of the Report until the final Report is submitted.  The ACHP 
will  forward the progress reports to the other consulting parties upon 
request.”  
The Section 213 Report, with a sixty-day deadline, took over ten months to be 
provided from the NPS to the ACHP,  and did not arrive officially until November 6, 
2007.113  To put it plainly, the NPS missed a legally mandated deadline.  In the report, 
the NPS admits it is based on the Draft EIS, and copies-and-pastes its findings nearly 
verbatim from that Draft EIS.  It repeats the threat of de-listing of St. Elizabeths as an 
NHL because of the proposals on the table.  This report became, in essence, an 
executive summary of the GSA's Draft EIS, not at all what was intended when the 
concept of a Section 213 Report was created.
A Failure at the ACHP and the National Park Service
The proposals for the fate of the cultural resources at St. Es may have been troubling, 
but a failure on the part of the NPS to act swiftly to compile the Section 213 Report 
based on its own research,  probably altered the course of the project.  This was a 
critical report required at a critical point in the history of St. Es, and those deadlines 
are there for a reason: the timely assessment of cultural resources is vital to ascertain 
their status and the magnitude of the threat to them.  While this report was 
supposedlyy being written,  consulting party meetings continued for months and 
months, decisions were made, and the hard work of negotiation and mediation 
continued on the GSA-designed NEPA time-line.  
113 A copy of this report is included in Appendix E, and is also accessible through the ACHP website at 
http://www.achp.gov/docs/st-elizabeths-section-213.pdf Last accessed 19Jan2013.
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The NPS waited ten months to begin to write this critical but tiny six-page report, 
something they should have easily been able to provide within the sixty-day time-
frame using information at hand and a miniscule amount of research on their own part. 
Instead, NPS waited to base its report on the Draft EIS, a document created provided 
by a GSA subcontractor.  Even worse, there is no evidence publicly available that the 
ACHP tried to keep them on the required sixty-day deadline.  In the end, this brings to 
the fore the realization that the ACHP has no actual power to enforce its deadline 
against the NPS.
Why would this report have been delayed?  Information from other consulting parties  
point to budget shortfalls at the NPS as the problem.  The staff at the NPS regional 
office who were tasked with creating the Section 213 Report found themselves 
overworked and unable to respond in a timely fashion.  Ten months for a six-page 
report is clearly excessive, but it points points to a problem even bigger than the St. Es 
project:  that of a system of overlapping protections that are being systematically 
dismantled, not by legal declaration or a change of statute, but by funding cuts.  This 
inability to adequately protect cultural resources puts properties across the country at 
risk.
The GSA, for its part,  really had little to fear from the delayed Section 213 report 
because on their staff was a person who had worked at the NPS for two decades, and 
was as intimately familiar with these reports.  Since the GSA was providing the 
majority of data for the draft EIS, it knew exactly what that EIS would say:  there were 
significant adverse impacts.  The GSA probably even knew the NPS was short staffed.  
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This knowledge and the subsequent delay allowed the GSA to take eight extra months 
to set the stage for a reply to the Section 213 report and the Draft EIS, and plan the 
direction of the project into the future.  
Instead of the Section 213 Report influencing the Draft EIS, as intended when one of 
these very rare and crucial works is requested,114 we instead have placed the cart 
before the horse by making it merely an executive summary.   The release of the 
Section 213 report on time, back in March of 2007 rather than November 2007, could 
have changed the direction of the St. Elizabeths consultation.  This report could have 
provided additional ammunition in the public relations realm, for regulatory 
compliance debates, and led to a more informed legal evaluation of the  project.  It 
also would have influenced research and writing of the Draft EIS.  Providing the 
Section 213 report earlier would have provided the same critical content, as other NPS 
personnel involved in the consultation could have easily have filled in the gaps.  
Instead, the NPS and the ACHP are left, at best, appearing to have failed in their 
responsibility to act diligently and with all due speed, in the best interests of this 
National Historic Landmark.  This failure allowed the consultation for the project to 
continue on the course set by the GSA, and not necessarily within the spirit of the 
regulations laid down to protect the site.  
The failure of the NPS to place this as a top priority might be seen as a resignation to 
the inevitable, given the previously mentioned administrative pressure to move the 
114  Years go by when no Section 213 reports are requested, and less than 20 exist to date.
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project forward.  It could also be a remnant of animosity from the historic foundation 
of the ACHP decades ago, when it was brought into being by being excised from the 
NPS.  At worst, given a more cynical reading of this situation, there is no way to 
completely rule out the possibility that the delay in production of the Section 213 
report served a particular purpose.  If you had wanted to make sure this report's release 
would have minimal effect, you could not have planned better timing then to release it 
after the Draft EIS.  Then again, it could just have been overwork, priorities, and lack 
of funding for additional staff at the NPS.  The reasons behind the delay will probably 
never be fully known.
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CHAPTER  NINE
St Elizabeths Consultation: December 2007 to January 2009 
.      
In this chapter we shall cover the St. Es project from December 2007 through January 
2009.  This begins with the “pause and reflect” period, and runs through through the 
creation of the GSA 'A' team.  In the end we will cover the final negotiations, 
concessions, and agreement documents that pressed the project forward to a final 
Programmatic Agreement on December 9, 2008.
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Illustration 12: St. Elizabeths Heat and Electricity Plant.  Author photo
Pause and Reflect-  December 2007 through March 2008
In December 2007 that the St. Es project at the GSA entered a period referred to as 
“Pause and Reflect.”115  There had not been a consulting party meeting since the end of 
July 2007, and the GSA didn't re-emerge with a public plan to move forward until 
March of 2008.  However, that plan had no doubt been designed over weeks of 
internal meetings, planning, strategizing and consideration of alternatives with the 
subcontracting architects and planners.  It led to concessions, and the Programmatic 
Agreement signed at the close of the year.
Beth Savage said of this period:
There was a critical point when the GSA acting administrator was called 
to  appear  before  Congress  and   asked  about  the  master  plan  for  St. 
Elizabeths.  The question was “Will you be able to accomplish this by 
December 9, 2008?” and he said “Yes.”  Management back at the GSA's 
Central Office heard this live on TV and said “Oh my God.” 
The only way to have a chance was to pull the “A team” together and 
make  them  sit  together  for  collaboration,  in  the  same  room,  know 
everything each other was doing all day long, have a daily 15 minute 
meeting each morning- what's on the docket for today,  who's got what, 
who's handing off-  That's when I was told, “you're moving over from 
NCR, you need to be sitting in the 'war room' to make St. Es happen.”
And  so  Joan  [Brierton]  and  I  and  George  [Siekinnen]  are  placed 
[together].  And we were told “This is your full-time job, this is what 
you're  doing,  we  will achieve  this.”  Bill  Guerin  was  appointed  the 
executive for the St. Es team, and they brought over the development 
director Dawud [Abdur-Rahman] from NCR.
There was a lot of resistance... NCR  was like, “wait a minute, Central 
Office is taking this project over?”  But is also became, you know what, 
this is the GSA's project. This has to happen, so here's the team.  My first 
question [when assigned] was “do I have a choice in going over there?” 
and the answer was... [shaking head].116 
115 There is no official written record of this period's existence, its start or finish.  It is referenced only 
in verbal discussions and interviews.  However,  it forms a definitive place in the progress of the St. 
Es consultation as far as the participants are concerned.
116  Interview with Beth Savage, GSA FPO.
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In the Fall of 2007 the GSA sat back and made no public statement about the Section 
213 report at the time it was released.  As a matter of fact, it is not clear in the ACHP's 
constituting and operational regulations if a response to the Section 213 report was 
required, expected, or if a rebuttal was even allowed.117  Behind the scenes at the GSA, 
however, the wheels had long been turning.
The idea about moving the new offices for FEMA (a part of DHS) across the road onto 
the now District of Columbia-owned St. Es East campus was reintroduced.  This was 
estimated to be able to reduce density on the West campus by a total of 1.5m GSF of 
combined office space and parking.  It reduced the west campus project from 4.5m 
GSF to 3m GSF, the upper limit proposed by the consulting parties.  In addition, 
design changes were proposed to sink the proposed parking structure several more 
floors into the ground, while increasing the green aspects of the project.  
From August 2007 (the last consulting party meeting of the year) through March 2008 
(the end of the GSA 'pause and reflect' period), the consulting parties continued to 
publicly express displeasure with the process.  They continued to seek a change of 
venue as the EIS and Section 213 Reports were released.    The changes which had 
been newly proposed for the West Campus project in the Spring of 2008 relieved 
public opposition, showed GSA flexibility, and its timing proved to be an excellent 
negotiation tactic.  Site visits for the consulting parties brought focus back to the 
117 Good examples on the ACHP website include the Section 213 Report on the Presidio, another 
famously contentions project from a decade before.
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discussions, and  both regularly-scheduled consulting sessions and one-on-one 
meetings restarted.  These and other measures taken in early 2008, with promises 
fulfilled and correspondence handled like clockwork on a daily basis put the St. Es 
NEPA and Section 106 responsibilities back on schedule.  The GSA St. Es team 
became a well oiled compliance machine.
Moving Forward on St. Es,  Spring 2008
From that point,  GSA communications showed a united project vision.  Public 
relations and communications improved markedly.  Every response, press release and 
news story commentary by the GSA is perfectly stated, and on-message.   On the other 
hand, a few of the consulting parties began to distance themselves from controversial 
comments about the project, and some even contradicted each other.   The spreadsheet 
responses show a careful and deliberate process to create a record of public 
consultation and compliance, even when some outside parties or other government 
agencies decided to publicly lambast their work.  
The word of the hour was compliance.   By documenting in exquisite detail, carrying 
on regular public consultation, and controlling public relations by making preparations 
in advance (things that only occurred ex-post-facto at the Winder Complex and the 
ABG), the GSA had a  powerful tool that it could wield with extraordinary efficiency 
and effect.  As the GSA left the 'pause and reflect' period, it issued a press release in 
early 2008: 
This initiative is the greatest real hope for preserving the historic 
buildings and landscape that define St. Elizabeths as a national historic 
landmark--if not this, then the buildings and grounds will continue to 
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decay...  This is an unparalleled level of investment never before seen in 
Ward 8, one of Washington’s most underserved yet promising 
communities.  The extent of this investment is one in which only the 
federal government, certainly in this economic climate, can undertake.  It 
is this type of investment that is needed to serve as the catalyst for 
neighborhood reinvestment and revitalization and we are proud to be a 
major contributor in that initiative.118  
NCPC, DCSHPO, CFA and ACHP began to line up over the spring and summer of 
2008, and eventually helped negotiate the final Programmatic Agreement with the 
GSA and DHS.  That December 9, 2008 deadline, however, was a bit later than was 
first estimated.  As mentioned previously, in 2005 the original period for historic 
preservation consultation was set at forty days.  As will be shown, it eventually 
dragged on to four years. 
GSA and the NEPA process:  The Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
The final EIS document, dated November 7, 2008 (almost exactly a year after the draft 
was released), includes a comprehensive list of mitigation measures to be taken for the 
parts of the site where design minimization was not going to be enough.  Under 40 
CFR 1502.14, mitigation measures that had not already been included in the proposed 
action (or alternatives) needed to be addressed in this document.  According to 40 CFR 
1508.20, mitigation entails avoiding, minimizing, or rectifying impacts to the 
environment.  However, mitigation does not fully offset all adverse impacts.  The final 
EIS stated:119 
118  GSA press release quoted in a communication to the NTHP,  21Oct2008.
119  St. Elizabeths Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).  Accessible through the online public 
document center: Mitigation and commitments section: 
http://assets.stelizabethsdevelopment.com/documents/document_center/10_Chapter%207.pdf?
CFTREEITEMKEY=D99  Last accessed 19Jan2013. 
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A Programmatic Agreement (PA) will be written for St. Elizabeths that 
will describe the approved Master Plan for the development of the site, 
that will establish the actions that will be taken to avoid, minimize or 
mitigate  the adverse effects  to the NHL contributing resources,  that 
will  include  design  guidelines to  direct  the  restoration  and 
rehabilitation  of  buildings  and landscapes,  and  that  will  establish  a 
process for ongoing review of the undertaking.  
A PA is typically used when the full effects of a project on the cultural resources 
cannot be determined at the early stages of the project and, because of this, it works 
extremely well with the NEPA process.  At St. Elizabeths, the design specifics for the 
rehabilitation or additions to the historic buildings and landscape, the location and 
design of utilities and roadways, and the designs for new construction may not be 
finalized for many years.  The PA  provides a structure for continuing review as the 
site development moves forward based on funding and DHS’ operational needs.  It 
defines the parties that will participate in the review, their obligations and 
responsibilities, the time frame in which review will occur, and procedures for dispute 
resolution.  The PA will also identify activities that may be exempted from review.
As part  of the PA and to support  and provide a framework for  the 
review of specific building or site projects,  design guidelines will be 
prepared  for  the  site.   The  guidelines  will  establish  the  acceptable 
parameters for preservation and protection of the cultural resources on 
the  site,  rehabilitation  of  the  buildings  and  landscape  that  are 
consistent  with  the  Secretary  of  the  Interiors  Standards,  and  for 
sensitive, compatible design for additions and new construction.120
The GSA pulled out all the stops in the last 12 months, and the comprehensive list of 
participants and contractors in the creation of the final EIS reads like a “Who's Who” 
120  St. Elizabeths Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).  Accessible at: Mitigation and 
commitments: http://assets.stelizabethsdevelopment.com/documents/document_center/10_Chapter
%207.pdf?CFTREEITEMKEY=D99  Last accessed 19Jan2013. 
135
of top practitioners and firms.121  The Programmatic Agreement (PA) was already 
being hammered out as the final EIS was being released.  Following it was the NEPA 
Record Of Decision for the DHS Consolidation at St. Es, released on December 7, 
2008.  Following that the FHA Section 4(f) Evaluation was released on December 8, 
2008. 
The St. Elizabeths Programmatic Agreement, December 9, 2008 
One of the most important aspects of the consultation was documenting any 
agreement, and that is done through formal, legally binding Programmatic Agreements 
and Memoranda of Agreement.   A site may have one or several of each, depending on 
the complexity of the undertaking.  The Programmatic Agreement for the St. 
Elizabeths NHL was followed by several Memorandums of Agreement covering 
different parts of the project.  For the St. Es project, for example, the USCG MOA 
covers the United States Coast Guard Building, Garage, Cemetery, and the specific 
site work associated with these parts of the undertaking.  Additional MOAs for St. Es  
include:  The Security Perimeter (excluding the cemetery);  Shepherd Parkway; 
Adaptive Reuse of existing historic structures; and the Public Access Program, 
including the Gate Houses, Entrances and Firth Sterling.  It's all very complex, and all 
interrelated.  
121  The comprehensive list may be found at the St. E's public documentation center 
http://assets.stelizabethsdevelopment.com/documents/document_center/9B18B499DB6FC03562F15
2193594F896.pdf?CFTREEITEMKEY=D101   Last accessed 19Jan2013.
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The Programmatic Agreement was finally signed December 9, 2008, on the four-year 
anniversary of the GSA taking over the property from HHS.122  Even as it was being 
carried from office to office for signatures, DHS was still trying to change its content 
via the telephone, and in the end, they would be the last of the day to sign it.  
122   The full PA document may be viewed at: 
http://assets.stelizabethsdevelopment.com/documents/document_center/St.Es_ProgAgreement_Final
_812091_20100419161713.pdf?CFTREEITEMKEY=D600  Last accessed 09MAY2013
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CHAPTER TEN
Mediation, Negotiation and Push-back During the St. Es Consultation
In this chapter we shall discuss mediation, negotiation, and the methods the consulting 
parties had at their disposal to keep the process in check.  In comparison, the power of 
the GSA's PBS and its ability to act as an experienced ringleader in a process that is 
focused on compliance is discussed, and its ability to avoid lawsuits and divert 
interference to its plans.  As an example of the law of unintended consequences, 
however, short-sightedness and poor planning may have both masked another site that 
would have been more suitable fit, and may have doomed the preservation portion of 
the St. Es project to 'death by funding shortfall.'
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Illustration 13: St. Elizabeths site visit August 21, 2012, approaching Coast 
Guard Headquarters construction site.  Left to right: Thomas Otto, Beth 
Savage, Tom Richmond, Joan Brierton.  GSA photo.
Consultation, Mediation, Negotiation: What's In A Word?
On the St. Elizabeths project, the participation of the NTHP and the other consulting 
parties had a significant impact on the undertaking, driving the GSA do an exceptional 
amount of due diligence and to seek multiple alternatives.  The place of the GSA in the 
project consultation process moved between mediation and negotiation quite regularly, 
and for good reason.  At times, the GSA was the mediator in the middle of the process, 
with the consulting parties pushing back, insisting on rules and regulations, and having 
the power to take the GSA to court if they did not walk the finest and most perfect line 
for consultation to the letter of the law, or if the GSA did any work at St. Es that they 
were not pre-briefed on.  The DHS seems to be an agency that chafes under the yoke 
of oversight, and is not used to seeing opposition to its decisions.  This made for a 
client that wanted it all, and wanted it on a short timeline.  
If all you have is a mediator representing the owner of a building or site (GSA), and a 
client (DHS) who is also related to the owner, the client would generally get 
everything it wants, whether it is reasonable or not, whether it is in their own best 
interests or not.  Given the institutional size and national importance of the DHS, 
without the push-back of the preservation consulting parties on the opposite side of the 
issues, the GSA could very well have been rolled over by its much more massive 
client, whose financial resources, available manpower and national security interests 
might have led to an outcome that would have literally flattened the St. Elizabeths 
west campus.  The consulting parties prevented that from happening because of their 
tenaciousness and the clout they wielded due to the NHPA and the NEPA process,  and 
they deserve their due in this process.
139
To properly mediate or negotiate, all the data needs to be shared equally between the 
parties concerned.  By making sure everyone has an even playing field, we have the 
best chance for a solution that optimizes the total value of the outcome.  This is the 
intent of the NHPA, NEPA and all those regulations quoted in this thesis:  protection 
of our cultural resources against the actions of the Federal government, its agencies, 
and the funding of its destruction by those agencies.
Laurence Susskind, author and mediation expert, says that a mediator should be held 
accountable for an agreement that he or she mediates.  It simply isn't enough to ask 
whether the parties find the agreement to be acceptable.  He also states: 
. . . mediators ought to accept responsibility for ensuring (1) that the 
interests  of  parties  not  directly  involved  in  negotiations,  but  with  a 
stake in the outcome, are adequately represented and protected; (2) that 
agreements are as fair and stable as possible, and (3) that agreements 
reached are interpreted as intended by the community at large and set 
constructive  precedents...   Otherwise,  mediation  can  be  used  as  a 
device by which the stronger party takes advantage of the weaker, or 
they both take advantage of others.
Losing trust and respect during the St. Elizabeths mediation and negotiation process 
could impact future consultations undertaken by the GSA on other projects across the 
country.  A lack of trust could cause a prolonged consultation period,  magnify the 
chances of a public relations nightmare situation (thinking back to the Winder 
Complex and the ABG), delay a project, and make a damaging lawsuit on this or other 
projects many times more likely.  Leigh Steinberg, author of “Winning With Integrity” 
states: 
There are obvious categories of facts that exist that you would like to 
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emphasize less than others, that might point to your weak spots more 
than  your  strengths.   You  cannot  ignore  these  or  you  will  lose 
credibility...   I  have to include [those facts]  in my presentation.   The 
other party is certainly going to be aware of [those facts].  It's better for 
me to acknowledge it  up front  and address it  in  a way that  does not 
detract from my overall argument than to simply ignore it and hope it 
will not come up.123  
The draft EIS was brutally honest.  When the GSA released it, the staff members were 
fulfilling one of the other primary rules of negotiation:  be totally truthful in what you 
do chose to reveal.  Information is power, and what you reveal shows a form of respect 
to the other parties in the negotiation.  If that information is laced with hyperbole, 
exaggeration or dishonesty, the negotiator insults the other parties involved, and loses 
their trust and respect. 
Being as truthful as possible, within the constraints of client and federal government 
secrecy regulations, we can see was important to the GSA.  This was not only because 
of the professional integrity of the staff, but also any intentional dishonesty could be 
even more damaging (which is again an echo of the Winder and ABG projects).  
Because of the GSA's position in property disposition, preservation, and management 
projects, there is usually a brightly focused spotlight on it, and with the St. Elizabeths 
undertaking a lot of people had been watching and taking notes.  If the GSA could be 
seen as getting away with ignoring federal regulations, then others would try too, both 
inside and outside the government.  The need for the GSA to make the optics of the 
consultation conform to the concept of compliance was absolute.
123 Stenberg, Leigh.  Winning with Integrity: Getting What You're Worth Without Selling Your Soul.  
New York. Villard Publishing (1998), pp. 71, 72.
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Make Your Plan, Then Execute it
An effectively planned and executed communication, consultation and negotiation / 
mediation  plan can take a set of facts and use them to set an appropriate project 
framework.  By presenting this framework, the GSA was setting up the reality by 
which the discussions and consultations took place under.  In the end, the party that 
controls the parameters of that reality124 controls the negotiations, and their reality 
will, in the end, prevail.  The point was for GSA to get its view of reality out first, and 
by doing so, influence the consulting parties to convince themselves that the GSA's 
proposal made sense.  Again, I point to the eight-month delay in the production of the 
Section 213 Report by the NPS, and how that time must have been used to their 
advantage by the GSA when crafting a planned response.
It is important to note that no evidence in the research or interview process emerged of 
the PBS itself of being anything other than honorable, and no sense from the 
consulting parties that anyone thought otherwise.  This is not to say that the GSA was 
perfect, or didn't try to take the occasional scheduling shortcut.  The PBS staff is adept 
at strategy and planning project campaigns to their best advantage, as good 
businesspeople have to be.  The GSA staff was adept at moving between the roles of 
mediator and negotiator at various stages in the process, depending on what was 
happening in the public, regulatory or legal process at the time, and this flexibility 
served everyone well.
124  Assuming  the release of information and the negotiation are done in an open and honest manner.
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The controversial nature of the St. Elizabeths project involving a National Historic 
Landmark and a massive increase of building coverage and site population was not 
unexpected.  Concerns about the fate of St. Elizabeths property had been expressed by 
many parties and for many years.  However, when we consider the release of the 
interim EIS and the Section 213 report, we have to once again reconsider both the 
terms 'minimization by design' and 'mitigation' in a whole new light, not as it applies 
to the St. Es NHL, but as it applies to the actions, policies, interpretation and public 
relations efforts of the GSA.  The PBS staff assigned to this project had the experience 
and the opportunity to foresee  issues before they were encountered, and could plan 
ahead to minimize their impact on the GSA and the project.  They could pre-evaluate 
all the possible responses for mitigating problems that were undeniable, controversial, 
and  unavoidable.   It was most likely akin to being able to create a public relations 
plan for a political crisis months in advance. 
Experience In Mediation and Negotiation Is Vital
You can almost take a monkey and teach it how to write a Historic Structures Report, 
but you can't give it the experience gained from sitting on different sides of the 
negotiating table for different parties.  You can't have it learn how to negotiate serious 
issues regarding the survival of important historic sites from a book.  Political and 
negotiation knowledge, gained in the field and honed in both winning and losing 
battles,  is vital for the preservation of the field of preservation.  
Being able to accurately gauge how a proposed undertaking will be viewed is also 
important when it comes to planning your strategy.  It was this ability that allowed the 
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GSA to be the one to set the agenda for the St. Es negotiations.   A negotiation has two 
parts,  the first part being the one which sets the tone and scope of the negotiation.  
Whoever can set those rules is eventually, statistically, going to come out on top in a 
negotiated situation.  By arriving at a negotiation session with a plan, prepared and 
armed with sound facts, the other parties see that you think enough of them and their 
capabilities to have done that research and homework.  However, those taking part 
may not realize that by taking charge you have already taken a critical step toward 
accomplishing your goals, and the GSA had a lot of experienced and well-paid people 
dedicated to helping plan this campaign.  The GSA staff got off to a rough start in the 
first few months at St. Es (as I noted earlier), but in the end, they recovered 
magnificently.  How do we define winning in this case?   Is it no lawsuits, and signed 
agreements that let the project move forward?   Do we need to reconsider this outlook, 
based on whether good stewardship practices for our cultural resources are being 
served, or not?
The Carrot & The Stick
 The National Trust, as a major player in the St. Elizabeths consulting process, appears 
to have exhibited little interest in compromise.  Why would this be?  Was the NTHP 
just really bad at negotiation, mediation, and conflict resolution?  No,  far from it.    
The answer lies in the negotiation itself.  In order to progress and enhance the 
protection of the site, the NTHP and the other consulting parties had to represent the 
buildings, the landscape, and the cultural resources as a complete, inviolable entity 
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within a historic district.  They always had the possibility of litigation in their arsenal, 
something the PBS in particular desperately did not want to give them the opportunity 
to use.   Another Winder or ABG fiasco was not what the GSA needed, and the PBS 
had the long-viewpoint ability to see that.
As we saw, the National Trust was more than ready to use legal action against the 
Army at WRAMC in 1996.  At St. Es, the PBS and preservation staff helped the GSA 
take the lead in consultations, responded promptly, and acted respectfully in regards to 
both the historic resources and the consulting parties.  They did this because historic 
sites are important, but it was their job under multiple statutes to protect and maintain 
these regulatory structures.  They worked hard to insure compliance, to make sure all 
the documents had their T's crossed and their I's dotted in respect to federal policy and 
preservation practice.  However, a huge factor behind this, at least from an 
administration standpoint, was to prevent legal action from impacting the project 
schedule.  Joan Brierton stated:
The only thing that was going to allow us to do a better project was the 
law.  It was the representatives from the legal counsel's office at the 
Trust that made the project better.  So much time has passed, and the 
pain exists, but we never want to underestimate how much we gained in 
the consultation process for that site.  
The law keeps us engaged, it keeps us compliant...  but the law is also a 
loophole, because as long as you counted every penny, dotted every I 
and crossed every T, we could get done what we needed to get done. 
So does that raise a question about the strength of the law, or it's value? 
So here we are in the same position as in the African Burial Ground. 
The  project  is  done,  the  money  is  used  up.  We  don't  budget  for 
mitigation, we always say it's going to come out of project funds.  What 
do you do when the project's done?  When the project is done from the 
construction standpoint, the way our funding works, we don't have any 
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more  resources,  and  so  we  don't  have  any  funds  [left]  to  do 
mitigation.125
If government agencies were left to their own devices, no matter if we are referring to 
the Army Corps of Engineers, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NASA, the 
Federal Housing Administration, or the GSA, the results would arguably be rote and 
and perfunctory.  This is one of the reasons why the NHPA and NEPA were enacted, 
and they provide the “sticks” used by organizations such as the National Trust.  Failing 
to live up to its NEPA, NHPA section 110 and 106 responsibilities, and the 
requirements under several executive orders was not an option.  This insured that all 
the work would have to be of the highest caliber possible, with the greatest 
consideration for the input of the consulting parties (the ones that could have sued 
them and made a public relations nightmare of the project).  Showing flexibility was a 
way of engendering goodwill and showing a real determination to meet the spirit and 
intent of NEPA/NHPA Section 110/106 responsibilities: this flexibility and goodwill 
discouraged legal action by project opponents.  Beth Savage stated:
The National Trust was regularly threatening to sue us.  So what would be the 
grounds to sue us?  They were looking at NEPA, but we felt we were totally 
covered on NEPA, so what are the grounds?  This was constant throughout 
the project.126 
The fact that the threat of a lawsuit was never recorded in meeting minutes or put into 
a written communication from the Trust or other consulting parties (at least not in any 
that are publicly available) doesn't meant it never happened, either.  The closest we get 
to the written hint of such a threat comes because a majority of written 
communications from the Trust came under the signature of Ms. Elizabeth Merritt, the 
125 Interview comments, Joan Brierton, GSA, PCAB, 09Jan2013.
126 Ibid.
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NTHP Deputy General Counsel.  To each of these a senior GSA administrator 
responded with a multiple-page communication outlining the positive aspects of the 
project, noting several improvements that had come out of work with the consulting 
parties, responding to specific points in a positive fashion and showing an appreciation 
for the process to date.  The GSA used this format so often that, in time, the 
communications from the consulting parties began to take on the same format (with a 
different focus, of course).
Considering options that would balance development between the two campuses by 
moving some development just off the site went a long way toward reducing the 
proposed density on the West campus, and reducing the possibility of a lawsuit.  The 
GSA showed good faith in the process by crediting the consulting parties persistence 
for the change.  This several hundred million dollar change to the project was made by 
moving nearly one million gross square feet of office space and parking to the East 
campus (on the opposite side of the road) to house FEMA (a part of DHS), building a 
secure transportation tunnel to connect the sites, and planning to rehabilitate East 
campus historic structures to provide that space.  
This change was intended as evidence that the GSA was willing to make compromises 
for the sake of preserving the fabric of the Historic Landmark site.  The concept was 
even floated about adding a new stop on the Washington DC Metro Green Line to 
service the St. Elizabeths complex (where thousands of new workers would otherwise 
be commuting by automobile) as a positive improvement that would reduce traffic and 
147
increase investment in the community.127  By agreeing to pursue these actions in the 
later stages of negotiation (after the Section 213 Report and the GSA's “pause and 
reflect period”), the GSA took the wind out of the sails of some of the more strident 
opponents of the undertaking, and strengthened its bargaining position in the event 
that a court battle was ever undertaken.   
Despite this, on the eve of the confirmation of the PA for St. Es by the NCPC in 
January 2009, the NTHP made sure the GSA knew it was keeping up the pressure in a 
Washington Post editorial timed for maximum effect.  In part it said: 
The National Park Service calls the GSA plan "wholly incompatible" 
with the preservation of St. Elizabeths.  What's more, the government's 
own projections show that after all the tearing down and building up 
and paving over are done, the St.  E's campus still would not provide all 
the  office  space  the  DHS  needs.   The  preserved  structures  would 
effectively be walled off from public access.  In the meantime, a unique 
urban asset would be wasted, a historic treasure would be turned into a 
fortress and a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to spark revitalization in a 
long-neglected neighborhood would be lost.128
To dissect this one paragraph of the letter:  
 The National Park Service "wholly incompatible" statement was made in the 
Section 213 Report over a year before.  It had not been retracted, but since then 
the word from the administration got the NPS and the GSA back to the table 
and moved the project planning forward.
 The use of the phrase “after all the tearing down and building up and paving 
over are done” diminished the GSA's plans to save sixty-two buildings and 
127 Nothing more on this Metro Green Line change has been heard on this for some time, and recent 
articles make no mention of it even as billions are being spent on other parts of the subway system.
128 A Disaster for St. Elizabeths.  Moe, Richard, President HTHP.  Editorial.  Washington Post.  
08Jan2009.
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require the removal of only eight structures,  six of them being already listed as 
non-contributing (leaving two which were of actual concern).  It also 
diminishes the fact that the NTHP had signed onto a consensus agreement with 
a number of consulting parties in 2007 where, independent of the GSA, they 
had agreed to the destruction of  these buildings.
 The paving itself was slated in the main to conform to existing Olmsted-era 
plans, and parking garages at St. Es were being redesigned to an even deeper 
subterranean style with green roof and wall features.  A huge amount of 
parking had been moved off of the West Campus into the East campus in the 
planning change for housing FEMA.  
 The no-access issue had been a historic fact on that campus throughout its 
lifetime, and was not going to be resolved with any conceivable federal tenant 
(blast security had become standard on federal buildings of many descriptions 
after September 11, 2001, and having a campus security perimeter was going 
to be cheaper,  more effective, and less invasive to the historic fabric than any 
other method).  By moving to a campus approach at St. Es, improvements in 
the streetscape in DC was going to be the result as secure federal tenants left 
downtown.  A great deal of security-focused concern had been expressed about 
allowing the public a sweeping view of downtown DC and the Bolling Green 
Air Force base where executive branch aircraft were housed, and maintaining a 
'security-focused' tenant on the site was an important criteria.
 Even though the space needs of DHS would not be fully met at St. Es, they 
already possessed an additional campus site (The Nebraska Avenue Complex), 
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and that was going to be used to help keep less-critical functions off of the St. 
Es campus.  The NTHP president had even previously stated on June 4, 2007: 
“We recognize that GSA has explored every reasonable alternative and we 
appreciate that.”129
 The claim of a lost “once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to spark revitalization” for 
the neighborhood ignored the idea that many employees who were to be 
relocated to work spaces at St. Es would probably decide to live near there.  As 
a matter of fact, by 2012 developers were already moving to fulfill that 
prospective need.  Many amenities have begun to spring up in the 
neighborhood since construction began.
 In saying that “a unique urban asset would be wasted” instead of “destroyed,” 
the NTHP leaves the door to the future cracked open.  Every urban resource is 
not open to the public.  For example, you can't wander the grounds of the 
White House or the Pentagon at will, without an escort.  By saying “asset... 
wasted,” instead of utilizing stronger terms such as “irreplaceable cultural 
resource...  destroyed,” the NTHP has essentially acquiesced to the project, 
acknowledging a begrudging acceptance of the fate of the property being 
brought into the twenty-first century.
However, most importantly, by sending this letter as the PA was being considered by 
the NCPC (and after the NEPA and FHA determinations), the NTHP made it clear that 
it was reserving its right to bring GSA and DHS to court if they did not follow through 
with their commitments.  The GSA knows that it must continue to seek the input of the 
129   Meeting synopsis,  04Jun2007, GSA, NTHP and ACHP attending.
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consulting parties throughout the remainder of the undertaking and fulfill its legislated 
requirements.  On the other side, the letter also keeps the project in the public eye, so 
the GSA  reaps the benefit of being able to continue recording a high level of external 
involvement in the process. 
It Takes A Village
The preservation professionals at the GSA's National Capital Region and the Public 
Buildings Service's Center for Historic Buildings were formidable during the St. 
Elizabeths project.  If we look at previous interview comments, it is evident that the 
preferred strategy of the DHS at one time was to flatten the site and build new.  On the 
other side of the table, the consulting parties expressed a “save everything” attitude.    
Without that “save everything” counter-balancing view of the parties who were 
lobbying on the side of  preservation at St. Elizabeths, the pendulum would have 
swung significantly in the other direction, and the impact on the historic cultural 
resources at St. Elizabeths certainly would've been greater.  
The value that is inherent in all of us as preservation professionals is 
understood, it is recognized, we get it.  But our nation as a whole does 
not.  I think that goes back to why it was not originally a priority in 
New York at the African Burial Ground and it wasn't a priority at St. 
Es. It's because we don't start from the same point as other countries, 
where they wouldn't even consider destroying a historic property. In 
our world, newer is still better...  until the work gets done and we see 
the result.130
The comments of the GSA preservation personnel seem to show a genuine 
appreciation for the participation of these consulting parties.  The participation of 
these organizations, groups, agencies and individuals externally held the back the 
130 Interview comments, Joan Brierton, GSA, PCAB, 09Jan2013.
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more radical demands of the client (DHS), and tempered some of the political pressure 
that was brought to bear on the project.  They gave the GSA, and its subcontractors 
completing work on surveys and plans, time to do more thorough and complete 
investigations,  and to consider multiple alternatives that would not have been possible 
during a truly fast-track project.  They voiced a concern for the property that helped 
keep it as intact as possible, and in this way the project was truly a collaborative 
design effort.  As Beth Savage, GSA FPO said about the preservation of St. Es: “It's 
not to use a trite phrase, but, it takes a village.”131
Preservation at GSA:  The Very Well-Versed and Politically-Connected 800-
Pound Gorilla.
Can negotiating with the GSA be a futile gesture, like a High School squad playing 
against an NFL team?  Certainly not, but the GSA does have the resources to move 
projects forward when they follow the right steps.  In the years since the Winder and 
ABG projects, the GSA had become extremely adept at politics, public relations, and 
has acquired a detailed knowledge for the requirements of the various reporting 
agencies.  The CHB arguably has as much experience working inside the system as 
any SHPO.  It also has more staff than many SHPO offices, and has the experience of 
working with dozens of SHPOs.  Historic preservation is more than hiring architects to 
deal with materials and authenticity concerns.  It includes getting specialists on the 
payroll who can deal with a hefty helping of regulation and negotiation.   The GSA 
had the ability to hire-in or out-source talent that had previously worked at the offices 
131 Beth Savage, GSA FPO Interview, 20Nov2012.  
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of the various consulting parties, allowing an understanding that led to widening the 
scope of the preservation portion of the consultation, making possible maximal 
benefits to the interested parties.  
As a huge real estate management firm with the budget needed to produce results, the 
GSA has the ability to hire whatever talent it needs, giving it an implicit advantage 
over other participants in the process.  By working closely with multiple regulations 
and regulators, setting the precedents, working with a larger team, and understanding 
the viewpoints of the consulting parties from the inside.  The GSA had in some ways 
become preservation's 800-pound gorilla.   The point, of course, is that we want to see 
the powers of our federal government “used only for good, not for evil,”  but as with 
many terms, their definition depends on one's viewpoint.
It can be understood why the GSA created this specialized preservation group, from 
which it drew some of the personnel with the sole purpose of dealing with St. 
Elizabeths and getting a programmatic agreement in place.  This was a significant 
project, an administration priority.  Those associated with this group included GSA 
employees with decades of experience working in the Washington DC  preservation 
community.  As previously mentioned, one person had spent two decades at the 
National Park Service, specifically in the office of the Keeper of the Records.132   
Another had over two decades at the GSA after a stint working at the DC Preservation 
League.133  A third person previously worked for the NCPC, CFA and the DCSHPO.134  
132 Beth Savage, GSA CHB FPO.
133 Joan M.  Brierton, GSA CHB.
134 Nancy Witherell, GSA NCR RHPO.
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A fourth had been the NTHP's Senior Architect who, after 21 years at that 
organization, left to work at GSA's Center For Historic Buildings.135 
At the GSA, four out of the ten preservationists working in the Center For Historic 
Buildings have a degree in architecture, the rest have historic preservation degrees, 
and as a group they have a track record that could enhance any project.   As we see in 
the example of St. Elizabeths, preservationists became the lead individuals in 
documentation, research, development of the site plans, and negotiation of the 
Programmatic Agreement.  Without all of this, a National Historic Landmark property 
might not have been much worse off, and could have continued to decay until its 
condition was so compromised that there was nothing left that would've been 
economically feasible to preserve.
DHS, the Tiger by the Tail
As difficult as the negotiations were with the consulting parties, they were equally so 
with the client.  The DHS had manpower and budgeting many orders of magnatude 
greater than the GSA.  The fate of its desired $3.6 billion campus at St. Es was being 
held in the hands of a couple of dozen staffers at the GSA, in a process that the DHS 
was very much at odds with.  The DHS staff and administration saw a campus that it 
wanted to move into in two or three years turn into a process that did not even break 
ground for nearly five years.  DHS saw the release of the draft EIS document and 
section 213 reports that were seemingly designed to skewer the possibility of moving 
135 George Siekkinen, AIA, GSA CHB  www.linkedin.com/pub/george-siekkinen/11/38/811  Last 
Accessed 05Jan2012.
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into St. Es, and it appears to have disagreed with the GSA's policy of openness.  The 
GSA, however, was on point with the political and professional wherewithal to insure 
compliance and carry the work through to completion.  In addition, it is important to 
note that there were those in Washington who felt that if they could push the St. Es 
project to failure, that it could have been an impetus for DHS to have been broken up 
into a few, smaller parts.  Those forces are still at work today.136
PBS As the Circus Ringleader
Having the consulting parties at the table from the start is the way to get done what 
you want to get done, not by excluding them and figuring that you'll clean up the mess 
later.  The project got off to a rough start, with missteps that would have been difficult 
to recover from without a seasoned preservation staff on hand with significant 
negotiation and mediation skills. PBS staff were pivotal in bringing the project back 
from the brink after those missteps were made, and in making sure the information in 
the Draft EIS and Section 213 Report were released without a possible client-desired 
rewrite.  
The following question was asked of each preservation professional who was 
interviewed: “Would St. Elizabeths have survived this process intact had it not been a 
National Historic Landmark, and had instead been 'merely' listed on the National 
Register?”  The response was an emphatic “No.” Those responses were immediate 
and without hesitation.  The import of the NHL status of the site truly echoed 
136 O'Connell, Jonathan .  Washington Post, March 30, 2012.  St. Elizabeths renovation as security 
campus faces resistance.  http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-03-
30/business/35446682_1_homeland-securitysecurity-campus-project   Last accessed 05Mar2013.
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throughout the process.  In the exact opposite of the planning for the Winder and ABG 
sites, preservation at the GSA was at the forefront of the project planning at St. 
Elizabeths.  However, it was not inexpensive in many ways, and in some cases it took 
pure politics to get things done.  Beth Savage, GSA FPO said about the project:137
I think there was a critical point, when we're talking about keys to it, 
the project would not have happened without the influence of John Nau 
from Texas [Chair of ACHP]. The political pressure kept pushing it up 
to the secretary level, and  we were told that this was an administrative 
priority  and  we  needed  to  get  this  done.   It  took  very  high  level 
communication and support. Once we signed the PA and then got the 
master plan, I thanked him.  It would not have happened without his 
personal and professional vision, and his power. I still can't believe that 
it actually happened.  
  
The Legacy of the St. Elizabeths Process
“St. Elizabeths is a dinosaur” is the way it was put in November 2012 by Nancy 
Witherell, GSA National Capital Region Regional Historic Preservation Officer, who 
was working at the National Capital Planning Commission during the first few years 
of the St. Es process.138  When undertaking this large a project, the GSA really knew it 
had to go above and beyond, but nobody expected a four-year process between 
acquisition and a signed Programmatic Agreement, several Congressional budget 
delays, and another two years to start real construction on the site.  Nobody expected 
the distraction of congressional members accusing DHS of budgetary incompetence.  
When St. Es was passed to the GSA in December 2004 nobody expected the tens of 
thousands of man-hours that eventually were put into the minimization and design 
phases.  Is there the continued political will to pour into extended preservation 
137   Beth Savage, GSA FPO Interview, 20Nov2012.
138  Nancy Witherell interview, 19Nov2012.  
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consultations?  At St. Es it certainly went above and beyond the 40 days allotted on the 
schedule for historic preservation consultations.  
The stress of negotiations ended in a politically-fueled, high-power race to the 
December 9, 2008 finish line to get the PA signed.  The pressure on the members of 
the team, as you can imagine, was not insignificant.  Beth Savage, GSA FPO stated:
I literally just  walked into this place,  a lot  of bad water had passed 
under the bridge, the project was on what we are now referring to as 
'pause and reflect,'  ...on hiatus.  They were doing an internal review 
of… 'What is St. Elizabeths', 'Where can we go', 'What's the risk with 
the NEPA', 'Whats the risk with 106', 'How can we progress this'.  They 
were trying to make a decision on how to proceed and then [said]- “yes 
we  can  do  this.”  But  then  they  had  nobody to  do  it  over  at  NCR 
because  they  already  chewed  up  and  spit  out  the  people  who  had 
valiantly tried to do the right thing.139 
A Cautionary Tale, Looking Toward The Future
This cautionary tale continues, with commentary that reflects on the unsure budgetary 
climate we live in today.  Nancy Witherell states (emphasis added for clarity): 
“We can't afford to throw the kitchen sink at it anymore....  we don't 
have money for mitigation...  we do design and think smarter, but there 
is no money for even that anymore.”140 
Could St. Elizabeths be one of the last massive consultative preservation projects, 
given the current federal financial difficulties?  Because of funding, and because the 
GSA has been as much a lightning rod for federal preservation as it has worked to be 
seen as the gold standard, its role also highlights the failings of other Federal Agencies 
who never seems to show up in the limelight.  Is this absence because the GSA is so 
139   Beth Savage, GSA FPO Interview, 20Nov2012.  
140   Nancy Witherell interview, 19Nov2012. 
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visibly involved in preservation, or is it because they are better at working the system 
and avoiding bad press?  In other agencies, with the current budgetary situation the 
Federal government finds itself in, enforcement is not expected to increase.  
In 2013 the St. Es project is entering its ninth year.  The problem in executing the 
long-term vision of the project are the short-term vagaries of funding.  There were two 
years within the time of this project (FY2006 and FY2007) when funding did not 
make it through the budgeting process.  The money is literally there one day, and gone 
the next, and the budgeting process now closely resembles that seen at the mid-
nineteenth century St. Elizabeths.  Congress is so focused on a short-term approach to 
funding that its detrimental impact is being felt by projects across the country.  
In 2012 parts of the St. Es undertaking were put on hold, again because of funding.  
Beth Savage states (emphasis added for clarity):  
The whole thing was supposed to be done in 2016, and here we are 
entering 2013, and we've got a little bit, and Congress of course has 
put the brakes on it.  I don't think it was a surprise to most people.  Yes 
it's a $3.4 billion project, do we think were going to get that any time 
in the near future? Someone's come up with the phrase [from the FDA 
project] “they're going to FDA us” which means they give you a big 
chunk up front to begin, get your master plans done, here's your first 
building, and then Ssssss....  [descending whistle].  Economically, yes 
it's a huge amount of money [for the St. Es project], on the other hand 
when you look at the construction cost and how much it's escalating 
because of the parsing of all of that, it's going to be far more than $3.4 
billion.141 
141   Beth Savage, GSA FPO Interview, 20Nov2012.  
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On January 2, 2013 the American Institute of Architects stated in press release 
regarding the last-minute agreement on January 1, 2013 to avoid the 'Fiscal Cliff' 
(emphasis added for clarity):142 
So, our nation has backed away from the Fiscal Cliff, but we’re still 
much too close to it.  The element of uncertainty left by this bruising 
political battle will plague our economy for months and years to come. 
And that will only delay economic recovery and impair the ability for 
business to grow, prosper and create jobs.  This clearly is no way to run 
a government.  Americans, and the membership of the AIA, are fed up 
with Congress’ inability to work together in the best interests of the 
people of the United States.  
It is time for Congress to set aside party differences and come up with 
viable  and  responsible  solutions  that  will  foster  economic  growth, 
reward  individuals  and  firms  for  success,  and provide  incentives  to 
reinvest in their businesses.  By dedicating our efforts to focus on the 
issues instead of the politics, together we will be able to stay on the 
path of economic recovery.
Delays at St. Elizabeths have caused overall costs to increase by tens of millions of 
dollars.  In the 2009 budget the St. Es undertaking received $450M in stimulus funds 
as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) to support the first 
phase of this redevelopment.  Further funding followed, but in the budget battles that 
raged on an amount of uncertainty crept into the project's future.
December 2012:  St. Elizabeths PA Update and Death By Funding Shortfall
In the annual project update dated December 20, 2012 to the ACHP from the NCR 
RHPO, Nancy Witherell,  the impact of budget cuts is made painfully obvious:143
142   Jacob, Mickey.  FAIA, AIA President:   http://www.archdaily.com/313731/aia-comments-on-
fiscal-cliff-vote/?utm_source=ArchDaily+List&utm_campaign=123c5944de-
RSS_EMAIL_CAMPAIGN&utm_medium=email  Last Accessed 04Jan2012.
143  2012 Programmatic Agreement Report to ACHP.  Nancy Witherell, GSA-NCR RHPO, dated 
20Dec2012.
159
Due to the availability of funding, portions of phase 1 development 
have been placed on hold.  It is anticipated that they will be completed 
during future phases.   The  following phase 1 elements,  which  have 
already  gone  through  section  106  consultation  and  proceed  design 
approval, are currently on hold:
 Gate 1 VIP staff screening facility
 Gate 2 visitor center
 Gate 3, tunnel infill
 Inner security fence between gates 1 and 3
 Building 37 Hitchcock Hall – Although completion of Hitchcock 
Hall is on hold, the building will be weather – tight and have an 
activated sprinkler and fire alarm system.
 Building 52 ice house
 Building 56 powerhouse
 Yellow  brick  paving  behind  building  40  and  adjacent  to  the 
center building/bakery connector; the brick pavers were removed, 
stacked and stored for future installation
 Fountain in the courtyard between buildings 31 and 32
 Planting around building 31
 Paving path/apron around building 31
 Site work around building 52
 Stone cladding [numerous locations].
This recent document is a critical piece of the puzzle when coming to understand 
where this multi-billion-dollar project stands today.  In none of the previous annual 
reports since the PA was signed in December 2008 was there any indication of project 
impact due to funding.  From a construction project management standpoint, placing 
some of these tasks on hold in 2012 can be easily justified if they are not on the 
critical path.  However some of the work listed, such as security fencing and the work 
on Hitchcock Hall, could eventually lead to the delayed opening of the nearly 
completed Coast Guard complex if funding is not found to complete them.  
As work is delayed, reference to standard construction references, such as RS Means' 
online construction price calculator, gives us a close estimate of the financial cost of 
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holding a project hostage.  On the other hand, some costs are not so easily calculable, 
and at St. Elizabeths (with preservation, design, construction, landscape, legal and 
political factors all at play simultaneously at all times), coming to a halt on one portion 
of the undertaking does not necessarily mean coming to a full stop on another.  With 
highly diverse materials and skills needed on new construction portions of the project, 
and a different set of parameters at work on the preservation/adaptive reuse parts, 
scheduling issues can mean the loss of highly skilled individuals at all levels, not just 
architects and planners.  Although the loss of a few brick masons may not slow most 
projects, if they are specially experienced preservation masons, the story can be quite 
different: people with these type of skills are not as easily replaceable as, say, glaziers 
who work with modern curtain-wall installations or steelworkers, or excavators.  
When a preservation project schedule is impacted in the early stages, it throws into 
question exactly who will be doing the work on the trade side of the projects' delayed 
time-line, and if there will be a problem filling that slot with experienced tradespeople 
due to previous commitments. 
The government budget and financing system has become so mired down that it is 
affecting the very design process that was created to protect the nation's historic 
resources and save it money (and this includes several hundred million dollars in 
financial savings that were supposed to have been had at St. Elizabeths alone).  Joan 
Brierton said:
It's only as good as the commitment is to see it through.  What happens 
when these funding scenarios occur? No matter how stellar this building 
is, you now have a major client in a ghost town [St. Es], and you're not 
going to get any additional support for infrastructure.  [However,] we 
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will complete the project, because the the PA says we will.144
As funding is sought for other preservation projects in the federal stable, one has to 
wonder whether, if the GSA can't get the money to move forward with the rest of the 
Department of Homeland Security campus plan at St. Elizabeths, a high priority for 
the administration right there in the District of Columbia, what chance do other more 
far-flung projects have?
If  Not DHS, Then Who?  A “What If” Scenario.
As the undertaking at St. Es continues, the questions that were present at the start have 
arisen again.  Shortly after DHS made its request for a new consolidated site, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation also approached the GSA about finding space for a 
new headquarters campus.  The FBI could have been accommodated easily at St. 
Elizabeths, and it would've provided this sensitive site with a secure, long-term, 
federal tenant.  It also would have kept the FBI inside the District of Columbia, while 
still providing the development for the Anacostia neighborhood desired by 
congressperson Eleanor Holmes Norton. 
By broadening the original time-line and placing the FBI at St. Elizabeths, a case 
could have been made for placing DHS elsewhere, such as WRAMC.  However, now 
in 2012 significant development at Walter Reed Army Medical Center has taken the 
best alternative out of contention.  Revisiting the possibility of a  land-swap for DHS 
space at the AFRH would also have preserved St. Es for another purpose.  
144   Interview comments, Joan Brierton, GSA, PCAB, 09JAN2013.
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Constructing a brand new Coast Guard facility across the Anacostia River at Buzzards 
Point (instead of St. Elizabeths) would have been excellent for neighborhood 
renewal.145 
Unfortunately, a significant amount of financial and political capital has been 
expended on the St. Elizabeths process, and making a sudden reversal at this point  
beyond belief.   These examples are only possible if we are convinced that long-term 
inaction will not lead to the additional loss of historic cultural resources.  
There are several examples where the GSA has, for example, held historic courthouses 
for future development opportunities for several reasons, some of which are to protect 
their historic fabric into the future.  The optics of this retention of property plays out in 
today's financial climate as waste, where anything unused needs to be liquidated to 
generate capital, which presumably (in the public's mind) is used to pay down the 
national debt, or reduce the budget deficit.146  
At this point in time it would be politically difficult for the GSA to reverse strategy on 
the siting of DHS to the St. Elizabeths campus.  The new Coast Guard building will be 
ready for occupation in August 2013, only a few months from now.  Additional federal 
145  This location, with a line of sight directly across from Bolling Air Force Base and St. Elizabeths,  
might have been possible, however, it also has been given up for commercial development.  Now a 
soccer stadium for DC Football United is being proposed for the site.
146  For example, to a congressional fact-finding committee, the Spanish colonial-revival David W.  
Dyer Courthouse in Miami (vacant since 2008) is seen as a five or six- million dollar asset to be 
liquidated: however, the GSA knew (and the politicians did not) that it will cost any developer twice 
the building's worth to do abatement and utility work severing it from other federal properties 
nearby (therefore making it virtually unsellable to a commercial developer), or more likely, the GSA 
would have to spend $10-12m just to get it to a point where a developer will be willing to take it on.  
However, the optics remain, and so provide an easy target in the sound bite news-world we live in.  
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agency offices throughout Washington are awaiting relocation in the next few years to 
federally owned sites so as to reduce commercial leasing costs (totaling tens of 
millions of GSF): the GSA needs to fulfill these requests in parallel with new 
development possibilities for the DHS.
After the Smoke Began to Clear...  A Reconciliation?
In 2010, two years after the St. Elizabeths PA was finally signed, the NTHP published 
its three-part report “Section 106:  Back to Basics.”  In it they state (emphasis 
added):147 
... when Section 106 is not applied properly, [federal] agencies lose 
critical  opportunities  to  avoid  harming  historic  properties,  and  the 
results can be devastating for communities that value their heritage. 
All  too  often,  this  happens  because  the  Section  106  consultation 
process  is  poorly  integrated  into  federal  agency  planning,  and  is 
carried out too late to allow project plans to be changed.  However, in 
some cases, federal agencies ignore their responsibilities altogether.
In  recent  years,  the  National  Trust  for  Historic  Preservation  has 
become increasingly concerned about  whether  federal  agencies  are 
fully  complying  with  the  consultation  obligations  of  Section  106. 
While the statutory and regulatory framework of Section 106 remains 
sound,  actual  implementation  of  this  important  preservation  tool 
suffers  in  several  key  respects.   First,  ...   many  federal  agencies 
recognize  their  responsibilities  and  ensure  that  their  paperwork  is 
managed well, but tend to apply their obligations in a “rote” manner 
that gives little serious consideration to planning to avoid or minimize 
harm to historic places.  Second, other federal agencies “do not often 
understand,  or  give only perfunctory attention  to,  their  compliance 
responsibilities” under Section 106.
For  a  number  of  years,  GSA dominated  the  Advisory  Council’s 
Reports to the President and Congress of the United States in terms of 
wilful noncompliance or, at best, dilatory compliance.  
147   Barras, Leslie E.  Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act:  BACK TO BASICS.  
Washington DC.  National Trust For Historic Preservation. 2010..  Technical section, p.47.
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...   Today,  however,  GSA is  widely recognized  (and  was  cited  by 
many SHPO staff  interviewees  for  this  report)  as  exemplary in  its 
planning to protect and maintain historic properties.  A recent report 
on  the  national  historic  preservation  program  identified  GSA as 
setting “the gold standard” in its “sophistication and commitment” to 
preservation through staffing and planning.
This is quite a change in tone from NTHP  written communications with the GSA 
between 2005 and 2009.  Although portions of the report call out the GSA for past 
actions, it also seems to aim at smoothing relations.  The GSA had seen an awful lot of 
'the stick' of late, and it was time to show a metaphorical 'carrot' to counterbalance it.  
It is interesting to note that nowhere in this several hundred page document is there 
any direct reference to the St. Elizabeths undertaking that so consumed the National 
Trust less than two years before (and was still continuing at the time of its 
publication).  The GSA was being encouraged to stay on track, not only with St. Es, 
but with all its projects.
Buried in this document is also a statement that bears special consideration: 
Consultation...   is  not  “simply  providing  information”  or  sending 
paperwork to  consulting parties  and asking for written comments  in 
response.148  
As covered in Peggy Robin's “Saving the Neighborhood,” the public needs  to be 
involved in the consultation process in order for it to truly be a public process.  Simply 
shuffling papers and posting notices does not cover the responsibilities placed upon 
the government, whether federal, state or local, by Sections 106 and 110.  If the public 
is not involved at the earliest stages of the project, their possible involvement in later 
148 Ibid., p.37.
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stages will be compromised, if it happens at all.  Consultation also includes work 
between agencies and between departments inside agencies, when a policy, real estate, 
or planning group of an agency begins to look a project, the designated historic 
preservation officer and their staff need to be involved from day one.  The problem 
comes when planning is well along in the process before the historic preservation 
planning professionals are brought in on a project or undertaking, and significant 
amounts of work are rendered invalid because no one thought to consult the 
preservationists.  
At the personal level of staff relations, there was great appreciation at the NTHP for 
the work done by the GSA Center for Historic Buildings staff on the project, and an 
understanding of the extremely difficult position that they had been been placed in.  
One result of this realization may have been, at the 2012 NTHP Conference, the GSA 
Center for Historic Buildings was presented with a special award for exceptional 
stewardship.149   
Moving Forward after St. Es.
Preservation does not speak with a monochromatic voice.  If we must come to grips 
with the reality of today's financial constraints, perhaps we need to revisit the parts of 
the NHPA and the Secretary of Interior's Standards that talk about “if an object is 
significant,” and “if it is worthy of preservation.”  It’s very easy to criticize from the 
outside, to say “I never would have been able to sleep at night had I worked there.”  
149 Unfortunately, due to budgetary constraints and issues relating to GSA problems that came to light 
in April 2012, no staff members from the GSA CPB were able to attend the conference to accept the 
award.  Instead, the local GSA RHPO accepted the award on their behalf.
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The multidisciplinary nature of the preservation field is both a blessing and a curse, 
and can viewed as a weakness by those on the outside who look for solidarity and 
unity.  
When considering documenting a site with Cultural Landscape Reports, BPP's, HSR's, 
etc, and creating a masterplan, all this needs to be written for the site, not the project.  
The reason is that a site will always be there, but it could change purpose in a few 
years, and a baseline series of documents is needed to begin to consider the 
alternatives.  You might not think a site is significant now, but in fifteen or twenty 
years, that could change.  
St. Elizabeths EAST Campus & A Lack of Preservation Interest: The Sad Truth
In 1987 the federal government transferred St. Elizabeths’ 118-acre east campus to the 
District of Columbia.  The west campus remained federal property under the auspices 
of HHS, although the District was given permission to use the buildings on the west 
campus in return for being responsible for the protection and maintenance of the entire 
site and grounds.  As the DC Department of Mental Health took charge of the site.  
The city was required to develop a plan for the entire 356-acre site (both East and 
West campuses) for submission to Congress.  This plan was never accepted as 
completed, and so in 2006 the district prepared a proposal only for the East campus 
that included 2 million plus square feet of new office buildings, new commercial 
development, and new high-end apartments.
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When this submittal came forward, the general governmental and consulting party 
response was, in comparison to the West campus, one of disinterest.  The time spent 
on this project by the consulting parties was not one percent of the time that they spent 
on participating in the process at the GSA-operated side of the campus.  There were a-
half-dozen poorly-publicized public meetings that few bothered to attend, so that the 
Master Plan was signed and stamped.  This, in spite of the fact that:
 The size of the St. Elizabeths Historic District is distributed evenly between the 
East and West campuses, and the effort should have been similar.
 The two parts were in use for roughly the same period of time in history, either 
in psychiatric care or in a support function before that.
 Each side included a similar number of potentially historic buildings and both 
sides were included in the St. Elizabeths Historic District.
 The proposed development is massive in scale, overpowering the East campus 
site with new construction of a height and style that dwarfs the original 
structures and landscape.  
The differences were:
 The East campus is owned by the District of Columbia, a financially-strapped 
entity.
 The East campus was being opened up for  “a ripe commercial development 
opportunity.”150
 The GSA, over on the West campus, is a federal agency, and to put it in the 
local parlance, 'everyone knows they have deep pockets.'
150  Details and renderings of the development can be seen at 
http://www.stelizabethseast.com/development-overview/  Last accessed 18Jan2013.
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This is a case of truth being stranger than fiction.  When compared to the effort they 
expended on the GSA-run St. Es West project, the consulting parties essentially failed 
to show up.  The comparative speed at which this development passed the hurdles is 
an embarrassment on so many levels:  professional (as a preservationist), financial (as 
a citizen), and societal (business wins!).  It has been suggested that “maybe they were 
just burned out” by the St. Es West process that had been going on, to that point, for 
eight years.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
Conclusion:  Lessons Learned - 
How Can We Better Prepare For Future Preservation Challenges? 
In this concluding chapter, we ask how we can prepare for the new reality of 
“compliance” focused federal preservation.  Can cultural resources still be properly 
protected  in this time of budgetary constraints, and what will it take to do so? 
170
Illustration 14:  St. Elizabeths NHL, US Coast Guard HQ building under construction. 
The historic Center building is at the at the extreme left edge of frame.  Source: USCG 
photo
As “well-meaning” as the GSA was in undertaking the St. Elizabeths project, without 
the input of the consulting parties the outcome would have had a much different.  Still, 
at the NTHP,  Deputy General Counsel Elizabeth Merritt and Field Director Rob 
Nieweg attributed “ninety-five to ninety-eight percent” of the preservation success at 
St. Es to the GSA preservation staff working at PBS.151  
The disagreements between governmental agencies involved and the inter-
departmental pressures within the GSA was mostly held in balance by a strict 
interpretation of the law, actions of the public and private consulting parties, and an 
acute awareness of public opinion.  As we have seen, the knowledge of how damaging 
and time-consuming a lawsuit could be (had the GSA not made a “reasonable and 
good faith” effort to fulfill the intent of the NEPA and NHPA processes) kept things 
moving briskly with an attentiveness to 'compliance' with historic preservation 
concerns.  The example of St. Elizabeths shows that training in preservation law will 
be even more vital in the future if we are to protect cultural resources at the federal 
level.
When we consider a project,  a better end-product can be had through through 
planning and design.  We can involve the public more.  We can have more flexibility 
by hiring qualified organizations and individuals in all areas of a project: not just 
preservation professionals, but engineers, architects, landscape architects, mechanical 
contractors, security consultants, and more who have worked on vital cultural heritage 
projects in the past.  By utilizing these kinds of firms with more experience, we end up 
151 Elizabeth Merritt & Rob Nieweg interview comments, 21Feb2013
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with better bridging documents.  These documents leave less to fall between the 
cracks of the various disciplines, and over time, we end up with a more robust 
consultation overall, making by-in from the concerned parties easier and more 
rewarding to everyone because the final product is better through public participation 
in all aspects of the project design.
To do all this we have to explain the preservation field to the other professions.  
People need to be shown how to go through the process, not just around the one 
problem they are viewing at that moment, to see each opportunity as a continuum 
across all projects.  Preservation practitioners need to be trained to negotiate, and be 
prepared for daily interactions with their peers in other professions.  New practitioners 
need to learn these things because, as I have found through interviews, at least 50% of 
their daily workload could be engaging in negotiations.152   
Preservation professionals need to be skilled in creating value and forming consensus 
around the issues on projects, and they need to understand  politics and its use in the 
determination of a project's import.  The most seasoned and well-respected 
professionals have held seats on many sides of negotiating table during their career, 
and it is obvious from my interviews that this is a critical element for project success.
Funding continues to be a significant concern on the St. Elizabeths project, as it has 
since its founding.  This is one of the reasons that the site has so many small to 
152  Interviews with every advanced professional I talked to put their workload being 50% or greater 
engaging in negotiation.
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medium size buildings: because appropriations are fickle, and money would have to be 
spent completely before a new fiscal year arrived.  One way around this was to build 
structures near each other, and then create a connector section between them when 
funds did become available.  This does account for some of the strange layout of 
buildings on the St. Es site, and since sometimes the funding did not appear, this 
meant that some buildings just  never got connected.
The approach to work at St. Es today is similar.  After the USCG building, the intent is 
to build several medium-sized buildings, and to connect them with the historic 
buildings by utilizing enclosed passageways.  At any point when funding is not 
available, construction can stop, and then restart later.  Of course, the historic 
structures on site have been stabilized, but certainly not restored yet.  One has to 
wonder how many years of budget cuts can they survive?  The Federal Antideficiency 
Act looms large when Beth Savage says: “How do we keep our promises when they 
cut the money... who's left to speak for the buildings?”153  
The St. Es project also reveals an interesting pattern: some of the most financially 
successful preservation professionals will be part of the earliest stage of a project (like 
archaeologists, Historic Structures Report writers, and Master Plan creators).  These 
professionals will do their work, get their payment, and get on to the next project.  
Being in the later stages of a project are perilous indeed, because mitigation and late-
stage documentation funding is usually part of the construction part of the budgeting.  
When the construction of the building is done, the funds are gone.  This means that the 
153 Beth Savage interview, 20Nov2012.
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money for historic interpretive signage, reports such as Historic Building Preservation 
Plans (BPPs), and production of books or pamphlets that are supposed to be part of the 
mitigation strategy, might not happen on a project.  By the same token, presentation of 
archaeological findings should be made as early as possible to prevent funding from 
being suspended, with artifacts and research then boxed up and possibly forgotten or 
lost.  When these late-term project funding failures occur, the mitigative measures are 
left essentially incomplete, and we all suffer from that lack of closure.
At this point it is uncertain if there ever will be funding to finish all the designed-in 
minimization and mitigation at the St. Es undertaking, because the GSA has been 
significantly impacted by the financial pinch of the times.  Its budget for construction 
and renovation were cut from $1.3 billion to $362 million in 2011, and in 2012 the 
House Appropriations Committee provided no money for construction and renovation, 
(and only $280 million for GSA building repairs nationwide). The federal building 
fund was cut from $9.1 billion in 2010 to $7.6 billion in 2011.  Legislation passed by 
the House in 2012 cut it still further, to $7.2 billion, the lowest level since 2007.  All of 
this was before the GSA Western Region Conference scandal that broke in March 
2012, and it doesn't take a lot to imagine the impact that has had, and will have in the 
future.
Regarding St. Elizabeths, work continues to this day, and will do so for the next 
several years (the current time-line estimates that the project may take fifteen years, 
even though optimistic reports early in the project hoped for less than five).  The new 
Coast Guard headquarters nears completion, and the work on five historic buildings 
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that I saw being repurposed in August 2012 was moving forward with sensitivity for 
the fabric of the structures and the integrity of the site. 
The term 'compliance' needs to be better understood by all parties concerned, in the 
Federal service.  Compliance can mean meeting the minimum standard, but it can also 
mean exerting the amount of effort needed to fulfill the mandate for protection of 
cultural resources.  The GSA is the most obvious target the Federal government has, 
given recent history, and the preservation professionals at CHB help keep the lawyers 
at bay by insuring that compliance.  In contrast, however, the US Postal Service is 
almost notorious in its failure to list their buildings as potentially eligible.  The State 
Department has, as far as I can tell,  apparently never listed a single one of its 
hundreds of overseas missions on the National Register on its own.  By always 
looking to the GSA, the agency that drew attention in cases such as the Winder 
Complex and the African Burial Ground, are we being distracted? With the GSA now 
setting the standards for compliance as they go, re-defining them for the rest of the 
federal government on a project-by-project basis, are we missing the point: Is anyone 
else at the federal level (other than the Department of Interior) actually expending the 
legally required resources necessary to comply with the NHPA?  
Now that the GSA has successfully threaded the metaphorical camel of 'compliance' 
through the eye of the needle of 'consultation' at St. Elizabeths, do government 
agencies now possess a formula which can be applied toward any project, anytime, 
anywhere?  In time, society will realize that historic resources are being irretrievably 
lost due to short-sighted, politically-motivated, budgeting issues, when it becomes 
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apparent that what comes out the other side of the needle little resembles what went in 
the first.  Unfortunately, this realization will be too late to save many sites already 
irretrievably lost.  The decisions made and the planning undertaken for the St. Es 
project will have ramifications far beyond Anacostia and the District of Columbia, and 
we will be living with the effects of this ongoing construction project for decades to 
come.  
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MEMORANDUM-ORDER 
GASCH, District Judge. 
This case is before the Court on defendants' motion to dismiss on grounds of 
mootness. The Court thinks it well to set forth the facts and circumstances giving rise 
to the present posture of the case. 
I. Legal Background. 
The National Historic Preservation Act of 19661 provides that any Federal project 
shall be begun only after taking into account the effect of such project on any property, 
site, structure or object which is listed on the National Register of Historic Places. The 
statute also provides that the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation shall be 
afforded the opportunity of commenting on such projects.2 Executive Order No. 
115933 also provides that the Advisory Council shall have an opportunity to comment 
on such a project.4 
The Advisory Council on Historic Preservation ("Council") has promulgated 
regulations setting forth the procedures for obtaining its comments. In general these 
regulations provide that the agency in charge of a proposed project must determine 
whether the project will affect a Register property. If such agency finds that the project 
adversely affects a Register property (or if the Director of the Council timely objects 
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to a determination of no adverse effect), an elaborate consultation process must be 
complied with. This process includes an on-site inspection by agency head and 
Council Director, a meeting on the matter open to the public, and an opportunity for 
the Council to suggest alternative plans. 
II. Facts. 
This case began, ironically enough, on Constitution Day of 1973.5 On that day the 
General Services Administration (GSA) advised the Council that it intended to 
construct a new building for the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) in the 
1700 block of G Street, N. W., in Washington, D. C. 
The buildings in question here are four. The first of these is the Winder Building, built 
in 1857,6 which was the site of part of the War Department during the Civil War and 
from which the search for the Lincoln conspirators was directed. The Winder Building 
was listed on the Register. The second was the Winder Annex which was, as its name 
implies, an integral part of the Winder Building. Third was the Riggs Bank Building, 
erected in the 1920's, whose imposing facade was regarded as an excellent example of 
the architecture of those days. Finally, there was the building occupied by the Nichols 
Cafe, a fine Federal townhouse from the early 19th Century (one of the few specimens 
of that style in the downtown area). In its letter of September 17, 1973, GSA stated 
that it would "determine the relationship" of the new building to the old ones.7 Since it 
is a well-known physical law that two objects cannot occupy a given space 
simultaneously, the "relationship" in question would appear to have been clearly 
adversary. 
On January 7, 1974, another communication issued from GSA to the Council. GSA 
found that the new building would have something of a detrimental effect on the Riggs 
Bank Building (total demolition) but that the Winder Building would be positively 
affected. The "positive effect" would be encirclement of the Winder Building by the 
FHLBB edifice. On January 31, 1974, it entered a contract for the demolition of the 
various buildings concerned.8 
On February 5, 1974, the Council wrote GSA concerning the Riggs Bank Building, the 
Winder Annex and the Nichols Cafe, pointing out that all three buildings might be 
eligible for inclusion on the Register (and thus bringing into play the provisions of 
Executive Order No. 11593, supra). GSA adopted the useful expedient of ignoring this 
letter. On February 8, 1974, therefore, the Council sent a telecon message to GSA 
which reiterated the views expressed in the letter of February 5. The telecon also 
pointed out that the contract of January 31, 1974, appeared to be a clear violation of 
the law. GSA ignored this message also. 
Undeterred, the Council then communicated the entire problem to an appropriate 
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official of the Department of the Interior and itself requested Interior to determine the 
eligibility of the three buildings for inclusion on the Register. On the next day 
(February 14, 1974) the Council informed GSA of its action — again without 
response. On February 20, 1974, Interior determined that the buildings were eligible 
for the Register and so informed GSA and the Council. On February 22, 1974, the 
Council itself informed GSA of the decision by Interior and stated that the Council 
looked forward to the undertaking of the legally required procedures of consultation. 
On February 27, 1974, GSA did respond. By letter of that date it advised that it had re-
evaluated its proposal in light of the determination by Interior and that it had decided 
to demolish the three buildings. This judgment was accomplished only seven days 
after notification of Interior's decision, thus showing how expeditiously the 
"Government's Housekeeping Agency" can weigh the 
most delicate of artistic and historical factors. GSA did, however, indicate its 
willingness to continue in the consultation process (leading to a decision which it had 
apparently already made). On the same day, GSA representatives met with those of the 
Council. 
At that meeting, the Council informed GSA that there had been no acceptable 
agreement regarding minimization of adverse impact on the buildings in question. 
GSA apparently agreed that it would undertake no demolition of the buildings until 
after submission of the matter to a full Council meeting on May 1-2, 1974. This 
agreement was set forth in a letter from the Council to GSA, dated March 1, 1974. 
Meanwhile, on February 26, 1974, an attorney for plaintiffs herein contacted GSA and 
expressed plaintiffs' concern over the matter. Plaintiffs, through counsel, stated that 
they would file a law suit against GSA if the agency intended to continue demolition 
before completion of the consultation procedures. An official of GSA advised 
plaintiffs' counsel that GSA would not demolish the buildings until completion of the 
consultation procedures. Ominously, however, a news release on March 1, 1974, from 
GSA, stated that the agency would continue to clear the site in question. 
On March 1, 1974, then, there was some confusion regarding the position of GSA. On 
Sunday, March 3, 1974, uncertainty terminated. GSA clarified the issue by execution 
of a classic Sunday sneak attack. It sent in the wreckers.9 Before any action could be 
taken, the Nichols Cafe was obliterated, the Riggs Bank demolished (save only for its 
facade) and the Annex roof pierced. On Monday, March 4, 1974, this Court granted a 
temporary restraining order to halt demolition until the Court could act on the question 
of a preliminary injunction.10 
There followed a number of orders,11 the intent of which was to give the parties an 
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opportunity to comply with the relevant consultation procedures. The result was that a 
special meeting of the Advisory Council was set for April 2 and 3, 1974. The first 
day's meeting was to be a public session while the second day's was to be an executive 
session, closed to the public. This scheme, of course, would seem to violate the 
requirement that the meetings be public. 36 C.F.R. § 800(5)(c). 
The first day's meeting went off without difficulty. On April 3, 1974, Mr. Sampson 
expressed his view that the Council staff members were misleading and misusing the 
Council to gain their own objectives.12 Sampson warned that these machinations by 
the staff were undermining the Council's credibility and "clout."13 He stated that he 
had previously consulted with persons (on various official bodies) who had far more 
expertise than the Council staff and these persons had agreed with the GSA 
decision.14 Sampson then continued: 
“At this point you may wonder why I did not attempt to call a meeting of the Council, 
or meet with Council staff, or Secretary Morton, or somebody — before ordering 
demolition.”15 
Indeed, the Court itself has often so wondered. It need not have done so. The answer, 
said Mr. Sampson, was "simple." It was the staff again. The staff, according to 
Sampson, was intransigent, inflexible and had "the power to control and/or influence 
the Council."16 Further consultation, thought Sampson, would be futile. The legal 
requirements were thus not deemed necessary and demolition began. The "simple" 
explanation, then, reduced itself to a statement that Sampson believed that the Council 
(of which he was a member) was under the misguided tutelage of its own staff and the 
staff would never agree with Sampson's views. Therefore, further consultation was 
vain and would not be carried on despite the legal mandates. In other words, Mr. 
Sampson was the dealer and the game was dealer's choice. 
While perhaps not expressed with the purity of a classical syllogism, this logic was 
probably not without effect. In any event, the Council issued its comments on the next 
day, April 4, 1974.17 To the astonishment of all defendants, the plaintiffs were not 
happy with this exercise in participatory decision making. On April 9, 1974, plaintiffs 
returned to Court seeking leave to amend their complaint. On April 11, 1974, they 
sought another temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, pointing out 
the fact that the Council meeting was not in accord with law.18 The defendants 
serenely filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that they had now done all that was 
required. Despite this eloquent argument, the Court granted the restraining order 
(April 11, 1974). 
Also on April 11, 1974, the Court ordered the defendants to produce any tapes or 
transcripts which might exist of the April 3, 1974, Council meeting. Concerned that 
the Court had departed the path of right reason and was unduly concerned over trivial 
matters, defendants (on April 16, 1974) moved the Court to reconsider. The Court 
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denied this on the same day. This led to the revelation of Sampson's speech to the 
Council. 
The Court then extended the restraining order by subsequent order (April 23, 1974) 
and by approved stipulation (April 26, 1974). Except for two orders permitting some 
necessary work to be done on the site, matters remained at rest until July 19, 1974, at 
which time the Court dissolved the restraining order but enjoined any work which 
would affect the integrity of the Riggs building until such time as the removal thereof 
had been agreed to by the Joint Committee on Landmarks, the Commission on Fine 
Arts and the National Capital Planning Commission. 
The matter is now again before the Court on motion to dismiss. The agencies 
concerned have gone to great pains to revise the construction plans to save, where 
possible, the remaining buildings. The record now reflects GSA's regret for the 
precipitousness of its prior actions and acknowledges GSA's responsibilities, under the 
Historic Preservation Act, to consult with the Advisory Council. It notes the recent 
efforts of defendants to comply with the law. The case, say defendants, is moot. 
CONCLUSIONS 
A nation is an entity in many senses beside the political. Shared beliefs and 
experiences provide the flesh and sinew  which cover and unite the bones of political 
organization. These common beliefs and experiences are nourished, sustained and, 
indeed, sometimes created by history. Historical knowledge, then, is the life's blood of 
a people. To cut it off is to assure the eventual disintegration of the political entity. 
Congress has wisely recognized this and has provided, in the statutes here involved, 
for a careful consideration of historical values before a project which may destroy 
those values is begun. 
This is not to say, of course, that contemporary needs should be utterly subordinated to 
the remnants of the past. That would indeed be to crush the present under the detritus 
of antiquity. All that is required is that the Government agency concerned take into 
consideration the historical values which may be affected by any planned project. The 
Congress has provided a procedure whereby this may be done. The situation is not 
dissimilar to that existing under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 
except that the values protected here are less tangible, if no less valuable, than 
environmental values. 
It seems clear to the Court that the actions of GSA through April 3, 1974, were in 
contravention of the policies and procedures mandated by Congress. Since that time, 
GSA has conformed to the law, although such conformity may well have been dictated 
more by concern for this Court's coercive powers than by any general respect for law. 
It is not, therefore, without some hesitation — and even trepidation — that the Court 
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concludes that this case is moot and must be dismissed. 
The plaintiffs sought an injunction prohibiting work until compliance with the 
consultation process, an injunction prohibiting Mr. Sampson from sitting on the 
Council on this matter, a declaratory judgment that GSA acted unlawfully herein and 
an injunction ordering GSA to comply, in the future, with the National Historic 
Preservation Act. All requisite permissions were obtained. It is undisputed that Mr. 
Sampson played no significant part in the Council's deliberations. There is no further 
need for a declaratory judgment. So far as the Court is aware, the conduct of GSA, 
although redolent of the "age of absolutism," has not been duplicated in any other 
instance relating to historic preservation. That it will be duplicated must be deemed 
speculative. GSA does not dispute the impropriety of its conduct, and, indeed, 
apologizes for it. The case is moot. 
See O'Shea v. Littleton,414 U.S. 488, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974); Laird v. 
Tatum,408 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1974); United States v. W. T. Grant 
Co.,345 U.S. 629, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953); Hinton v. Udall, 124 U.S.App. 
D.C. 283, 364 F.2d 676 (1966); Brandenfels v. Day, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 374, 316 F.2d 
375 (1963). 
Accordingly, it is by the Court this 23rd day of April, 1975,  ordered that the motion of 
defendants to dismiss this action be, and the same hereby is, granted and the said 
action is dismissed. 
===
Footnotes
1  80 Stat. 915, 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1970). 
2  Id. 
3  36 Fed.Reg. 8921 (May 13, 1971). 
4. The Executive Order also requires an agency head to refer any questionable actions 
to the Secretary of the Interior for an opinion regarding the property's eligibility for 
inclusion on the Register. Id. Where the Secretary of the Interior determines that the 
property should go on the Register, the referring agency must reconsider the entire 
project in light of this classification. Id. 
5  September 17, 1973. 
6  It is one of the few pre-Civil War office buildings left here. 
7  The letter, however, made no mention of the Winder Annex or the Nichols Cafe. 
8  This appears to have been a clear violation of 16 U.S.C. § 470f, since the Council 
had had no reasonable opportunity to comment on the project before approval of the 
expenditure of funds. 
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9  Mr. Sampson, Administrator of GSA, has stated elsewhere that demolition actually 
began on Friday, March 1, 1974. See Statement by Mr. A. F. Sampson before the 
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation on April 3, 1974 (copy on file in this case). 
It is a well-known principle, however, that a plaintiff's allegations must be taken as 
true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. 
10  The temporary restraining order halted demolition until the case could be heard on 
March 12, 1974. It was later extended to March 13. On March 14, 1974, pursuant to 
the consent of all parties, the Court entered an order terminating all work (other than 
clearing rubble and the like) on the site until a hearing on the motion for a preliminary 
injunction which was set for March 23, 1974. On March 20, 1974, a similar consent 
order was entered providing that GSA would undertake no further work (with some 
exceptions) without giving five days notice thereof. 
11  See supra, note 10. 
12  See supra, note 9. 
13  Id. 
14  Id. 
15  Id. 
16  Id. 
17  The Council thus bettered GSA's own reaction time in the delicate judgmental task 
involved here. It may be that this was due to the Council's greater experience and 
expertise herein. It may be also that the Council's ability to call on one of its members, 
Mr. Sampson, who had also figured largely in GSA's decisions, speeded its 
deliberations. 
18  GSA had given notice that it intended to resume demolition. 
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APPENDIX B 
Landmarks of the St. Elizabeths Undertaking (to date)
 December 9, 2004: St. Es signed over by HHS to the GSA.
 January 14, 2005: GSA formally notifies the DCSHPO of the transfer of St. Es West 
campus property (this formally initiated the Section 110, 111 and 106 consultation for 
the GSA's Master Plan undertaking).
 January 24, 2005: The GSA formally notifies ACHP and NPS of the transfer of St. Es.
 January 14, 2005: The GSA announces a Pre-Proposal meeting for a Land Use 
Feasibility Analysis and Campus Master Plan for the West Campus of St. Elizabeths.
 January 25, 2005: The GSA St. Es Pre-Proposal meeting takes place.
 May 13, 2005: The GSA PBS issues a Certification of Need justifying the new design 
and construction of the USCG headquarters at St. Elizabeths.
 May 24, 2005: EOI solicitation deadline for firms for design of Coast Guard Master 
Plan.
 May 26, 2005: The DC Historic Preservation Review Board designates the St. Es 
historic district, including East and West campuses.
 June 7, 2005: GSA issues Notice of Intent (NOI) to prepare an EIS for St. Es West 
campus.
 June 14, 2005: Public Scoping Meeting, Master Plan for the Redevelopment of the St. 
Elizabeths West Campus.  
 September 7, 2005: Meetings with consulting parties begin.  (there were 22 of these 
meetings over the next several years).
 September 23, 2005: GSA presents plans for USCG to the OMB.
 October 11, 2005: Consulting party meeting.
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 December 9, 2005: Washington Business Journal Real Estate section article on St. Es 
development.  
 December 13, 2005: Consulting Party meeting.
 December 23, 2005:  Announcement that DHS is coming to St. Es.
 January 30, 2006: RFP for USCG construction management services.
 February 14, 2006: Consulting party tour of St. Es.
 February 14, 2006: Consulting party meeting.
 March 1, 2006: GSA Commissioner Winstead goes before the House of 
Representatives Subcommittee on Coast guard & Maritime Transportation Committee 
on Transportation & Infrastructure.154
 April 5, 2006: Anacostia community meeting hosted by Rep.  Eleanor Holmes-
Norton.  
 April 12, 2006: Letter from NTHP Counsel to GSA referencing possible Section 106 
procedural and intent violations.  
 April 27, 2006: Consulting party tour of St. Es.
 May 25, 2006: DC Preservation League places St. Elizabeths campus on its list of 
most endangered places in DC.  It renews it for 2007 (under “Historic Vistas”) and 
again in 2008.
 October 4, 2006: Public Law 109-295 (Department of Homeland Security 
Appropriations Act of 2007) passes in Congress.155
 January 12, 2007:  ACHP letter to NPS: Request for 213 Report.
 June 28, 2007: GSA issues a revised NOI to house DHS at St. Es in response to Public 
Law 109-295 (of October 4, 2006).
154 Available at http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/102077 .  Last accessed 18Jan2013.
155 This document may be found at the GPO website: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-
109publ295/pdf/PLAW-109publ295.pdf  Last accessed 19Jan2013.
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 September 18, 2007: Public Meeting in Anacostia hosted by the GSA regarding the 
proposed St. Es undertaking.
 September 28, 2007: Draft EIS published.  
 October 18, 2007: Draft EIS public hearing held by GSA.  
 November 6, 2007: Section 213 Report from NPS to ACHP.
 November 12, 2007:  Draft EIS comment period closes.
 December 2007- March 2008: The GSA 'Pause and Reflect' period occurs.
 March 2008 – Consulting Party meetings restart
 November 16, 2008: Final EIS Document is released.
 December 7, 2008:   NEPA Record of Decision (ROD) for the DHS headquarters 
consolidation was signed.
 December 8, 2008:  Federal Highway Administration issued its Section 4(f) 
Evaluation.  
 December 9, 2008: St. Es Programmatic Agreement is signed and put into force.
 January 9, 2009: NCPC approves St. Elizabeths Programmatic Agreement.
 September 11, 2009: A ceremonial groundbreaking for the DHS headquarters project 
takes place at St. Elizabeths.
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APPENDIX C
http://washington.bizjournals.com/washington/stories/2005/12/12/story2.html
Southeast's St. E's to land new HQ’s, $900M budget  
Washington Business Journal - December 12, 2005
Tim Mazzucca, Staff Reporter 
D.C.'s long-in-limbo St. Elizabeths Hospital campus will start the new  year with a new 
mission -- if not a fully fleshed-out plan -- boosted by a  $900 million investment to transform 
the blighted campus into a complex for several headquarters operations. 
President Bush voiced earlier this year his desire to move the Coast Guard  headquarters from 
Southwest's Buzzard Point to the 176-acre west campus of  St. E's. What no one knew then is 
that Coast Guard wouldn't be alone atop the hill in Southeast's Anacostia neighborhood.  The 
General Services Administration, the federal government's real estate agent for St. E's, now is 
getting ready to put out an RFP for construction management services on the project. Aside 
from the $270 million GSA  expects to pay for the Coast Guard headquarters, the RFP also 
will allot $600 million for "two additional headquarters buildings that have not yet been 
identified," according to a pre-solicitation notice. The GSA would not comment on possible 
tenants. 
GSA is expected to publish an RFP Dec. 19, looking for a construction manager to handle the 
rehabilitation and new construction on St. E's campus. Proposals will be due in mid-January.  
No size is given for the unidentified headquarters buildings, but brokers say an agency related 
to the Department of Homeland Security -- the cabinet-level department that contains the 
Coast Guard -- would make the most sense. However, whether that agency is related to Coast 
Guard or D.C.'s Unified Communications Center (UCC) is unclear.  Related to the Coast 
Guard, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (www.ice.gov), now at 425 Eye 
St. NW, will be hunting for a new base around the time the buildings could be delivered.  
On the other hand, as the city's emergency switchboard, UCC has innate ties to the Homeland 
Security Department's emergency response teams, which has brokers talking about moving a 
related federal agency -- such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency, now at 500 C 
St. SW.  FEMA (www.fema.gov) had planned to move to Potomac Center, at 550 12th St. SW, 
in 2001, but after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, heightened security standards made the 
building unsuitable for the sensitive agency. St. E's west campus could provide FEMA with 
the needed security, such as controlled access and setbacks from roads. 
Security has everything to do with GSA's new plans for the campus, which will bluntly rebuff 
any trends elsewhere toward mixed-use development.  Contrary to original plans, GSA is 
ready to construct a secure federal campus that will have little public access.  Developers and 
urban planners had hoped St. E's would have a component that would allow the public onto 
the site's bluff, where there is a full view of Washington. "This isn't something that's going to 
support the neighborhood," says Dave Garrison, senior fellow with the Brookings Institution. 
"There are some ways to divide the west campus up." Also, being a locked-up campus may 
effect commercial development along Martin Luther King Avenue. "How are they going to 
avoid the Buzzards Point problem of being consigned to Siberia?" says Garrison, referring to 
the Coast Guard's current secluded base. "If you look five to seven years out, you can see how 
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that [Anacostia] neighborhood could be a vibrant area. But when you lock the west campus 
up, who knows?" 
The federal government owns the entire west campus, at 2700 Martin Luther King Ave. SE, 
which has 61 buildings totaling about 1.1 million square feet.  All types of real estate 
professionals in the past year have been thinking about uses for the campus. Land-use 
professionals, architects, engineers and environmental surveyors all have helped in a 
feasibility study to figure out how the Coast Guard should operate and what the campus 
should look like. 
Architecture firm Perkins + Will (www.perkinswill.com) was hired in September to design the 
headquarters. GSA will ask for funding in President Bush's 2007 budget to begin construction 
on the Coast Guard headquarters. A master plan is scheduled to be completed early next year,  
but GSA wants to have a construction manager in place so building and rehabilitation can start 
while the ink dries on the plans.  
All that has led to this point: Building it. 
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APPENDIX D
 http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-03-30/business/35446682_1_homeland-security-
security-campus-project
St. Elizabeths renovation as security campus faces resistance
By Jonathan O'Connell, March 30, 2012  - Washington Post Business
Washington real estate developers Jeff Epperson and Rick Powell began snapping up land on 
Howard Road in Anacostia in 2004. It was an aggressive move in the downtrodden 
neighborhood.
The potential, after all, was great.
A new headquarters for Homeland Security — the biggest federal construction project in the 
country since the Pentagon in the 1940s — was on the way. The $3.4 billion project was 
expected to transform the sweeping grounds of St. Elizabeths Hospital into a national security 
campus and bring 16,000 jobs to the very poorest of Washington neighborhoods.
Federal and District officials have promoted the project as a savior that would finally bring 
jobs and prosperity to surrounding Southeast neighborhoods — Anacostia, Buena Vista, Barry 
Farm, Congress Heights. The work-a-day crowd with cash to spend also has signaled 
opportunity to commercial real estate developers whose business was kicked sideways in the 
recession.
Yet after 10 years of planning and two years of construction, progress is dragging to a halt as 
lawmakers feud over matters big (how to secure the nation) and small (what offices to lease). 
A tug-of-war over funding has left the project with barely enough money even to finish its first 
building, the U.S. Coast Guard headquarters.
A larger existential crisis also looms: Some in Washington are asking whether the Department 
of Homeland Security, an agency created in the days after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, should be 
dismantled.
For now, the former mental asylum — whose vacant brick buildings and placid grounds once 
served as a home to patients including the poet Ezra Pound and John Hinckley, who shot 
President Ronald Reagan in 1981 — is still planned as the agency’s home.
So much, it turns out, depends on Congress, where the Republican-controlled House has 
slimmed or rejected a series of funding requests. The delays have added an estimated $500 
million to the cost, which has ballooned to $3.9 billion, $1.3 billion of which was spent as of 
December. Initially expected to be completed by 2016, the project could now take until 2021 
or later, if it is finished at all.
The chairman of a House committee overseeing the project says most of the plan ought to be 
scrapped. And even the project’s most fierce advocates cannot say for certain when the project 
might be finished or even if it will be.
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Over on Howard Road, Epperson and Powell have watched their prospects fade. The partners 
tried to lure Wal-Mart, but it went elsewhere. They tried to land a lease for additional 
Homeland Security offices, but the government canceled the offering. In recent months, they 
tried to secure financing to build apartments on their 10 acres but found no takers.
“We’re in a bit of a holding pattern with not much prospects at this point,” Epperson said. “We 
don’t know what we’re doing. We’ve lost a tremendous amount of value in the past few 
years.”
Historic hospital
First called the Government Hospital for the Insane, St. Elizabeths was built in the 1850s as a 
grand demonstration of therapeutic treatment for the mentally ill after furious lobbying of 
Congress by advocate Dorothea Dix. Bisected by Martin Luther King Jr. Avenue SE, the 
hospital’s 183-acre east campus is owned by the District, which built a new 450,000-square-
foot in-patient mental hospital there in 2010.
Since the last patients left the federally owned west campus in 2003, it has been vacant but for 
the occasional escorted tour group or film crew (you might remember it from the opening 
scene of the 1992 Tom Cruise/Jack Nicholson film “A Few Good Men”).
That is, until the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. After President George W. Bush and 
Congress created the new security agency, the eerie and empty brick buildings quickly entered 
the discussion about where to consolidate.
The plan to house the agency there was forged on a promise that the department, created to 
coordinate the work of dozens of government agencies that play a role in securing the nation 
from terrorist threats, would be based near Congress and the White House.
A decade later, the 22 agencies that report to the department — formerly scattered under 
Justice, Energy, Treasury, Transportation, Agriculture and beyond — operate out of more than 
40 office buildings across the region. The department’s headquarters are in a space formerly 
used by the Navy, in the Nebraska Avenue Complex, but other parts are as far away as 
Herndon and Springfield — a painfully long drive in the event of an emergency that requires a 
rapid response. The campus is considered critical.
“It will help us build that culture of ‘One DHS,’ ” DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano told CNN 
at the groundbreaking in September 2009. Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman (I-Conn.), who helped 
create the agency, said, “I feel like we’ve finally given a home to this child we’ve created, 
which is finally reaching maturity.”
The master plan called for nearly all the agencies to relocate to St. Elizabeths, to new 
buildings and 52 (of 62) renovated ones. After wrangling with historic preservation groups 
that wanted to protect the quaint quality of the campus, which was designated a National 
Historic Landmark in 1991, and downsizing its plans, the General Services Administration and 
the department won approval to pack 3.8 million square feet of office space on the west 
campus and another 750,000 square feet for the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
across the street on the District’s east campus.
Shifting grounds
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Since the plan’s approval in 2009, Clark Construction and its subcontractors have removed 
more than 1.6 million cubic yards of dirt for the Coast Guard headquarters, but the political 
ground beneath St. Elizabeths has shifted even more dramatically.
Led by House Republicans, the 2011 Congress, amid the throes of deep economic turmoil, 
brought a renewed focus on austerity that has clamped the revenue streams on which many 
commercial real estate firms in Washington have long thrived.
The federal government fills roughly one-quarter of the region’s commercial office space. And 
the slowdown caused something of a panic for landlords wondering where to get their next 
rent check. Some office buildings that once relied on government tenants are now empty, with 
owners at risk of defaulting on loans.
Leases for government agencies, which formerly were approved with regularity, now 
sometimes wait a year or more for Congress to act. Historically, such leases were often signed 
for 10 or 20 years. Uncertainty about the economy and political infighting have left real estate 
developers eager to land even two-year lease extensions.
In the 2011 fiscal year, the GSA submitted or resubmitted 19 Washington-area lease 
prospectuses to Congress; 11 have been approved. Most had been trimmed considerably. For 
instance, a request for 231,000 square feet for the National Park service was cut to 158,000 
square feet. Of the five leases Congress received this fiscal year, it has approved none. The 
delays require the GSA to allow leases to fall into holdover, which costs extra and which adds 
to the agency’s administrative burden. It also flummoxes private landlords.
“These tenants are just sitting and these leases are approaching expiration. And the landlords 
just don’t know what to do,” said Darian A. LeBlanc, director of government services at the 
brokerage firm Cassidy Turley. “In some cases it is just devastating to the ability to plan what 
happens within these buildings.”
The government owns other space, some of it valuable and expensive to operate, that it allows 
to lie vacant or underutilized. After pressure from lawmakers, including Rep. Jeff Denham (R-
Calif.), the GSA moved to lease out the Old Post Office pavilion on Pennsylvania Avenue, 
which was occupied but losing more than $6 million a year. Donald Trump’s hotel company 
won a bid to turn the landmark into a 250-room luxury hotel.
More often, properties languish. That was the focus of a forum, “GSA Downsizing — A 
Perfect Storm Looming,” held by the D.C. Building Industry Association, a trade group. 
Ernest D. Jarvis, the group’s president and senior vice president at First Potomac Realty Trust, 
said disagreement on the Hill had tempered investment interest in Washington. He hopes the 
elections will lead to the “re-igniting of the local economy.”
“We hope that one party, from the real estate perspective, will control both the White House 
and Congress,” he said, “because then I think we’ll see more prospectuses moving.”
Dismantling plans
If Washington’s austerity spirit holds, the next step could be dismantling the plan for St. 
Elizabeths and perhaps even the security agency itself. In some ways it’s already begun: For 
the 2011 fiscal year President Obama requested $668 million for St. Elizabeths construction 
through the GSA and Homeland Security budgets; Congress provided $107 million.
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In the following budget, the department and GSA requested a combined $376 million, which 
the House initially cut to zero. A deal on the budget ultimately produced $37.3 million for 
GSA and $56 million for the department, just enough to finish the Coast Guard headquarters. 
The department postponed work on utilities, a stone facade along an access road and a 
visitor’s center.
Much bigger, more overt steps may be on the way. Rep. John L. Mica (R-Fla.), chairman of 
the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, which oversees GSA, says he 
thinks the master plan for St. Elizabeths ought to be chucked and the combining of dozens of 
agencies into one department, as Congress and Bush did in 2002 with a law creating 
Homeland Security, ought to be reconsidered.
“It was a time post-9/11. Bush had resisted efforts to put 22 agencies with over 200,000 people 
together,” Mica said, “but the pressure was pretty strong and usually government overreacts. 
And of course that’s what we did.”
It should be turned back, he says. On this point, Mica is joined by a number of the Republican 
presidential candidates. Rep. Ron Paul (R-Tex.), who voted against creating the department, 
has repeatedly called for dismantling it and referred to the department’s Transportation 
Security Administration as “a bureaucratic monster.” Former House speaker Newt Gingrich 
wants to move its focus to the Mexican border. “I would be willing to take half the people 
currently serving in Washington, ship them to Texas, Arizona and New Mexico,” he said in a 
September debate.
Rep. Peter T. King (R-N.Y.), who leads House oversight of the department, supports DHS and 
its consolidation but acknowledged that “because of our current fiscal challenges, this project 
will not be completed as quickly as anyone hoped.”
Mica said the agency’s mission did not require so many employees.
“There’s no way you need 16,000 people that close to the White House. And I think there’s no 
way you need 16,000 people in DHS,” Mica said. “You need some people to connect the dots, 
which was the recommendation of the 9-11 Commission.” He expects the House to become 
more conservative after the election, which could lead to a recalibration of the department and 
its headquarters.
“My prediction,” Mica said, “and remember this conversation a year from now, is that there is 
a new crowd coming, and they will be refining the DHS mission.”
Promise lost
If the plan for St. Elizabeths falls apart, so too will a second promise on which it was created 
— that the campus would contribute to the rejuvenation of Southeast Washington, where 
unemployment has floated above 20 percent in recent years.
Consider the cafeteria at the Coast Guard’s new 1.2 million-square-foot building: It will seat 
300, or one of every 12 employees at lunch time.
This was intentional, part of a plan to avoid building an isolated fortress where badge-wearing 
security workers simply drive through gates fit for the citadel on their way to homes in 
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Virginia or Maryland. Better, it was thought, to bolster the city just outside its gates. 
Employees could step out for lunch, dry cleaning, haircuts and the like.
The Coast Guard’s building is on a bluff overlooking the Anacostia River and downtown 
Washington, with views that rival those in Rosslyn skyscrapers. But in terms of food, it’s a 
long way from anywhere. Employees could get in their cars and take I-295 to Maryland or hop 
a shuttle bus off of campus to eat at . . . well . . . the former Players Lounge. Now called 
Georgena’s, the former strip club at 2737 Martin Luther King Jr. Ave. is nearly the only sit-
down option nearby.
Retailers and developers have staked positions near the campus. The Curtis family, which built 
the 19-foot-high “Big Chair” in downtown Anacostia, partnered with Four Points, a real estate 
firm with expertise in Tysons Corner. Together they plotted a broad renovation of downtown 
Anacostia, 1.5 million square feet of new development.
Victor MacFarlane, builder of the largest African American-owned real estate investment firm 
in the country, bought a stake in the city’s professional soccer team, D.C. United, and looked 
at Anacostia for a new team stadium.
Private developers bought sites near Green Line Metro stations in Prince George’s County and 
hoped to attract 1.1 million square feet of DHS office space that the agency couldn’t fit on St. 
Elizabeths.
The D.C. government also moved aggressively to develop Poplar Point, a swath of 110 
undeveloped acres along the Anacostia waterfront that mayor Adrian M. Fenty called a “once-
in-a-lifetime” opportunity to bring prosperity east of the river. Early in 2008 Fenty picked 
Clark Realty Capital from a strong pool of development teams to build 40 acres of the site into 
a $2.5 billion mixed-use community with offices, housing, retail, an international 
environmental center and 70 acres of parkland.
Soon after, the Obama administration pledged $450 million from the American Reinvestment 
and Recovery Act for redevelopment of St. Elizabeths, setting a booster rocket to the project.
But by the gray day of the groundbreaking in 2009, storm clouds for St. Elizabeths loomed. 
Though the plan had been approved only nine months earlier, many of the large streams of 
private and public investment into the area seemed to run dry.
In the wake of the recession, Four Points and the Curtis family backed off of building new 
offices. The Fenty administration cut Clark Realty loose as its Poplar Point development 
partner, as city administrator Neil O. Albert cited the “extremely challenging economic 
environment.” And MacFarlane sold his stake in D.C. United; the team is looking elsewhere 
for a stadium.
Epperson, one of the owners of the land on Howard Road, is wondering what it will take to get 
St. Elizabeths on track again. “I think it’s a political issue,” he said. “If Homeland Security 
raises to be an important security issue, they start cracking whips and they will make it 
happen. That’s sort of how politicians work. Today everyone is talking about jobs. But if 
someone drops a bomb in Washington tomorrow, it will seem pretty important.”
District’s representative
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House Del. Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-D.C.), the District’s non-voting member of Congress, 
says she is committed to seeing the project through. She points out that many of the city’s 
landmark buildings (National Archives, Federal Trade Commission, the west building of the 
National Gallery of Art) were built during Franklin D. Roosevelt’s presidency. Partly because 
the country under Roosevelt spent heavily on public works projects. Partly because he was 
president for a long time: 12 years.
Norton says a project as ambitious as St. Elizabeths requires many years and multiple 
compromises and commitments to complete. “To end it,” she said, “would be one of the 
greatest mistakes of all time.”
Norton and Robert Peck, head of the Public Buildings Service for the GSA, both acknowledge 
that the master plan may have to change. Norton said the government might have to reconsider 
the order in which to construct buildings if it can’t be sure the entire campus will be finished. 
Utility systems may have to be built piecemeal as segments of the campus are funded, rather 
than building the system at once (though that would cost less).
The GSA, under Peck, is reducing the office space it builds or leases for government workers 
by encouraging desk-sharing, telecommuting and no longer reserving space for those who are 
traveling or out sick. Ultimately Peck thinks he could bring more than 16,000 employees to St. 
Elizabeths, which would save costs elsewhere.
But will Congress come through?
“Homeland Security is still planning to move,” Peck said. “If you ask me when is Homeland 
Security going to be there, I just don’t have an answer.”
“I predict yes,” Norton said, “but I can’t tell you when.”
East campus develops
The D.C. government, meanwhile, presses on with the east campus, where — after proposing 
to Northrop Grumman that the contractor move its global headquarters there — it has nearly 
completed a master plan that calls for a mixed-use neighborhood with convention spaces, 
offices and cybersecurity research facilities. Mayor Vincent C. Gray, a resident of Southeast, 
has made development of east-of-the-river neighborhoods a top priority and proposed $113.5 
million for the campus. Gray is expected to begin seeking private development partners for the 
site this year.
Even with the uncertainty that emanates from the federal campus across the street, there is 
some private sector interest in the District’s parcel.
Microsoft may open an Innovation Center, a hub to help local residents and businesses access 
new technology opportunities, that would be its first in the nation. Victor Hoskins, the city’s 
deputy mayor, said Microsoft officials toured St. Elizabeths three times and that the company 
was “very serious.” about the idea.
“I’d like to see a Johns Hopkins-type of technology park,” Hoskins said.
A California company, MVM Technologies, plans to open an ink-jet manufacturing facility 
there.
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And the Chesapeake Crescent Initiative, an alliance of nine research universities in the region, 
imagined St. Elizabeths east as a science and innovation hub. Co-founded by former AOL 
executive George Vradenburg and Georgetown developer Hebert S. Miller, the group helped 
the city, Carnegie Mellon and Virginia Tech land a $532,000 grant to help spin off 
opportunities from DHS into the local technology community.
By December, at a meeting on St. Elizabeths convened by Chesapeake Crescent, the 
innovators were optimistic — even as they puzzled over the delays. Vradenburg asked: “How 
do you get things moving on the east campus well before things are happening on the west 
campus?”
Chris Cummiskey, Homeland Security’s deputy under secretary for management, addressed 
the crowd of academics, government officials and business leaders who were eager to hear 
about the future of his agency, which procured $83.3 billion in business from the private sector 
between 2005 and 2010.
“Things have changed,” Cummiskey said. “The ground has shifted. And we’ve had to be agile 
in response to those challenges. Sometimes better than others, quite honestly.”
Even so, Mica said, these are frugal times. Going forward, he expects the department “will be 
more of a security, connect-the-dots agency.”
“Congress isn’t going to give it money. And I think in the future things will only go there 
when we have a need for it,” the congressman said. “It may not be what was initially 
envisioned.”
195
APPENDIX E
  SECTION 213 REPORT TO 
THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION 
U.S. Department of the Interior’s Evaluation of the Government Services 
Administration/National Capitol Region Rehabilitation of  Saint Elizabeths 
Hospital National Historic Landmark (West Campus) for the Department of 
Homeland Security National Headquarters, Washington, DC 
Prepared by National Historic Landmarks Staff 
Northeast Region, National Park Service 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
November 6 , 2007 
Introduction: 
St. Elizabeths Hospital West Campus, a 176-acre tract located between Martin Luther 
King Junior Avenue and Interstate Highway 295 in the Anacostia section of 
Washington, D.C., is currently under consideration for redevelopment as the 
headquarters facility for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This parcel is 
part of the St. Elizabeths Hospital National Historic Landmark (NHL) District 
designated by the Secretary of the Interior on December 14, 1990. On January 12, 
2007, John M. Fowler, Executive Director of the Advisory Council on Historic 
Preservation (ACHP) requested a special ‘Report on the Redevelopment of St. 
Elizabeths’ under Section 213 of the National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. 
§470u) “detailing the significance of (the) historic property, describing the effects of 
(the) proposed undertaking on the affected property, and recommending measures to 
avoid, minimize, or mitigate adverse effects.”  During the past nine months NPS staff 
has visited the NHL District, reviewed draft documents and followed the deliberations 
of the St. Elizabeths Hospital West Campus Consulting Party Working Group. On 
October 1, we received the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) that defines 
the alternative plans developed by the Government Services Administration (GSA) for 
the reuse of the West Campus as the DHS Headquarters. The DEIS serves as the basis 
for the comments on evaluation of effects. This report speaks for the historic resource 
and explains how the DHS plans would affect this unique National Historic Landmark, 
a resource that is by definition one of the most important cultural, architectural and 
historical properties in the United States. 
Significance: 
St. Elizabeths Hospital is nationally significant for its associations with historical 
persons, events, architectural innovation and landscape design for over a century from 
the time that it was founded in 1852 until the mid-twentieth century. This legacy was 
officially recognized by the Secretary of the Interior's designation as a National 
Historic Landmark in 1990. The resource includes some 336 acres located along both 
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sides of Martin Luther King Junior Avenue. The West Campus, the subject of this 
review, is the heart of the NHL District and contains the most significant landscapes, 
views, and buildings. 
St. Elizabeths represents one of the most progressive, reform movements in our 
nation’s history: the humane and professional treatment of the mentally ill. It is the 
direct descendant of initial improvements in mental health care begun in Great Britain 
in the late 18th
 
century which influenced Quaker reformers at Friends Hospital in 
Philadelphia in 1818 (NHL 1999) which was developed further at the Institute of the 
Pennsylvania Hospital in Philadelphia (NHL 1965) by Thomas S. Kirkbride during the 
second quarter of the 19th
 
century. Dorothea Dix, one of the most noted humanitarians 
and social reformers of the mid-19th
 
century was instrumental in bringing the 
Kirkbride plan to Washington in 1852 and having it serve as the basis of the newly 
authorized federal hospital for military personnel suffering from mental illnesses. This 
movement towards humane and constructive therapeutic treatment of the mentally ill 
represented one of the most important reforms that swept the nation in the 19th
 
century, transforming it from a culture of ignorance and neglect to one of respect and 
hope. One of the most important aspects of this approach was providing clean well lit 
and ventilated facilities in the midst of a healthy, rural environment where the patients 
could enjoy beautiful landscaped settings and benefit from working in the gardens and 
on the associated farm. This early form of occupational therapy became a hallmark of 
the Kirkbride approach. 
Dix worked closely with Charles H. Nichols who served as the first superintendent 
until 1877. Dix (who had an apartment on the grounds of the hospital) and Nichols 
engaged Thomas U. Walter, one of the leading American architects of his generation 
(who served as Architect of the Capitol from 1851 to 1865 during the expansion of 
both the Senate and House wings and the construction of the present dome) to design 
the Center Building, the first and most prominent of the early buildings. This building 
improved on the Kirkbride design and was embraced by Kirkbride himself in his 
seminal work “On the Construction, Organization, and General Arrangements of 
Hospitals for the Insane”. Known as the “echelon plan” or “the improved linear plan” 
it “afforded the best facilities for the thorough classification and inspection of the 
Patients, for ventilation and external views, and for the requisite sub-division of the 
pleasure grounds.” This plan, first developed at St. Elizabeths, and still very much in 
tact today, was widely copied at hospitals throughout the United States during the last 
half of the 19th
 
century. The Nichols tenure was also distinguished for its treatment of 
African Americans within the same institution as whites, although in segregated 
buildings. 
In the late 1870s, Nichols’ successor, William W. Godding, pioneered the first “cottage 
plan” scheme which was to become the standard in the field. This plan consisted of a 
series of detached buildings that featured dormitory accommodations and day rooms. 
In 1902 Godding’s successor initiated another major expansion of the facility with 
thirteen buildings designed by the Boston firm of Shepley, Rutan and Coolidge. Four 
of these buildings were the first to appear on the East Campus, which had been 
primarily reserved for the farming operation up to that time. Most of these structures 
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survive today offering a view of mental hospital construction over six decades that 
traces the developments and theories of the mental health field. 
In addition to the architectural and landscape aspects of treatment the Hospital was 
noted for many other progressive practices. One of the first full-time pathologists in a 
public mental hospital was hired in 1884. Clinical and scientific research expanded in 
the early 20th
 
century, leading the field in introducing these functions to mental 
treatment facilities. In 1907 experimental psychologist Sheperd Ivory Franz took 
charge of one of the first psychology laboratories. St. Elizabeths pioneered 
psychotherapy, hydrotherapy and malarial therapy. Superintendent William Alanson 
White, through his association with Carl Jung, made St. Elizabeths one of the first 
American hospitals to introduce psychoanalysis, and by 1914 created the position of 
clinical psychiatrist. 
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the Landmark’s significance is its high level of 
physical integrity. Not only did the site bear witness to an important transition in the 
way we care for the mentally ill, the evidence of the history on the site is remarkably 
complete. The evolution of the field of mental health is displayed through out the 
grounds like a great text. The many phases of development have been carefully 
maintained over the past 150 years and exhibit both historical importance and 
considerable beauty making it a potential site of both instruction and pleasure. 
Effects of the Proposed Undertaking: 
The GSA proposed adaptive reuse of the West Campus of St. Elizabeths Hospital 
poses serious, permanent alterations and destruction of multiple character defining 
features of the NHL. The cumulative effect of these changes would require that the 
facility in its entirety be considered for dedesignation as an NHL. The landscape 
setting so important to the design concept that forms the basis of Landmark 
recognition will be profoundly altered, both in terms of experience of the resource 
within the property and in the views of the property from outside the NHL, 
particularly from central Washington. Some buildings will be demolished and the 
degree to which surviving buildings will be altered remains to be determined, but the 
security measures inherent to the new use will most certainly require significant 
alteration.
Archeological resources will be destroyed and potential for public use and enjoyment 
of the Landmark and its landscapes would be virtually eliminated. It also seems 
reasonable to conclude that once the new use is in place, any further alterations and 
demolitions by DHS could not be prevented. In general, this proposal calls for a 
treatment of the Landmark that is wholly incompatible with its most character defining 
features. 
The DEIS provides the basis for these summary conclusions and states the results of 
such a reuse on page iii of the executive summary. These conclusions regarding 
impacts bear repeating here: 
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1. Direct, major, long-term, adverse impacts on historic buildings would occur due 
to demolition of some of the buildings on St. Elizabeths West Campus, and to 
the construction of three entrances along Martin Luther King, Jr. Avenue. 
2. Direct, long-term, major, adverse impacts to St. Elizabeths’ landscape would 
occur as features outlined in the Historic Resources Management Plan would 
be impacted. 
3. Due to new construction, there would be direct, major, long-term, adverse 
impacts on views to and from the Center Building, views from the lawn, views 
from Congress Heights Historic District, and views to and from the West 
Campus Cemetery. 
4. All alternatives would result in direct, major, long-term, adverse impacts on 
archeological resources due to new construction. 
We concur with these conclusions and commend GSA for accurately assessing the 
damage that will occur to the NHL if this program is carried out. The uncontested 
destructive impacts of the proposed program are so extreme that negotiations have not 
produced an alternative, or the promise of one, that could possibly preserve the NHL. 
All four alternatives presented including the preferred alternatives, impose an 
extraordinary burden on the historic resource. 
Historic Landscape: The 176-acre West Campus will receive over five million square 
feet of new construction. (By comparison, The Pentagon, one of the largest buildings 
ever constructed for the federal government, contains 3.7 million square feet.) The 
historic landscape has been analyzed in two major studies in recent years and the 
components of the design have been summarized in figure 4-3 of the DEIS. As 
described, all of the landscape in the West Campus is significant and integral to the 
historic resource. The vast majority is identified as either “Therapeutic, Ornamental 
Landscape”, which includes and surrounds the main building clusters, or as 
“Agricultural Landscape” or “Cemetery and Woodland Slope”. All of these landscapes 
are crucial to the integrity and significance of the NHL. Only the 27.4 acre “Service 
Landscape and Ravine” area might offer non-intrusive, relatively non-visible 
opportunities for new construction. However, all alternatives call for the construction 
of massive buildings on all landscape parcels with the exception of Landscape Unit 3, 
the Agricultural Landscape. At the very least, 27 of the 60 identified historic landscape 
features (DEIS p. 5-37 to 45) will be adversely affected. Of course, the new 
construction will not only directly damage landscape features, it will fundamentally 
alter the existing relationship of the historic campus buildings. The alternatives site 
plans all specify massive new construction in close proximity to historic structures that 
would fundamentally alter the views from and to the buildings and limit their views, 
both within the complex and from outside the complex. 
Security Requirements and Public Access: In addition to the extensive new 
construction, the plans require improved security fencing. The existing perimeter 
fences and walls would need to be supplemented with an additional inner chain link 
fence that would establish a twenty-foot no-mans-land within the outer perimeter. The 
new security fencing will impose a major incompatible design change. The security 
requirements for the site will also result in severely limiting or totally eliminating the 
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possibility for public access to the site and the interpretation of its social and 
architectural history. At this stage in the Hospital’s history, more than a hundred and 
fifty years after its founding, public access in the context of a new use would provide 
an important opportunity to interpret the nationally significant history of the site. 
Barring such access, while not in violation of the Secretary’s Standards, confronts the 
broader objectives of federal preservation programs. 
Historic Buildings: Each of the alternatives would produce serious direct impacts on 
the historic structures. At least 29% of the contributing historic structures are slated for 
demolition with a cumulative loss of between 11 to 23% of historic floor space (DEIS 
p. 5-21). Specific treatments of buildings are generally not being considered at this 
level of planning. However, many of the buildings contain significant interior spatial 
arrangements as well as original finishes and features that will likely pose problems in 
the reuse of the structures. The structures cannot be treated as “shells” for purposes of 
the reuse plan without seriously compromising their integrity. 
Recommended Measures to Avoid, Minimize, or Mitigate Adverse Effects: 
The reuse plan set forth in the DEIS does not allow for any constructive criticism that 
would realistically bring the proposal into conformity with the Secretary’s Standards 
for the Treatment of Historic Properties and the avoidance of consideration of 
dedesignation of the NHL should it be implemented. Reuse of the West Campus as a 
federal office park is certainly possible and would seem to offer the most likely 
opportunity for preserving the historic buildings and landscape. However, an 
appropriate reuse would require doing what GSA and other federal agencies have done 
at other major facilities, and begin with the evaluation of the historic resource, setting 
appropriate design guidelines and developing reuse proposals that work within the 
guidelines. We do not question the spatial and security needs set forth by DHS; we 
find that they are incompatible with the St. Elizabeths Hospital NHL. Pursuing the 
DHS program at St. Elizabeths will, in the words of the DEIS, have “direct, long-term, 
major, adverse impacts” on the Landmark which will deprive the nation of one of its 
most historically significant and unique resources. We encourage DHS to seek an 
alternative location where they will be free to pursue their needs unencumbered by 
historic architectural and landscape resources that were not intended to house their 
type of facility. 
GSA is fully capable of pursuing an appropriate approach to St. Elizabeths; one that 
can both provide federal agencies with desirable facilities and at the same time offer 
the public a major cultural and recreational amenity. The opportunity presented by the 
reuse should preserve the site both for its intrinsic historic significance and its general 
appearance as one of Washington, D.C.’s most distinguished visual landmarks. 
The potential to provide the general public and particularly the city neighborhood of 
Anacostia with a spectacular park and an interpreted historic resource is clear. St. 
Elizabeths West Campus served its originally intended use for nearly one hundred and 
fifty years. The vacating of the West Campus by the Hospital in itself constitutes an 
adverse effect that should be mitigated. Rather than now subjecting this noble resource 
to a use program far beyond its capacity, St. Elizabeths should be brought into the 
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public light that it so richly deserves. This federal facility, born of the most ambitious 
motives of social reform, humanitarian treatment and medical progress, deserves to be 
respected materially and interpreted to the public. The achievements of a woman of 
conscience such as Dorothea Dix, and inspired hospital administrators such as Charles 
H. Nichols, and renowned architects such as Thomas U. Walter, deserve to be a part of 
the public historical experience. The fact that the historic use of the hospital largely 
prevented such public use is no reason why we, as a nation, should not seize the 
opportunity at this time. The destruction of St. Elizabeths Hospital is not necessary. To 
do so will mark a sad failure in the management of our most important historic sites. 
Documents Included In the DOI Section 213 Review: 
--St. Elizabeths Hospital National Historic Landmark Nomination, NPS, 1990.
--Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Department of Homeland Security 
Headquarters at the St. Elizabeths West Campus, General Services Administration, 
September 28, 2007. 
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APPENDIX G
 GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
HISTORIC PRESERVATION OFFICE
December 20, 2006
William B. Bush
Assistant Regional Administrator
Public Buildings Service
National Capital Region
United States General Services Administration
301 7th Street, SW
Washington, DC  20407-0001
Dear Mr. Bush:
I think it is appropriate at this point to offer some observations on the planning process 
for  the  West  Campus  of  Saint  Elizabeths  Hospital  and  on  consultation  about  the 
project in accordance with the National Historic Preservation Act.  I hope that if all  
parties  can understand each other,  redevelopment  can move forward expeditiously, 
resolving the remaining issues.  
Sections  106  and  110  of  the  Act  require  federal  agencies  to  consider  how  their 
undertaking or approval of projects might affect historic properties and require them to 
try to avoid or limit harm to those properties.  You are undoubtedly aware that Saint 
Elizabeths  is  a  National  Historic  Landmark  (NHL),  the  highest  level  of  historic 
designation available.  Section 110 requires agencies to  consider the preservation of 
historic  resources as part  of their  property management responsibilities.   It  further 
requires that “[p]rior to the approval of any Federal undertaking which may directly 
and adversely affect  any National  Historic  Landmark,  the  head of  the  responsible 
Federal agency shall,  to the maximum extent possible, undertake such planning and 
actions as may be necessary to minimize harm to such landmark...”  In other words, as 
applied to the present case, it requires GSA, the owner and lead agency, to create a 
plan that would seek to preserve Saint Elizabeths as well as to serve other ends in 
terms of use.
   
The  Section  106  regulations  outline  at  length  the  process  for  trying  to  resolve 
anticipated  adverse  effects.   As  you  know,  we  have  embarked  on  the  public 
consultation specified to resolve such effects.  While GSA’s consultants have produced 
some very nice graphics and good surveys of the significant resources present at Saint 
Elizabeths, the meetings for the last several months could be characterized as simply 
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adding more detail to the  development alternatives that were initially presented—as 
opposed  to  creating  or  discussing  a  bottom-up  plan  for  the  site  or  modifying  or 
reconsidering any of these alternatives in order to avoid or minimize adverse their 
effects  on the historic resources present.   I  have observed a significant amount  of 
confusion  and  frustration  among  the  participants  in  the  Section  106  consultation 
because there is little concrete response to the many comments made (in truth, there 
are  sometimes  objections  but  never  overt  agreement),  only  assurances  that  the 
substance  of  the  comments  are  being  relayed  to  decision-makers  higher  up  or 
addressed in an eventual Environmental Impact Statement.  It may go without saying 
that a consultation is something of a give-and-take process, but it is nonetheless stated 
to be so in the governing regulations.   
I fear that there is a misunderstanding current among some agencies in this region that, 
with the combination of reviews under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
and  the  National  Historic  Preservation  Act  (NHPA),  the  process  of  the  former 
somehow trumps the intent of the latter.  The coordination of NEPA and Section 106 
reviews is encouraged for the sake of convenience and avoiding duplication,  since 
they are both public processes and because NEPA addresses preservation issues as 
well as other environmental concerns.  But it has been our experience that when NEPA 
and 106 reviews are combined, the aims of the latter often suffer for it.  The typical  
NEPA process begins with a public scoping meeting at which a project is introduced; a 
draft EIS or EA is later distributed; written comments are accepted up to a certain 
deadline; the agency then produces a final EIS, hopefully taking into consideration 
comments made (but at least publishing them) and issues its Record of Decision and 
proceeds  with  the  project.   There  can  be  more  public  consultation,  but  there  is 
frequently not.  And that is the crucial distinction.  According to Section 106, if there 
are adverse effects anticipated for a project of the size and complexity of the Saint 
Elizabeths redevelopment, there is active consultation with interested parties, usually 
of a face-to-face nature.  In such a case as this, NEPA allows for such a degree of 
public participation.  Section 106 requires it.  
The Section 106 regulations explicitly address what happens when the reviews are 
combined and the NEPA process is followed.  Section 800.8 of the regulations (36 
CFR Part 800) discusses coordination with NEPA.  Among other things, it states that 
consulting parties should be prepared to consult with agencies “early in the NEPA 
process, when the purpose of and need for the proposed action as well as the widest  
possible  range  of  alternatives  are  under  consideration.”   The  NEPA process  and 
documentation may be substituted for the Section 106 procedures outlined in Sections 
800.3 through 800.6 if certain standards are met.  Among these standards is the need 
to “[i]dentify historic properties and assess the effects… in a manner consistent with 
the standards and criteria of Sections 800.4 through 800.5...”  Survey of the resources 
present has occurred, but there has been no follow-up analysis nor acknowledgment—
let alone proposals for avoidance, minimization or mitigation—of effects posed by the 
present undertaking(s).  Finally, Section 800.8(v) requires that the agencies “[d]evelop 
in consultation with identified consulting parties alternatives and proposed measures” 
that might avoid, minimize or mitigate effects.          
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It  is  difficult  in  the  present  case  to  wholly  separate  procedural  from substantive 
problems with the present undertaking(s), but in light of the regulations cited above, I 
would suggest the following procedural issues thus far:
 Initially, as of January 2005, the undertaking was to be the master planning of 
the  campus,  presumably  from  the  ground  up,  based  upon  the  site’s 
characteristics and needs, as is typical for such a plan.  Such a plan would be 
expected  to  conclude  with  a  sense  of  the  “carrying  capacity”  of  the  site 
balancing  the  preservation  interests  with  development  that  would  make 
possible  both  the  preservation  and the  provision  of  infrastructure.   Months 
later,  and  before  any  consultation  had  commenced,  the  undertaking  was 
changed to the planning for “up to 4.5 million gross square feet,” including the 
Coast Guard headquarters and other, unnamed agencies.  While it is legitimate 
to accept  the necessity of siting an individual,  mandated project within the 
campus,  it  does  not  obviate  the  need  for  continued,  true  planning.   It  is 
consistent with your agency’s Section 110 responsibilities and with Executive 
Order 11593, Sections 2(d) and 2(f); with Executive Order 12072, Sections 1-
102,  1-104,  1-203(c)  and,  to  the  extent  that  any historic  buildings  will  be 
proposed  for  demolition,  Section  1-105(b);  with  Executive  Order  13287, 
Section  4;  with  GSA’s  October  19,  2003  order  (ADM  1020.2)  relating  to 
historic  preservation;  and with  the first  site  selection  criterion published in 
GSA’s  Design Excellence Policies  and Procedures handbook.   There really 
needs to be an analysis of the level of investment needed to provide necessary 
infrastructure and building preservation/rehabilitation and of the level of bulk 
that becomes too much for the site to bear while retaining its character—i.e., a 
lower and an upper limit.  It is only on the basis of such solid analysis that an 
undertaking  that  poses  serious  adverse  effects  upon  a  National  Historic 
Landmark should even be considered.  At present, we are proceeding with a 
vague notion that simply because there is a lot of demand for high-security 
space in the region, most of the Department of Homeland Security should be 
relocated to Saint Elizabeths.  In the absence of any specific justification, the 
alternatives  proposed  for  the  sake  of  NEPA review  appear  arbitrary  and 
unfounded.   We understand  that  the  levels  of  development  presented  were 
derived from a Jones Lang LaSalle study, but we have not seen the study and 
thus are not familiar with its premises or reasoning.
 The  three  general  levels  of  bulk  proposed  as  NEPA alternatives  were  first 
presented  in  a  May  2005  meeting  of  reviewing  agencies  prior  to  any 
introduction or scoping meeting or any plans for 106 consultation.  It is helpful 
in a scoping meeting to present a wealth of information about the proposed 
undertaking(s),  but these initial  bulk studies were not presented at  the June 
2005 scoping meeting  despite  their  availability  (see  NCR Public  Buildings  
Service St. Elizabeths West Campus Scoping Report, July 2005).  Without fully 
sharing the available information, the public was deprived of the opportunity to 
anticipate and address all likely issues.  Still more unfortunate is the fact that, 
with the exception of rearranging some of that same bulk, the alternatives have 
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not fundamentally changed since last summer, despite very pointed requests 
for  consideration  of  additional  or  substitute  alternatives.   The  Council  on 
Environmental Quality’s  Memorandum for General Counsels, NEPA Liasons,  
and Participants in Scoping states that, through the scoping process, public 
participants “have access to public officials before decisions are made and the 
right to explain your objections and concerns….  [Y]ou have a responsibility to 
come forward early with known issues.  In return, you get the chance to meet 
the responsible officials and to make the case for your alternative before they  
are committed to a course of action.”  Federal agencies are advised that their 
“main interest is in getting a proposal through the review process.  This interest 
is best advanced by finding out early where the problems with the proposal are, 
who the affected parties  are,  and  where accommodations can be made.   In 
several  cases,  we found that  the compromises made at  this  [scoping]  stage 
allowed a project to move efficiently through the permitting process virtually 
unopposed.”
 In the absence of genuine planning derived from GSA analysis of the site and 
potential  program,  the  consulting  parties  have  been  conducting  their  own 
analysis of the alternatives’ adverse effects.  Consistent with Congresswoman 
Norton’s vision for the site, the consulting parties have always accepted the 
premise  that  a  lot  of  bulk  is  justified  and  necessary  for  redeveloping  the 
campus.   Consequently,  they  requested  early  and  repeatedly  additional  or 
substitute  alternatives  reflecting  a  reasonable  balance  (based  upon  real 
analysis)  between  preservation  and  new  construction.   It  was  clear,  for 
instance,  that  the  alternatives  representing  the  lowest,  “1.5-million-square-
foot” level of development are not viable, and GSA has no interest in pursuing 
them  for  the  purposes  of  analysis  or  actual  use.   Representing  merely 
mothballing half the campus (and in one alternative, fencing it off, with no 
possible  street  access),  they  are  neither  suitable  as  addressing  preservation 
goals nor planning/redevelopment ones.  To simply not plan a large portion of 
the campus is not a responsible or comprehensive way to approach planning 
and merely kicks the problem of reuse down the road.  This is not to say that  
no  1.5-million  scenario  is  possible,  only  that  it  seems  the  1.5  million 
alternatives  would  be  summarily  dismissed  as  inadequate  to  meet  reuse 
demands.   As  shown,  there  was  little  use  including  them in  the  draft;  the 
consulting parties  have repeatedly requested studying instead or in addition 
levels of two to 2.5 million square feet.
 We  have  been  given  an  idea  of  the  desired  bulk  for  the  Coast  Guard 
headquarters and of the fact that the agency prefers a single, new building to 
accommodate it.   While  we understand that  the Coast Guard has produced 
some alternative designs for a headquarters, these have not been presented for 
consultation.   We understand that  there  was a  presentation  of  headquarters 
designs at a GSA peer review with other federal review agencies at the end of 
June,  and  all  of  the  alternatives  were  located  at  the  present  warehouse 
(Building 118) site, a site favored by the GSA commentary on the concepts. 
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These  alternatives  were  presented  only  three  weeks  after  I  was  told  by  a 
representative of the Coast Guard that the agency had no preferred location on 
the campus.  While we have always maintained that that location is suitable for 
redevelopment,  too  much  bulk  there  would  be  problematic  for  reasons  of 
inward and outward views and encroachment upon the Civil War cemetery and 
the  Center  Building  precinct.   We  have  maintained  that  the  area  around 
Buildings 60, 66 and 68 is a commodious site preferable from a preservation 
point of view for several reasons.  We ask that the designs for this central piece 
of the site plan be provided for review by the consulting parties as soon as 
possible.  
 GSA has  maintained  that  planning  for  the  site  would,  and  would  have  to, 
proceed without necessarily regarding the specific programmatic preferences 
of  likely  projects/tenants  if those  potential  tenants  were  not  quickly  
forthcoming with statements of those needs.  But until two weeks ago, we had 
no  specific  information  on  DHS’s  program  other  than  an  unsupported 
statement from its representative that the agency wants—in fact, needs—the 
full 4.5 million gross square feet proposed in the highest-density alternatives 
presented by GSA and will walk away from the site entirely if it does not get it.  
Such a position is unresponsive to the legal mandates of NEPA and the NHPA 
and logically inconsistent with a simultaneous claim that the department has 
nowhere else to go.  We are fairly certain that DHS had not supplied GSA with 
this information (the size and make-up of the components) until recently either. 
Nonetheless, no bona fide independent planning or analysis had gone forward, 
apparently frozen subject  to  a  DHS claim on the property at  that  agency’s 
desired intensity of development. 
 The  consulting  parties  were  told  on  several  occasions  that,  despite  being 
selected without the benefit of any consultation, the bulk alternatives presented 
by GSA would be assessed fairly and even-handedly in accordance with NEPA 
regulations.  But in addition to the DHS statements of need for this particular 
site,  GSA  representatives  have  privately  and  publicly  admitted  that  the 
intention is to construct the 4.5-million-plus alternatives, again defeating the 
letter and spirit of NEPA and the NHPA.  The most recent occasion of which I 
am aware was a November 3, 2006 presentation to the District of Columbia 
Building Industry Association in which Dawud Abdur-Rahman stated that “We 
are trying very hard to achieve that density on this site.”  In a meeting two 
weeks  ago  between  the  project  team,  myself,  and  a  representative  of  the 
Advisory Council  on Historic  Preservation,  the  team suggested that  it  may 
drop the appearance of continuing to consider less than the 4.5-million-square-
foot-plus  approaches,  and  certainly  the  consideration  of  the  1.5-million 
alternatives.  The Department of Homeland Security National Capital Region  
Housing Master Plan certainly has done so, referring only to “evaluating three 
development scenarios of 4.5 million gross square feet for office space plus 
parking that meets DHS’s minimum density need.”
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 After consultant presentations illustrating the historic resources present on the 
campus, the nature of the consultation meetings has been mainly the further 
detailing of the proposed bulkier alternatives—rather than a grappling with the 
problems that those present.  In recent months, we have had presentations on 
parking, security, and storm water management, all of which will have their 
own effects on the character of the campus and thus aggravate the effects of the 
underlying  bulk  of  the  development.   The  fact  that  these  details  are  being 
added  now suggests  a  real  possibility  that  those  who  took  the  decision  to 
pursue the 4.5-million-square-foot alternative(s) may not have had sufficient 
information at that time in order to make an informed choice.
 The  summary  of  the  site  selection  process  for  DHS  facilities  that  was 
ultimately presented to the consulting parties has now been incorporated into 
the October 2006 Department of Homeland Security National Capital Region  
Housing Master Plan.  It is slim and uncompelling.  It has the appearance of an 
executive summary of another report, as yet unseen, and does not demonstrate 
the need for specific co-location of constituent agencies.  While an argument 
for  consolidation  sounds  plausible  if  one  accepts  the  rationale  for  the 
department,  there  are  no  figures  offered  comparing  alternative  costs  of 
development including for the transportation improvements; comparing costs 
of presently leased space versus new construction including support for the 
assertion of present inefficiencies; comparing costs (or even security benefits) 
of concentration versus dispersal; or presenting analysis of all of the pros and 
cons of potential sites aside from mere floor area available—in other words, 
the basics one would expect from a study.  While they must be known by now, 
the  “Campus  Occupancy Plan”  does  not  offer  actual  numbers  in  terms  of 
personnel nor square footage required for each of the DHS components, nor is 
there any accompanying rationale for why any particular component must be 
collocated with any other—other than the overarching policy argument that 
concentration is better.  Naturally, we recognize that this document was not 
produced  by  or  necessarily  for  GSA,  but  GSA is  nonetheless  proceeding 
according to its conclusions.  If Congress is going to use this document to take 
an  informed  decision  on  the  broader  DHS consolidation,  then  the  nation’s 
elected representatives deserve to be shown a stronger basis for the various 
assertions in it.   Its arguments are also germane to the consultation.  I will  
address issues with the Housing Master Plan under separate cover.
 The  site  selection  process  also  eliminated  immediately  any  “reasonable 
alternatives not  within the jurisdiction of the lead agency”—including such 
ideas as land swaps or cooperation with the Department of Defense—contrary 
to NEPA requirements for an EIS (see reference below).  One example we have 
recommended  is  consideration  of  a  land  swap  with  the  Armed  Forces 
Retirement  Home  in  order  to  site  a  portion  of  DHS  there.   AFRH  is 
entertaining  private  proposals  for  an  approximately  4.5-million-square-foot 
development in the Home’s southeast portion.  The inclusion, and dismissal, of 
such an idea in the Department of Homeland Security National Capital Region  
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Housing  Master  Plan is  offered  as  an  example  of  such  consideration  of 
alternatives not within the agencies’ jurisdiction.   Upon closer examination, 
however, it proves a counter-example, as this option was dismissed out of hand 
instead of being truly entertained.  The DHS Housing Master Plan erroneously 
states that “the property would also not likely be available in a timely manner” 
when it is common knowledge that AFRH is interested in starting construction 
as soon as physically possible.  More important, the site is rejected because 
AFRH  expects  revenue  through  a  ground  lease  on  the  land.   And  this  is 
precisely the reason that we proposed a swap: since GSA has a number of 
marketable urban and suburban sites that are not suitable and AFRH simply 
needs  revenue,  such  land  is  fungible  and  exchangeable.   We  have  also 
recommended  closer  cooperation  with  the  Department  of  Defense,  which 
maintains several large, secured and, some might argue, underutilized parcels 
in the National Capital Region.
 I need not tell you that, as a major landholder and manager in this region, GSA 
has a broader responsibility to plan for the use of its land.  Naturally, there is  
no way that you could have expected the need for a DHS campus prior to the 
creation  of  a  DHS.   Ideally,  planning  for  Saint  Elizabeths  would  have 
commenced  when  GSA took  title  to  the  property—or  even  before.   But 
planning must continue despite the cropping up of immediate demands so that 
one is not buffeted by events but can present and support a reasoned approach 
to responding to such demands.  If the matching of sites and tenants continues 
as a function primarily of the timing of the termination of office leases, then 
there will tend to be a substantial number of instances of fitting square pegs 
into round holes.  We would encourage closer agency cooperation with the 
National Capital Planning Commission on long-range planning in this region.
I am sure you would agree that, in order to resolve the anticipated adverse effects of an 
undertaking,  one  must  first  recognize  and acknowledge them.   While  all  of  the 
alternatives  involve  demolition  of  historic  buildings  and  the  agency-preferred 
alternatives would demolish a couple dozen, the idea that such an action constitutes or 
creates  adverse  effects  is  presently only to  be  inferred.   The Federal  Preservation 
Officer  for  DHS  has  been  silent  through  the  consultation  process,  which  is  odd 
considering that this project is likely the largest and most historically sensitive that 
DHS will ever undertake.  Meanwhile, we have no analysis of effects on landscapes 
and  views  and  of  the  visual  effects  of  such  substantial  bulk  and  scale  and 
encroachment upon the overall setting and the cohesiveness of the campus.  We all 
must comply with the provisions of the Section 106 regulations cited above requiring 
that agencies “[d]evelop in consultation with identified consulting parties alternatives 
and proposed measures” that might avoid, minimize or mitigate effects.  But we have 
no indication that  such alternatives are being developed nor measures  proposed to 
avoid, minimize or mitigate.   
We  are  hopeful  that  a  Draft  Environmental  Impact  Statement  will  manage  to  go 
beyond mere form and not only fully describe but conscientiously address and resolve 
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the adverse effects.156  Given the public and private insistence of the DHS and GSA 
personnel upon 4.5 million gross square feet of office plus a couple million square feet 
of  parking,  storm  water  retention  ponds,  and  a  helipad  on  a  National  Historic 
Landmark campus, we are concerned that the EIS may not grapple with the immense 
preservation issues in a sufficiently rigorous fashion.  Again, the intent of the relevant 
law and regulations is to formulate alternatives that best avoid adverse effects, not to 
choose a preferred alternative and then try to improve it at the margins.
Ultimately, all problems are substantive; the reason for following proper procedure is 
to arrive at a reasonable outcome, and we are not there yet.  I would be willing to 
detail all of the specific adverse effects anticipated (beyond what has been done in the 
consultation meetings), but an analysis of particular effects is now more important and 
more appropriate  coming from GSA and DHS.  The one overarching,  inescapable 
conclusion is that the proposed bulk is simply too great.  We disagree strongly with the 
statement of the Department of Homeland Security National Capital Region Housing  
Master Plan to the effect that “all the full build (4.5 GSF) master plan alternatives can 
preserve  and  protect  the  important  tangible,  as  well  as  intangible,  historic 
characteristics of  the campus while  ensuring operational  effectiveness.”   Certainly, 
when an undertaking entails the demolition of a couple dozen contributing structures, 
one has to conclude that the bulk responsible is problematic.  The bulk would also 
create scale and setting issues relative to the remaining historic buildings; will destroy 
or  visually  harms  historic  landscape  and  archaeological  resources  beneath  it;  will 
impede or impinge upon views within or from the campus, and will dominate views 
from the outside in.  It is simply a function of the limits of the burden such a property 
can take.  And even if 4.5-plus million were shown to be an appropriate upper limit, 
156 NEPA regulations, Section 1502.1:  “The primary purpose of an environmental impact statement is 
to serve as an action-forcing device to insure that the policies and goals defined in the Act are infused 
into the ongoing program and actions of the Federal Government.  It shall provide full and fair 
discussion of significant environmental impacts and shall inform decisionmakers and the public of the 
reasonable alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts or enhance the quality of the 
human environment….”
“§ 1502.14 Alternatives including the proposed action.
This section is the heart of the environmental impact statement. Based on the information and 
analysis presented in the sections on the Affected Environment (§ 1502.15) and the Environmental 
Consequences (§ 1502.16). It should present the environmental impacts of the proposal and the 
alternatives in comparative form, thus sharply defining the issues and providing a clear basis for choice 
among options by the decisionmaker and the public. In this section agencies shall:
(a) Rigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives, and for alternatives 
which were eliminated from detailed study, briefly discuss the reasons for their having been eliminated.
(b) Devote substantial treatment to each alternative considered in detail including the 
proposed action so that reviewers may evaluate their comparative merits.
(c) Include reasonable alternatives not within the jurisdiction of the lead agency.
(d) Include the alternative of no action.
(e) Identify the agency's preferred alternative or alternatives, if one or more exists, in the draft 
statement and identify such alternative in the final statement unless another law prohibits the expression 
of such a preference.
(f) Include appropriate mitigation measures not already included in the proposed action or 
alternatives.”
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you would have to concede that any changes in construction or any (likely) future 
growth would by definition be problematic.  Failure to address this point is a further 
weakness.  The bulk proposed and the associated security measures, parking, storm 
water retention ponds, etc. put pressure upon every point.  Beyond some point, there is 
no way that the bulk can be re-arranged so as to eliminate these effects or make them 
tolerably respectful of the NHL.  We believe that the “high-density” alternatives, while 
saving some of the major buildings and some of the landscapes, would destroy the 
character of the campus.  
For  the  sake  of  comparison,  a  few years  ago  the  District  of  Columbia  Office  of 
Planning conducted a study of Saint Elizabeths for the purpose of a redevelopment 
plan.  That study came up with a proposed 2.7 million gross square feet to be on the 
West  Campus,  with  nearly  one  third  consisting  of  the  adaptive  reuse  of  existing 
buildings.  The total for the entire campus, East and West, was under 5.4 million.  And 
these numbers were produced independent of and prior to the same sort of mandated 
preservation review that is occurring now for the West Campus and were thus subject 
to  adjustment.   When  the  Urban  Land  Institute  studied  the  West  Campus  and 
concluded  that  residential  is  the  most  suitable  use,  the  panel  estimated  new 
construction of 570,000 square feet of condominiums and 25 single-family infill units 
which, in addition to adaptive reuse of historic buildings, would have surely totaled 
less than 1.5 million square feet.  Sure, more bulk could have been proposed in either 
scenario, but both organizations took very seriously the necessity of preserving the 
character of the campus.  In addition, these square footage numbers are not directly 
comparable  to  the  bulk  proposed  for  DHS,  because  in  the  private  development 
scenarios  much of  the  parking would  have  been placed below the  new buildings, 
whereas the present high-security alternatives add substantially to the overall above-
grade bulk by separating parking into independent structures—and thus creating even 
more impervious surface and greater demands for storm-water management.  With the 
parking included, the total development is comparable to the size of the Pentagon—
but unlike the Pentagon, it is not to be placed at a previously undeveloped site a hub of 
highways and public transportation but rather perched on a prominent, treed hillside 
within  a  National  Historic  Landmark  district  and  between  low-density  residential 
communities with limited highway and subway access.  The Department of Homeland 
Security National Capital Region Housing Master Plan  suggests that the proposed 
bulk is acceptable because it is arranged in such a way that the ratio of the total area to 
be occupied by the footprints of existing and proposed buildings is at a one-to-four 
ratio to the entire area of the campus.   It is unclear from where this standard was 
derived  (no  design  guidelines  have  yet  been  devised),  but  again,  for  the  sake  of 
comparison, the ratio of built to unbuilt area (including circulation, yards and parking) 
in many predominantly rowhouse neighborhoods—a very distinct pattern from that of 
campuses—is about one to three.  And the idea of aggregate footprint doesn’t fully 
capture the impact of bulk.  A rowhouse neighborhood would be characterized by two- 
and three-story buildings instead of the proposed two to six.  Both relative the height 
and relative distance of objects affect impressions of bulk and space.  A better measure 
of total bulk is the floor area ratio (FAR), which incorporates an understanding of the 
effects of footprint, height and massing together.  In addition, the fact that a substantial 
portion of the site is slope (and another portion is proscribed by the eagle protection 
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zone) indicates that the effective density on the buildable portion is higher and the 
buildings more crowded.
We all still have the opportunity, prior to any approval of this undertaking, to plan and 
to take any actions necessary to minimize to the maximum extent possible harm to this 
NHL,  as  required  by  law.   To  that  end,  I  would  strongly  encourage  GSA’s 
responsiveness to the substance of this matter as much as possible and as quickly as 
possible in accordance with statute.  DHS has conceded that, even with all the bulk 
proposed, the site is not sufficient to accommodate all of its Washington offices.  Thus, 
there will continue to be DHS facilities elsewhere.  The essential question then is, how 
much, of what, is appropriate in each place?  Again, it  is logically inconsistent for 
DHS to assert both that it has no alternatives to putting its requested bulk and program 
and that it will walk away from the site entirely if not satisfied.     
GSA has engaged very talented consultants whose work has been extremely helpful in 
understanding the challenges.  It would be helpful, even crucial, to add an economic 
analysis  balancing  the  campus’s  needs  for  development  and  retention  of  original 
fabric.  I look forward to working with your consultants and the consulting parties in 
trying to find a solution that accommodates federal office needs while respecting the 
National Historic Landmark.  In any case, we will continue to strive to make any plan 
better.  If your agency is determined to pursue the 4.5-million-plus alternatives alone, 
however, it is our fear that we may not be able to conclude a Programmatic Agreement 
for such a plan.  We believe that the Secretary of the Interior will also have to report to 
Congress the potential threat to the National Historic Landmark.
Sincerely,
Timothy J. Dennée
Architectural Historian
cc:  Anthony Costa
William Guerin
Rolando Rivas-Camp
Hector Abreu-Cintron
Thomas Luebke
Patricia Gallagher
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